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The premise of this dissertation is that copyright law should exist to benefit 
primarily the public not the copyright holder. The current licensing schemes and 
copyright protection that favor copyright holders are viewed as running counter to the 
primary purpose of copyright legislation. Increasingly, the U.S. is moving toward a 
society where “owning” cultural works is not allowed and users of digital creative works 
are becoming mere licensees locked into restrictive licensing agreements imposed by 
copyright holders. The current copyright law has also failed to keep up with new ways 
that consumers of digital content interact with cultural works in their daily lives.   
This dissertation questions in particular how the first sale doctrine, one of the 
“safety valves” within the copyright system, can and should play a key role both in 
curbing structural tendencies toward overprotecting copyright and in re-establishing the 
fundamental rights of consumers. The first sale doctrine serves the important purpose of 
extinguishing the copyright owner’s right to control the subsequent disposition of that 
particular copy after its initial distribution.  
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, this study seeks to move beyond 
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the existing knowledge of the origin, application, and development of the first sale 
doctrine by providing an in-depth look at the ebook ecosystem where the doctrine plays 
out in conjunction with other socio-cultural factors that have shaped the current political 
and economic conditions and copyright regime with regard to ebooks. Second, drawing 
on the notion of cultural democracy rooted in democratic copyright theories, this study 
critically explores the doctrine’s ability to further the public’s interest in the wide access 
to and use of copyrighted works in the digital age.  
This dissertation is concerned with the implications of cultural democracy in a 
digital environment, including policy recommendations to reform and update the current 
copyright legislation. Ultimately, this study develops a framework to protect the rights of 
digital content consumers by promoting cultural democracy as one of the primary goals 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Do users really “own” digital content when they buy a digital book, digital 
music, or computer software? In most contemporary circumstances, the technical answer 
is no. Most digital works allow copyright owners to choose among several distribution 
models that favor the licensing model, and licensing in principle does not bestow 
ownership rights on those who use the “licensed” product. In a time when users are 
transitioning their use of media products such as books, photographs and music to digital 
formats, it is logical that they bring many of the expectations cultivated on the basis of 
those earlier non-digital material content forms to the new digital forms. Buying an ebook 
results in having a book to read, even if it is on an electronic device. But not actually 
owning that book does surprise the ebook user. It comes as no surprise that copyright 
owners who want to extend control over their content choose a licensing model instead of 
transferring ownership of their works permanently to users. Licensing offers the prospect 
of permanent control and recurring income. Unfortunately, it also comes at a cost to the 
broader public and to the shape of public goods everywhere.1  
                                           
1 Another important issue that digital technologies have brought up is related to copyright law’s unclear 
treatment with regard to temporary reproductions. Even to access or transfer digital works on the Internet, 
one needs to make “copies” of them on his or her computer’s random access memory (RAM) or similar 
medium, and making temporary copies, under some circumstances, can be interpreted as a violation of the 
exclusive reproduction right of the copyright owner. It is worth noting that whenever one runs a computer’s 
RAM and other parts of the computer. Those copies are essential in using the program. Lawmakers 
implemented a provision to prevent computer program users from being subject to copyright liability by 
owning a copy of a computer program and making another copy of it to use the program. This law is based 
on the logic that the owner of the copy should have a right to use it (Siy, 2013). 
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This study seeks to problematize the current copyright regime by exploring the 
origin, application, and development of the first sale doctrine and its ability to balance the 
public’s interest in the wide access to and use of copyrighted works with the property 
interest of copyright holders in the digital age. Historically, public interest considerations 
such as the limited duration of protection, the fair use doctrine, and the first sale doctrine 
have been the subjects of statutory exceptions and limitations imposed on the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights. Those considerations are supposed to serve as a “safety valve” 
preventing the complete self-interest of the copyright holder from imposing an undue 
burden on users’ freedom to access and use copyrighted works. In this, these safety 
valves are often juxtaposed to arguments regarding the utility of extended copyright 
protections for incentivizing creators. The ever-increasing copyright protections 
witnessed in the late 20th century onward necessarily raise questions about the extent to 
which and in what ways the current copyright system threatens the countervailing 
interests, namely the public’s intellectual freedom, free flow of ideas, creative works and 
information, and freedom of expression.  
Among those statutory considerations, this study focuses on the first sale 
doctrine, which extinguishes the copyright owner’s right to control the subsequent 
disposition of a particular copy after its initial distribution. I argue that the applicability 
of the first sale doctrine to digital copyrighted works sheds light on how the public 
interest can play a key role both in curbing structural tendencies of over-protection of 
copyright and in re-establishing the fundamental rights of consumers. The matter of the 
rights of consumers is a critical discursive and deliberative factor in understanding the 
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path of the first sale. The specific case of ebooks is used to explore an iconic case of 
digital content that butts up against centuries-old traditions and values surrounding a 
prominent way that important ideas and discoveries have circulated. The book and the 
ebook comprise a lightning rod of sorts to explore the limitations and potentials of 
copyright to contribute to society as it was meant to.  
 The original intent of copyright is to carve out an ecology where the creation and 
use of informational and cultural works are promoted (Litman, 2010). However, the 
dramatic expansion of intellectual property rights, in general, and copyright, in particular, 
raises questions about where we stand now. There is a growing consensus that the current 
copyright system has put too much power into the hands of intermediaries that are located 
between the creators and users of copyrighted works (Gillespie, 2007; Litman, 2010). 
Many scholars have questioned the legitimacy of this ever-increasing concentration and 
imbalance, arguing that modern copyright law is failing to achieve its original purposes 
by allowing copyright holders to inhibit scientific and technological progress (Boyle, 
1996, 2008; Gillespie, 2007; Lessig, 2006, 2008; Litman, 2010; Netanel, 2008; Postigo, 
2012; Vaidhyanathan, 2001). From the consumers’ side, there has been a growing 
awareness regarding the failing of the copyright system. For example, the Consumer 
Electronics Association issued a Declaration of Innovation Independence in 2005 that 
reads:   
For too long, the content community has been allowed to define the terms 
of the IP debate. Today we reassert our independence. We reassert our 
independence from the content community’s stranglehold on determining 
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the language of the debate. We reassert our independence to counter their 
efforts to inhibit the democratization of creativity enabled by digital 
technology. And we reassert our independence to ensure that legal 
activities conducted by consumers remain legal and are not inaccurately 
labeled as “piracy.”2  
However, to date, too little attention has been paid to how the current licensing 
regime inhibits users’ rights through restrictive agreements. Compared to their leverage 
over physical copyrighted works, users’ leverage is only mediocre over lawfully 
purchased digital works. They cannot resell, rent, lease, or lend copyrighted digital works 
despite having lawfully purchased them. I argue that the applicability of the first sale 
doctrine to digital copyrighted works is closely related to public rights with respect to 
referent properties and more broadly to the shaping of digital culture.  
To advance our understanding of the first sale doctrine and its applicability to the 
digital realm, I have chosen, among various digital goods, to focus in this study on 
ebooks. This is partly because the current development of the ebook ecosystem raises a 
clear set of questions concerning the mission of libraries, public interest considerations, 
and efforts to balance competing legitimate interests between copyright holders and users 
of copyrighted material. “E-books possess immense potential to change the spread of 
knowledge and education. The public interest in the right to educational and written 
materials should supersede any attempt by copyright owners to expand their rights 
beyond the first sale” (McKenzie, 2013, p. 70).  
                                           
2 Available at http://www.ecoustics.com/products/principles-innovation-independence/ 
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This study examines the ecosystem of ebooks at the point where tensions over the 
first sale doctrine exist. In doing so, this study builds on theoretical accounts of 
“democratic copyright” (Benkler, 2006; Bracha, 2007, Bracha & Syed, 2014; Coombe, 
1991; Elkin-Koren, 1996; Netanel, 1996; Van Houweling, 2005). A democratic approach 
to copyright law recognizes values and social goals other than economic efficiency. 
Those social goals include self-determination, political democracy, cultural democracy, 
and an enriched concept of human welfare (Bracha & Syed, 2014). In this study, I argue 
that the notion of cultural democracy holds particular significance, especially in today’s 
unbalanced copyright regime, because it raises questions about the balance of power 
between users of copyrighted works and copyright holders. Cultural democracy is a 
normative concept that values individuals’ opportunities to fulfill their capacities to the 
fullest and to actively participate in cultural meaning-making processes in an egalitarian 
manner. That concept views democracy “as developmental, as a matter of the 
improvement of mankind” (Macpherson, 1973, p. 78) and does not limit its focus to 
enhanced access to cultural works but rather promotes also more egalitarian access to the 
means of production and distribution. In sum, the notion of cultural democracy addresses 
the importance of having a cultural environment that supports democratic values. It can 
be said that cultural democracy’s call for more egalitarian access to and decentralized 
control over the production and distribution of cultural works is synonymous with values 
that are much sought by scholars in the political economy of communication (see 
Golding & Murdock, 1991).  
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A democratic approach to copyright law can provide room for more sophisticated 
deliberation about the proper scope of copyright protection. By resurrecting the intent of 
copyright and restoring the balance between users and the copyright holder, with the help 
of public interest considerations, we may be better positioned to reform the copyright 
scheme. Building upon the tradition of democratic copyright theories, I will undertake the 
task of normative evaluation of current copyright regime with particular focus on the first 
sale doctrine.  
PROBLEMATIZING THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT REGIME 
 
The need to foster creativity and respect for the rights of copyright owners while 
ensuring the public’s access and use of copyrighted works is a value with which most 
critics can agree. However, modern technologies have raised new concerns related to 
copyright enforcement, including the ease of pirating copyrighted works, the non-
degradation of digital files’ quality, the compactness of works in digital form that 
facilitates easier sharing (Calaba, 2002), and the low marginal cost of reproduction. Even 
if we acknowledge the need to protect copyright owners’ interests, the ability to actually 
correct an imbalance between protecting their interests and those of copyright users 
remains a challenge under the current copyright system (Boyle, 1997). 
In the U.S., the growing copyright protection evident in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and other recent laws raises questions about the extent to which 
and in what ways the current copyright system threatens the public’s intellectual freedom, 
free flow of information, and freedom of expression. In response to those questions, 
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many scholars and public interest copyright activists are concerned about the current 
situation where copyright laws are undermining the public’s legitimate use and access to 
cultural works. Some court and policy rulings have fought successfully against the over-
protection of copyright (Aufderheide, 2009; Boyle, 1997). For example, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. is a good 
example, as are some more current decisions around fair use definitions and practices. As 
Aufderheide (2009) aptly notes, successful fair use cases are “all examples not only of 
attempted intimidation but of fighting back and winning critically important legal 
precedents that inhibit future bullying” (pp. 189-190). Nevertheless, the small successes 
in resisting strong copyright are dwarfed by the contemporary magnitude and growing 
strength of copyright provisions.  
The public policy of copyright law should “find a balance between two aspects 
of the public interest inherent to copyright: copyright as driving creative activity and thus 
promoting learning for the benefit of the public and exceptions to copyright that offer the 
widest availability of copyrighted material for the public” (Davies, 2002, p. x). However, 
this rhetoric of balance has failed to provide solid guidelines for both copyright owners 
and copyright users. Given this reality, supporters of strong copyright have effectively 
deployed the metaphor “copyrights are property” in pursuing copyright protection for 
their intellectual property (Herman, 2008), thus for example framing file-sharing through 
peer-to-peer networks as “pirating.” That framing (i.e., “copyright as property”) has been 
articulated by subsequent policy discussions throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in both England and the United States (Vaidhyanathan, 2001, p. 11). Alternative 
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framing of copyright protections, and in particular a frame that valorizes the rights of 
users or consumers of intellectual property, has struggled.   
At the turn of the century, “intellectual property has no corresponding place in 
popular debate or political understanding” in ways similar to the politics of the 
environment or of health care reform (Boyle, 1997, p. 113; Samuelson, 2001). When it 
comes to politics of intellectual property, we still do not have a conceptual map that 
encompasses relevant issues, and we lack viable coalitions that are unified by shared 
interests as perceived in various contexts (Boyle, 1997). However, with the dramatic 
increase of networked connections in the public sphere, things are gradually changing 
with regard to the politics of intellectual property. Most notably, U.S. society recently 
witnessed an historical instance of online outrage that killed two anti-piracy bills, SOPA 
(Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA (Protect Intellectual Property Act). According to the 
Los Angeles Times, 4.5 million people signed Google’s petition opposing SOPA 
(Netburn, 2012). Adding quantitative detail to the politics of copyright, Herman’s (2013) 
study tried to answer the question of “which policy advocates communicate what 
messages in which media” (p. 355). According to Herman (2013), the copyright debate 
looked very different depending on the medium through which it was viewed. Herman’s 
research demonstrates that online platforms provide a good venue for strong fair use 
coalitions. Consequently, new ways to think about copyright are emerging.  
A growing body of literature on alternative understanding of contemporary 
copyright users is emerging (e.g., Caraway, 2012; Condry, 2004; Edwards, Klein, Lee, 
Moss, & Philip, 2012, 2015; Lessig, 2008; Postigo, 2012; Rutter & Bryce, 2008). 
 
 9 
Challenging the dominant representation of copyright users, these studies view users as 
“social actors whose actions are prompting policy and industry responses vis-à-vis 
copyright, and who are themselves a product of the historical and social contexts in 
which copyright discourse emerge” (Edwards et al., 2015, p. 693). Herman (2008) claims 
that changing the current imbalance between copyright holders and users of copyrighted 
works can start by correcting the false metaphor that “Copyrights are property,” and by 
polishing counter-metaphors that stress that copyright is a government-granted monopoly. 
As Reyman (2010) notes, “[a]nalysis of the digital copyright debate makes visible the 
discursive structures operating in the legal arena of copyright law and identifies spaces 
where change might be possible” (p. 144).  
Based on an analogy with the environmental movement, Boyle (1997) claims 
that a political economy of intellectual property is needed in order to oppose structural 
tendencies that over-protect the interests of intellectual property holders. He further 
promotes the employment of “a set of analytical tools which reveal common interests 
around which political coalitions can be built” (Boyle, 1997, p. 113). Boyle recommends 
recognizing the value of the public domain as a fundamental contributor to innovation 
and culture and seeing potential benefits of openness that can create space where 
theoretically refined and rhetorically sophisticated arguments can gain strength to stop or 
reduce over-protection tendencies of contemporary intellectual property law (Boyle, 
2008). In a similar vein, Samuelson (2001) also points out the importance of articulating 
the benefits that an open information movement can bring to society as a whole.  
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These attempts to reframe the copyright dilemma by contributing metaphors or 
analogies can be productive, and a growing body of scholarship in media and 
communication studies has paid greater attention to the politics of copyright. For 
instance, Gillespie (2007) critically examines the debate over digital rights management 
(DRM) technologies and its profound implications for the shape of digital culture. He 
demonstrates that in the debate over copyright in the digital age “what is lost are the 
venues in which the public interest side of copyright might effectively counterbalance the 
demands of copyright owners, who can only envision the value of culture through a lens 
of their own commercial survival and success” (p. 189). Gillespie (2007) advances our 
understanding of the role of technology in both shaping and being shaped by the law. 
After tracing the historical development of American copyright law with particular focus 
on cultural arts such as literature and music, Vaidhyanathan (2001) also shows in what 
ways “thick” copyright is incompatible with the original intent of and democratic 
principles of copyright. Both Gillespie (2007) and Vaidhyanathan (2001) built on 
political economy perspectives in the sense that the main purposes of their works were to 
lay bare current socio-legal conditions and to show how power relationships among 
social actors—including technological apparatus—have played a role in shaping 
copyright laws.  
Building on a political economy perspective, Bettig (1996) also persuasively 
employs two case studies to make his point: (1) the emergence of the cable television 
industry and its influence on the filmed entertainment industry; and (2) the introduction 
of the VCR and its impact on the broadcast industry. Cable television and VCRs were 
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introduced into the marketplace before policy determinations were made about how to 
govern the use of disruptive communication technologies within the copyright system. 
Over time, the lack of guiding principles for cable television and VCRs has brought to 
light an awareness that intervention by the capitalist state has been driven by intraclass 
struggles among relevant stakeholders, thereby revealing the influence of capital in the 
legislative policymaking process. Driven by the logic of capital, filmed entertainment 
copyright owners have exerted their power on the policymaking apparatus so that new 
communication technologies, which became related markets for the filmed entertainment 
companies, have folded into the prevailing market structure (Bettig, 1996). Therefore, 
rules for governing new disruptive technologies were integrated into the dominant market 
environment. Bettig’s work demonstrates that “technological breakthroughs and product 
innovations, though perhaps originating at the periphery, eventually get incorporated into 
the core” (p. 100). After addressing the need for a structural analysis of the current 
copyright system that has failed to maintain a delicate balance between copyright holders 
and users of copyrighted works, Bettig (1996) concludes that the success of social 
movements depends on maintaining a focus on a shared goal, rather than dealing with 
fragmented interests. As Bettig (1996) notes, “Even the most progressive judges do not 
cast their decisions in a way that disrupts or questions the fundamental social order” (p. 
154).  
Given that courts are generally reluctant to take an active role in challenging the 
status quo and shaping society in a new direction through their decisions, persuading 
lawmakers by presenting to them the public opinion of constituents may be a more 
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feasible way to change social conditions. Perhaps, much needed copyright reform can be 
accomplished only by making consumers’ voices heard. Exploring the ways the public 
good or public interest can function as a guiding and penetrating principle embedded in 
copyright laws can and should shape the debate surrounding digital copyright regime in 
today’s rapidly changing technological environment.  
To problematize the current copyright regime and provide policy 
recommendations for how the first sale doctrine should be understood in the digital era, 
this study uses a combined theoretical approach. In doing so, this dissertation uses both 
the legal studies and communication studies literatures to gain a broader and fuller 
understanding of normative principles related to copyright. First, a positive approach is 
adopted to describe and disclose various social and political factors that have shaped the 
current ebook ecosystem. Additionally, a normative approach is employed to demonstrate 
how the notion of cultural democracy can provide solid rationales for reforming 
copyright law. Relying upon a democratic approach to copyright, as discussed earlier, 
offers a normative vision that can guide the shaping of the digital culture. I argue that by 
combining the two frameworks the question of the future of the first sale doctrine can be 
usefully addressed through a holistic analysis of its implications.  
 
PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISSERTATION  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, this study seeks to move beyond 
the existing knowledge of the origin, application, and development of the first sale 
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doctrine by providing an in-depth look that examines one specific domain, ebooks, where 
the doctrine plays out. Second, this study critically explores the doctrine’s ability to 
balance the public’s interest in the wide access to and use of copyrighted works that bear 
property interests of copyright holders in the digital age. In this, it considers how the 
doctrine’s principles are favorable for citizens and consumers. Ultimately, this study 
proposes policy recommendations on the future of the first sale doctrine as a vehicle for 
improving copyright functions. More than a decade ago, the Copyright Office took a 
wait-and-see approach to the application of the first sale doctrine to digital copyrighted 
works. This might, at that time, have been a reasonable decision. However, we are now at 
a crossroads in the evolution of digital culture, giving rise to the need to reevaluate the 
role of the doctrine on the future of digital culture.  
 
While the literature on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital 
copyrighted works has increased in recent years, little is known about how the first sale 
doctrine operates or can operate in a given specific domain such as the ebook market. 
This study, therefore, seeks to address that gap in the literature. From a theoretical 
perspective, democratic theory provides a framing lens. By applying normative values 
and social goals that have been articulated by democratic copyright theorists to a legal 
conundrum surrounding the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital works, this 
study seeks to advance the explanatory power of “democratic” copyright. This study 
develops a helpful theoretical framework by locating in cultural democracy a primary 
goal that should be sought through copyright’s principles. In this, both the legal studies 
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and communication studies literatures provide pertinent perspectives that have not yet 
been in conversation with each other. This dissertation seeks to use both literatures in 
order to blend an understanding of normative principles with an understanding of the 
nature of ownership of and participation in making content in the digital era.   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The literature on the first sale doctrine and its applicability to digital copyrighted 
works initiates a discussion of the current status and history of the doctrine. However, as 
noted above, it falls short of providing a detailed and clear understanding of the ways in 
which the first sale doctrine in the digital age applies to different domains of copyrighted 
works. Most of the previous studies on digital first sale doctrine lack a coherent and 
adequately employed theoretical framework. To fill those academic lacunas, the 
following research questions will be addressed in this study.   
1) How has the first sale doctrine been understood in the past by U.S. courts and 
Congress?   
2) How does or might the first sale doctrine function as a safety valve that 
balances the public’s interest in wide access to and use of copyrighted works 
with those of the copyright holders?  
3) What does it mean to “own” a digital copy of copyrighted works, and how are 
various digital environments recreating the idea of owning copyrighted material?   
- What political and social factors have shaped the current economic 
conditions and copyright regime with regard to ebooks? 
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- How was the ability of the first sale doctrine to achieve its purpose 
changed in the new media environment? 
4) How does the notion of cultural democracy apply to the resale of copyrighted 
material in digital form, and what implications does the concept have for digital 
content consumers?  
5) What conclusions can and should be drawn about the necessity of applying the 
first sale doctrine to digital copies of copyrighted works?  
 
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
 
   
In legal scholarship, there are two types of legal theory (Vermeule, 2008). One is 
positive theory and the other is normative theory. Positive theory can be descriptive (or 
doctrinal), explanatory, or predictive. In other words, positive legal theory seeks to 
explain what the law is about and why the law is that way as well as how the law affects 
society. Describing statutory provisions in question, providing an explanation of various 
sociopolitical or economic factors that have shaped current conditions, and predicting 
future conditions based on the understanding of where we stand now are examples of 
main tasks positive legal theorists are supposed to address. By comparison, normative 
legal theory evaluates the desirability of the law and seeks to answer, “what the law ought 
to be” (Hart, 1958, p. 606). In other words, normative theory values two arguments: 
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“claims about the best means to adopt, given stipulated ends, and claims about what ends 
it would be good to adopt” (Vermeule, 2008, p. 390).  
To address research questions posed in this study, I combine positive and 
normative theories in the context of digital copyright. First of all, I lay out the relevant 
legal principles and statutes relating to the first sale doctrine. Then, I seek to unpack 
socio-technical considerations and social interactions among social actors that produced 
the particular law. These positive speculations of the current copyright regime with 
regard to ebooks are undertaken based on Lessig’s (2006) theory of four modalities of 
what he calls regulation.3 In this study, the positive analysis is undertaken to provide a 
basis for normative articulations of the current copyright regime. As May (2003) points 
out, critical theorists do not take for granted the power relations among social institutions 
and actors; rather they make an effort to understand underlying conditions and factors 
that led to present manifestations.  
In sum, the positive analysis of the current copyright system surrounding the 
ecosystem of the ebook is complemented by normative evaluations that question and 
challenge the current copyright regime. Democratic copyright theorists pay attention to 
balancing competing interests between copyright holders and users of copyrighted works 
since they consider copyright as a tool for realizing normative ideals, such as “cultural 
democracy” and individual autonomy. By contrast, positive theorists, such as political 
economists, are concerned about the ways in which social, political, and economic 
                                           
3 Lessig’s four modalities (i.e., the law, the market, architecture, and social norms) regulate individuals’ 
behaviors both online and offline. Lessig (2006) argues that changes in one modality can cause changes in 
the other modalities. Therefore, it is important to consider all the four modalities collectively.  
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resources are distributed and the effects of structural and economic factors on cultural 
and political expression (Stein, 1997). For example, among various positive approaches, 
political economy is particularly concerned about “the relationship between structural 
determination and human agency” (Bettig, 1996, p. 6). The positive mode of the political 
economy can be complemented by normative evaluations when questioning and 
challenging the current copyright regime. It is sometimes difficult to draw a clear 
distinction between positive and normative theorists. This is because normative theorists 
make arguments based on positive speculations and positive theorists also pay attention 
to normative values. With that in mind, this study evaluates social outcomes and explores 
what conditions are needed to mobilize democratic principles of copyright.    
In conducting normative theorizing based on positive speculations, this study 
examines the legal, sociopolitical, and historical variables that contribute to the creation 
and development of the current copyright regime. In conducting legal research that 
tackles problems in common law countries, it is important to understand the concept of 
stare decisis. Stare decisis refers to the principle that judges are supposed to follow 
precedent when making a decision with regard to cases with similar facts.4 Therefore, in 
common law countries, which includes the United States, case analysis has been widely 
used to conduct legal analysis under the assumption that “case law develops rationally so 
that one may trace the logical connection between one case and the next” (Goldman & 
Jahnige, 1976, p. 157). This study also analyzes legal cases pertaining to the first sale 
doctrine and its application to digital copyrighted works. Both primary and secondary 
                                           
4 See Black’s Law Dictionary  
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legal sources are collected and analyzed in this study, with a lens drawn from the 
democratic theory of copyright. Primary sources include statutes, Congressional hearings, 
court decisions, administrative materials, and other documentary evidence used in cases. 
Secondary sources include media reports on the first sale doctrine, treaties, law review 
articles, and media journals. In addition, this study assembles an historical approach to 
legislative history.     
CHAPTER OUTLINES  
 
 This dissertation raises questions as to whether the current copyright regime that 
regulates ownership of digital content comports to the purpose of copyright law. Chapter 
2 begins by reviewing the relevant theoretical justifications for copyright and democratic 
copyright theories. The literature on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to 
copyrighted works in digital form is then surveyed. Finally, Chapter 2 addresses literature 
on the ownership of digital content in the context of growing tension between copyright 
holders and copy owners.  
Chapter 3 seeks to better understand the origin and historical trajectory of the first 
sale doctrine by examining primary and secondary historical sources. After the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus in 1908, the first sale doctrine 
became law. In 1909, Congress codified the doctrine, and scholars have ever since come 
to consider it an important balancing mechanism within copyright law. A survey of 
legislative history of the doctrine is covered as well as a discussion of how courts have 
approached the balance between copyright holders and copy owners with regard to 
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subsequent distribution of copyrighted works after their initial distribution. Chapter 3 also 
scrutinizes policy rationales and theoretical justifications for the first sale doctrine. 
Finally, Chapter 3 calls for a cohesive normative framework that can justify the 
expansion of the first sale doctrine to digital goods.  
 Chapter 4 examines the shaping of the ebook ecosystem, a topic that has received 
increased attention from the media. By contrast, what has attracted less attention is how 
consumers’ experience with ebook usage is being limited by various socio-cultural 
factors, such as restrictive licensing agreements that publishers demand. Chapter 4 seeks 
to identify socio-cultural constraints associated with Lessig’s (2006) four modalities that 
have shaped the current ecosystem of ebooks. It also seeks to explain how those 
modalities affect the current political and economic conditions and copyright regime with 
regard to ebooks. In doing so, particular attention is directed to the role of public libraries 
in furthering democratic principles, including a discussion of how restrictive agreements 
are hampering the mission of libraries in the digital age. Drawing on the discussion of 
“materiality,” this chapter also addresses the issue of copy ownership. Ultimately, 
Chapter 4 presents policy implications for consumers of digital content and provides 
groundwork for suggesting policy recommendations.  
Chapter 5 applies the notion of cultural democracy to the discussion of the digital 
first sale doctrine, focusing on the case of ebooks. Particular attention is given to the 
relationship between the notion of cultural democracy and policy rationales of the first 
sale doctrine. Chapter 5 argues that the concept of cultural democracy can provide a 
theoretical framework for reestablishing consumer digital rights in the digital age. Based 
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on the literature of legal studies and communication studies, this chapter seeks to 
contextualize the notion of cultural democracy with descriptions of how the concept plays 
out in practice. Chapter 5 also pays particular attention to how the notion of cultural 
democracy relates to helping public libraries fulfill their mission.   
 Chapter 6 summarizes the findings, evaluates some of the legal issues discussed 
in earlier chapters, and addresses whether justification can be put forth to expand the first 
sale doctrine to digital works. Chapter 6 offers policy recommendations based on 
conclusions drawn from earlier chapters. This chapter seeks to answer the question of 
what can and should be done about the future of digital culture in association with the 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter reviews the relevant theoretical justifications for copyright, one type 
of intellectual property right, and looks at some of the most important democratic 
copyright theories. Given that this dissertation explores one specific domain of copyright 
law, the first sale doctrine, and advocates the doctrine’s expansion to digital goods, the 
literature on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital transmissions is surveyed. 
Finally, this chapter addresses the literature on the relationship between copyright owners 
and owners of copyrighted works. As Fisher (2001) notes, intellectual property theories 
carry value in that “[they] can catalyze useful conversations among the various people 
and institutions responsible for the shaping of the law” (p. 198). This chapter argues that 
democratic copyright theories, in general, and within cultural democracy, in particular, 
can and should guide copyright reforms in conjunction with a digital first sale doctrine.    
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT AS PROPERTY 
 
Copyright is one type of intellectual property right, and disagreements over the 
interpretation of copyright law center on different perspectives of the normative concerns 
that undergird copyright. More specifically, scholars have different views over what 
constitutes the public interest (welfare) in copyright. Although the concept of public 
interest does not have a uniform meaning that can be applied to different contexts of 
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society in an equal manner, the public interest concept has, nevertheless, been critical to 
the development of U.S. copyright law in that the public interest standard holds out the 
possibility of benefitting the public (Davies, 2002). Gillespie (2007) claims that both the 
legislature and the courts have consistently believed the best way to pursue the public 
interest is by strengthening copyright in relation to cultural expression. However, as 
Davies (2002) notes, “emphasis on taking the public interest into account may be said to 
have played a positive role in striking the balance between authors and other right owners 
and the general public” (p. 99).  
With regard to the question of what constitutes the public interest in copyright, 
scholars have presented various responses. However, those responses can be grouped 
into two broad opposing categories: arguments for “strong copyright” and arguments 
against “strong copyright.” Those who defend the need for strong copyright believe 
that seeking to uphold the public interest can be accomplished by maximizing social 
welfare measured by monetary value (i.e., individuals’ willingness and ability to pay). 
They tend to believe that copyright protection serves “to increase incentives for 
creative activity” (Fisher, 2001, p. 197). It should be noted that not all economic 
efficiency-oriented copyright theorists are so-called copyright maximalists. Within the 
economic efficiency framework, there exists a continuum based on their position on 
the issue of expanding intellectual property “beyond the minimum necessary to 
provide authors with an incentive to produce” (Netanel, 1998, p. 28). However, there 
is little or no debate that rights-based copyright theorists support “strong copyright,” 




On the contrary, opponents of strong copyright protection (or the so-called 
access-oriented copyright theorists) argue that the public interest is served by 
promoting wide dissemination of informational and cultural works throughout society 
and by increasing access to and use of copyrighted works, while also ensuring a 
“reasonable” reward for the creators.  
Theories of intellectual property have roots in four theoretical homes discussed 
below.5 Each argument offers a slightly different rationale for justifying protection for 
intellectual and creative work. The four theories are: the utilitarian theory, the labor-
desert theory, the personality theory, and the social planning theory of intellectual 
property. Though all the theories are considered to be normative theories, the utilitarian 
theory and the social planning theory build their theoretical explanations based on 
speculations of what “consequences” will result from copyright protection. By contrast, 
the rights-based theories justify copyright as a “natural right” given to the creator of 
copyright material. The rights-based theories include the labor desert theory and the 
personality theory of intellectual property. Rights-based theories of intellectual property 
were developed largely by scholars based in European countries, whereas U.S. scholars 
have focused mostly on questions of what “consequences” will result from copyright 
protection and how to interpret welfare within the copyright context.  
                                           
5 Property theories constitute a major component of the literature exploring intellectual work and 
ownership. Theories of intellectual property are based on property theories. Although some differences 
exist between tangible and intellectual property, the theories that have been utilized to justify ownership of 
tangible property generally can be applied to the ownership of intellectual property without too much 





Perhaps one of the most popular and commonplace justifications for intellectual 
property is utilitarianism. Arguments that look to how to create incentives and maximize 
social welfare and seek economic efficiency constitute the top priority of utilitarianism 
(Fisher, 2001). In other words, maximizing utility is a top priority in deciding how to 
shape an intellectual property regime. For instance, when it comes to economic benefits 
of trademarks, utilitarian benefits include the reduction of consumers’ “search costs” and 
the creation of an incentive for the creators (Landes & Posner, 1987; Fisher, 2001). Those 
who espouse utilitarianism argue that although trademarks can sometimes be harmful for 
society, in general, trademarks provide benefits in terms of greater recognition and ease 
of searchability that outweigh potentially harmful effects and thereby justify the existence 
of trademarks. From a utilitarian perspective, protecting intellectual property can be 
justified since it can allow innovators to recapture the costs of innovation. Economists 
largely rely on this logic and courts have often resorted to this rationale since the concept 
of aggregated utility (whether it is viable or not) provides a simple and clear guideline for 
comparisons when compared to other theoretical justifications for intellectual property in 
general and copyright in particular.  
One of utilitarianism’s most significant problems is that it oversimplifies the 
relationship between copyright and social welfare (Alexander & Peñalver, 2012; Meng, 
2006).6 For example, there is no established analytic that can be adapted to measure the 
                                           
6 It is often said that utilitarianism cannot take account of economic externalities.  
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costs and benefits of copyright protection, given the lack of information about the extent 
to which creative innovations are contingent upon material incentives provided by 
copyright, and what the social benefits of less protection might be. An empirical study, 
based on data from U.S. copyright registrations from 1870 through 2006, found there is 
no clear causal relationship between copyright expansion and an increase in the number 
of new creative works (Ku, Sun, & Fan, 2009). Rather, Ku et al’s (2009) study showed 
that “the historic long-run growth in new copyrighted works is largely a function of 
population” (p. 1672) than due to increased protection of copyright. Some commentators 
have argued that material incentives may not be a determining factor for the production 
of copyright material (e.g., Benkler, 2006); non-monetary rewards, such as the reputation 
enjoyed by artistic and scientific innovators, academic tenure, and open source 
developers’ humanitarian purposes, promote the creation of informational and cultural 
products, regardless of economic incentives. The existence of other non-monetary 
motives complicates the question of the extent to which creators’ entitlements should be 
extended. Prioritizing a list of social welfare factors is another problem that utilitarianism 
does not address well. As Fisher (2001) notes, the theory defines social welfare too 
narrowly. Some argue that the contemporary trend of overinvestment in intellectual 
property protections as opposed to education, community activism, and primary research 
is problematic (Fisher, 2001; Sunder, 2012). Finally, granting generous incentives can 
lead to “rent seeking” behavior among corporations aiming to simply acquire intellectual 
property rights (Fisher, 2001) rather than engaging in creative activity themselves.  
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The Labor-Desert Theory   
 
A second approach proposes that “a person who labors upon resources that are 
either unowned or ‘held in common’ has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her 
efforts” (Fisher, 2001, p. 170). According to this theory, individuals are entitled to claim 
their rights over intellectual works they generate because they endeavor to create them. 
This approach draws inspiration from the writings of John Locke (Alexander & Peñalver, 
2012), who argued that a person’s ownership of her labor is a “natural right” that exists 
regardless of the existence and nature of governments (Christman, 1994). This approach 
claims that the author has a natural right in his or her work because of the labor the 
individual devoted to create the work. Thus, the notion of labor mixing7 is a critical 
factor in determining the establishment of a property right (Christman, 1994). Ploman 
and Hamilton (1980) claim that “John Locke’s attempt to shift the rights of [property] 
from a statutory right to a naturally given right meant in practical terms a shift of the right 
from the publisher to the author” (p. 17). According to Locke’s “proviso”—the 
proposition that “a person may legitimately acquire property rights by mixing his labor 
with resources held ‘in common’ only if, after the acquisition, ‘there is enough and as 
good left in common for others’” (Fisher, 2001, p. 170)- one’s appropriation can only be 
justified if others are no worse off by his or her appropriation. This is of course 
particularly appropriate to intellectual endeavors.  
                                           
7 The labor-desert theory is also referred to as the labor-mixing theory (See Resnik, 2003).  
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The labor theory of intellectual property has to confront the ambiguity that 
originated from Locke’s rationale for property rights (Fisher, 2001). Locke did not focus 
on “intellectual labor” in developing his theoretical justifications for private property, so 
that the question of what counts as “intellectual labor” needs to be addressed in applying 
Locke’s labor theory to intellectual property. Locke’s concept of “the commons” also 
raises questions about what exactly constitutes intellectual commons among various 
candidates (Fisher, 2001; Meng, 2006). As Fisher (2001) notes, there are several 
possibilities (e.g., the “facts,” languages, cultural heritage, the set of ideas currently held 
by at least one individual, the set of “reachable ideas,” and the set of all “possible ideas”) 
and depending upon which option we choose, the boundary of an intellectual commons 
can be differently shaped (p. 186). Another uncertainty that Locke’s labor theory raises is 
captured by Nozick’s rhetorical question: “If I pour my can of tomato juice into the 
ocean, do I own the ocean?” (cited in Fisher, 2001, p. 188). This quote illustrates the 
difficulty of determining an appropriate level of appropriation based on an individual’s 
devoted labor to the establishment of the property. Consider recent legal battles between 
Apple and Samsung on mobile device functionalities. Recently, each company filed more 
than 40 lawsuits about patent, each arguing that the other had stolen some of its own 
features (Chowdhry, 2014). It is not difficult to find similar cases in contemporary 
society because many new creations are built on preexisting works. Also, some critics 
argue that the labor-desert theory does not provide useful guidance on how to allocate 
“intellectual credit” among authors who collectively participated in creating creative 
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works, claiming that “intellectual credit” should be allocated based on the significance of 
one’s contribution (Resnik, 2003).  
Personality Theory   
 
Personality theory claims that some fundamental human needs can be satisfied by 
private property rights (Fisher, 2001). Hughes (1988) points out that one’s “persona”—
“an individual’s public image, including his physical features, mannerisms, and history” 
deserves legal protection, according to personality theory (p. 340). One derivative of this 
perspective may be that creators, such as authors and inventors, are entitled to the 
protection of their works from being mutilated or misattributed (Fisher, 2001).  
Personality theory argues that property rights are crucial to the fulfillment of some 
elementary human rights. This line of thinking, which some trace to the works of Kant 
and Hegel, has been popular in European countries. Hegel (1896/1996) addressed the 
importance of individuals’ free will and argued that property is essential to externalize 
the will embodied in objects. In other words, property is important because it enables 
people to express their free will. As Alexander and Peñalver (2012) note, in Hegel’s 
view, “[a] person is a subject who self-consciously realizes freedom by realizing her 
needs and wants as chosen rather than given” (p. 59).  
Drahos (1996) claims that Hegelian theory does not provide a good justification 
for differentiating between physical objects and intellectual works, failing to address the 
question of why creators should be entitled to enjoy special entitlements for their creative 
works where the individual’s personality is embodied. Following Drahos’s understanding 
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of Hegel, Meng (2006) also argues that in Hegel’s view, “property is the means for the 
development of personality rather than the receptacle of personality” (p. 18). As Meng 
(2006) notes, “Hegel considers the state not as an opposite force against individual 
freedom but as representing the highest form of freedom an individual can attain” (p. 19) 
and he did not advocate the state’s active role as the protector of private property rights. 
Although Hegel recognized the importance of property in the development of one’s self, 
he believed that the state should be a guardian of “the ethical life of the community,” 
which people are expected to participate in to reach the highest form of freedom, rather 
than viewing property as the ultimate goal of individual will (Meng, 2006, p. 20).   
Social Planning Theory   
 
The last of the four categories regarding justification for intellectual property is 
called social planning theory (also known as human flourishing theory). This theory does 
not have a unified name yet and it is less well recognized than the other justifications 
discussed above. However, a growing body of scholarship on democratic copyright has 
developed its normative accounts of copyright based on a concept of human welfare.8 
The theoretical groundings of the theory are rooted in the political and moral theories 
developed by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (Alexander & Peñalver, 2012).9 As 
                                           
8 Scholars whose theoretical framework is rooted in or overlapped with the social planning theory, on one 
way or another, include: Oren Bracha, Rosemary Coombe, William Fisher, Niva-Elkin-Korean, and Neil 
Netanel (see Bracha & Syed, 2014; Coombe, 1998; Fisher, 2011; Elkin-Koren, 1996; Netanel, 1996).  
9 “For Aristotle, the ultimate end of the good human life is happiness (eudaimonia), or flourishing. Every 
other good is sought because it is part of or leads to happiness, Aristotle argues. Aristotle recognized that 
there is disagreement about what constitutes happiness (flourishing), and he dismisses several plausible 
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Alexander and Peñalver (2012) aptly note, “human flourishing depends upon social 
structures, [and] the communities to which property owners belong may legitimately 
make demands of them to contribute out of their resources or to share their property in 
order to sustain those social matrices” (p. 95).10 In other words, social planning theory 
emphasizes the significance of meaningful engagement for accomplishing better human 
welfare. Cohen (2012) notes that “[h]uman flourishing requires not only physical well-
being but also psychological and social well-being, including the capacity for cultural and 
political participation” (p. 223).  
The underlying reasoning of participatory-democracy theory is also in line with 
that of social planning theory in that both theories value governments’ role in shaping and 
constructing a “just and attractive culture.” In his essay, Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society, Netanel (1996) argues that “an important role of law in a democratic state is 
to underwrite a robust, democracy-enhancing civil society through a combination of state 
involvement and private initiative” (p. 345). It should be noted that he also argues that 
“Too thin a copyright would diminish the incentive for autonomous creative contribution, 
but a copyright of bloated scope, and one that would treat creative expression as simply 
another commodity, would stifle expressive diversity and undermine copyright’s 
potential for furthering citizen participation in democratic self-rule” (Netanel, 1996, p. 
                                                                                                                             
candidates, including pleasure. Flourishing is an irreducibly complex concept that is constituted by 
numerous plural and incommensurable goods…Aquinas built on Aristotle’s ethics to further elaborate a 
concept of property focused on the virtues and human flourishing” (Alexander & Peñalver, 2012, pp. 81-
84).  
10 Although intellectual property and tangible property are two different realms, the theoretical 
justifications for tangible property can be applied to intellectual property without too much difficulty 
(Alexander & Peñalver, 2012).  
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364). Advocating the necessity of furthering the shared goal of the First Amendment and 
copyright, such as expressive diversity, Netanel (2008) argues that “copyright must be 
tailored to serve our fundamental interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate 
from diverse and antagonistic sources” (p. 168).  
However, social planning theory is not free from criticism. The question of what 
sort of society we need to try to promote must be answered first. As Fisher (2001) notes, 
“[m]any of its components—for example, the criterion of distributive justice—have for 
centuries been the subjects of furious debate among political philosophers” (p. 193). As 
with the utilitarian perspective of intellectual property, answering the question of what 
level of protection will be sufficient is an issue that social planning theory needs to 
handle. As Alexander and Peñalver (2012) aptly note, “utilitarian theory does not provide 
the basis for criticizing a culture that, say, fails to give due weight to the distribution of 
access to intellectual property when providing such access would not necessarily happen 
to maximize utility” (p. 203). Social planning theory allows us to overcome the utilitarian 
perspective of intellectual property by employing an “objective and pluralistic conception 
of human well-being” (Alexander & Peñalver, 2012, p. 203).   
The rights-based theories have difficulty justifying the first sale doctrine because 
those theories view creators’ copyright as a “natural right” or something intrinsically 
attached to the creator’s personality. In particular, alienability of intellectual property 
cannot be explained by personality theory that is rooted in the Hegelian view (Alexander 
& Peñalver, 2012). The two rights-based theories—the labor-desert theory and the 
personality theory—put copyright owners’ rights before those of copy owners. 
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Additionally, the utilitarian theory values maximizing social welfare by incentivizing 
creators to create more cultural works thereby making it difficult for supporters of the 
utilitarian theory to advocate the first sale doctrine because the first sale doctrine denies 
in part the copyright owner’s right to distribute. That denial can be seen as a limitation to 
the copyright owner’s right. On the contrary, democratic copyright theories are 
supportive of the wider dissemination of cultural works, as well as the use of cultural 
works by copy owners.  
DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND COPYRIGHT  
 
Thus far, I surveyed four theoretical justifications for copyright protection. Here, I 
pay attention to democratic copyright theories that include the social planning theory 
discussed above. Normative accounts of democratic copyright sometimes overlap with 
one another in their philosophical positions, and those theories can be categorized into a 
several normative frameworks (Bracha & Syed, 2014). After reviewing those normative 
frameworks rooted in liberal democratic theories, this dissertation adopts cultural 
democracy as a guiding framework. The notion of cultural democracy is appropriate as a 
normative foundation for addressing various social relations that occur in the cultural 
dimension. Liberal democratic theories are based on the notion of self-determination in 
which individuals’ realization of their life choices is valued. Therefore, in terms of 
copyright issues, relational aspects that regulate stakeholders are becoming more 
important. As Alexander and Peñalver (2012) argue “although human beings value and 
strive for autonomy, dependency and interdependency are inescapable aspects of well-
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lived lives” (p. 87). Thus, the notion of self-determination needs to be extended to the 
cultural domain where various forms of self-determination compete. Political democracy 
takes the notion of self-determination to the political domain where collective decisions 
are made, but does not extend its primary concern to ordinary citizens’ participation in 
cultural meaning-making processes. As Bracha and Syed (2014) note, at some point, “the 
connection between cultural expression and the subject matter of the formal political 
process seems too tenuous or intractable” (p. 254). Instead of limiting its primary focus to 
the collective self-determination related to political issues, cultural democracy positions 
the notion of individual autonomy within the cultural sphere.    
A neoclassical approach to copyright, which is rooted in a utilitarian perspective, 
has dominated theoretical justifications for copyright and has prioritized an efficiency 
calculus as an exclusive element in the commitment to maximize social welfare. 
However, problematizing the neoclassical market paradigm, some scholars have 
proposed various normative accounts of copyright under the heading of “democratic” 
theories of copyright. Here, my purpose is not to provide a comprehensive survey of 
those normative accounts of copyright, but rather to canvas some of the most important 
theoretical accounts in terms of reestablishing the preferential purpose of copyright in 
democratic societies and articulating counterarguments to the economic efficiency 
paradigm.  
Democratic theorists consider copyright as something that serves the realization 
of normative ideals such as individual autonomy and active participation in cultural 
meaning-making processes. A growing body of scholarship has sought to establish a 
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connection between democratic theory and copyright (e.g., Benkler, 2006; Bracha, 2007; 
Bracha & Syed, 2014; Elkin-Koren, 1996; Netanel, 1996, 2008; Sunder, 2012). For 
example, Netanel (1996) contended that copyright law should adopt a view that 
“copyright is in essence a state measure that uses market institutions to enhance the 
democratic character of civil society” (p. 288). In her article, “Cyberlaw and social 
change: A democratic approach to copyright law in cyberspace,” Elkin-Koren (1996) 
also adopted a democratic paradigm that reflects “the will of the citizens,” defining 
democracy as a process of “discursive will formation” (p. 225).  
One normative account of copyright is self-determination. Benkler (2006) 
provided an elaborated explanation of this normative value in the context of copyright. 
He contended that we have to be “the authors of our own life choices in some meaningful 
sense” (p. 141). It is critical that individuals, in pursuing self-determination or autonomy, 
are enabled to make a “free choice” among a variety of options (Benkler, 2006).  
Ideally, individuals’ pursuit of self-determination should be free from constraints or 
manipulations by others. Within this framework, some conditions are also required to 
enable meaningful self-determination. Conditions that enable a diverse expressive 
environment include “the capacity to understand and evaluate the options, and the 
opportunity and means to critically reflect upon and possibly revise one’s choices and 
sense of attractive alternatives” (Bracha & Syed, 2014, p. 251). Benkler (2006) defined 
commons as “where human agents can act free of the particular constraints required for 
markets, and where they have some degree of confidence that the resources they need for 
their plans will be available to them” (p. 144). He concluded that “[a]s new strategies for 
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the production of information and knowledge are making their outputs available freely 
for use and continuing innovation by everyone everywhere, the networked information 
economy can begin to contribute significantly to improvements in human development” 
(Benkler, 2006, p. 468).  
Another normative account of copyright is raised by those who believe that some 
decisions are collective in nature, influencing society as a whole. This normative account 
of copyright takes self-determination from the individual level to the collective-level. 
Netanel (2008) applied this normative framework to the context of copyright. Much like 
the self-determination framework, this normative framework values freedom of 
expression with the recognition that free expression is a fundamental condition for the 
shape of collective self-determination. According to Habermas (1996), under the 
deliberative model of law, rights are not just spaces reserved for individuals, impervious 
to any form of intervention. Rather, rights are constituted through a public, deliberative 
process whereby people participate in collective self-determination. Put differently, rights 
exist in the abstract yet necessitate specific conditions and contexts where those rights 
can be exercised in practice. Thus, questions about who shapes the conditions and 
contexts become important.  
Within this framework, to enable meaningful collective self-determination, two 
conditions should be met: 1) there should be given to each individual of society an equal 
opportunity to participate in the collective decision-making processes, and 2) the same 
conditions that are required for free choices should be applied to collective decisions 
(Bracha & Syed, 2014). Participatory-democratic theorists view property as a changing 
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set of rights and entitlements that are subject to governmental interventions intended to 
achieve policy goals (Stein, 2006). They admit that the legal configuration of property 
rights is largely shaped by lawmakers’ evaluation of conflicting interests at stake and 
their normative framework of social values (Stein, 2006; Streeter, 1996). 
The cultural democracy framework considers the notion of self-determination as 
being within the cultural arenas, whereas the political democracy framework is concerned 
largely with collective decisions that are more or less directly related to political 
processes (Bracha & Syed, 2014). The cultural democracy framework recognizes that 
there exists a boundary between cultural expressions and the subject matter of narrow 
perception of politics, albeit the line separating them is a hard one to draw (Bracha & 
Syed, 2014). Netanel (1996) notes, “When taken as a whole…expressive works created 
for symbolic impact or broad audience appeal must, no less than copyright-supported 
political analysis, be seen as a vital part of democratic self-governance” (p. 351). 
However, in the same article, Netanel (1996) acknowledges that “While artistic speech 
does make a certain contribution to democratic governance, it may be that political 
speech…has a greater and more direct importance for democratic governance and thus 
should be treated differently in the First Amendment context” (p. 352). Therefore, it can 
be said that Neil Netanel’s normative accounts are more focused on democratic 
governance. To contrast and extend the self-determination to the cultural realm, Bracha 
and Syed (2014) argue that cultural democracy has a commitment to “decentralizing 
meaning-making power on the grounds of equalizing individuals’ effective opportunity to 
participate in the semiotic shaping of others’ subjectivity” (p. 24). They also argue it has 
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a commitment to enabling ample opportunities for individuals to pursue a meaningful 
self-determination in the cultural realm.  
In a similar vein, Coombe (1998) argues that the expanding trajectory of 
intellectual property law, which confers ever-growing capacity to restrict and control the 
meaning of ideas, symbols, and cultural artifacts, is detrimental to our society by 
restricting social interactions and limiting our capacity to engage in cultural sphere. In 
other words, Coombe (1991) suggests that “intellectual property laws may deprive us of 
the optimal cultural conditions for dialogic practice” (p. 1866). In any democratic society, 
facilitating freedom of expression is essential for accomplishing its social goals. Strong 
copyright can raise a wide range of issues incompatible with the notion of freedom of 
expression.  
Gordon (1993) also argues that the use of certain words is critical in the delivery 
of a message. Prohibiting people from using certain words when they are critical in terms 
of delivering an intended message is unduly “violat[ing] the [Lockean] proviso because it 
interferes with the public’s ability to communicate” (p. 1591). The people’s right of 
access to an information commons holds significance today. Given that one’s creation of 
cultural works is a cumulative process, having ample room for derivative works is 
desirable. As Gordon points out, “inability to use the work of others can stifle free 
thought and vital interchange” (p. 1535). Her cohesive argument questions whether the 
“overweening growth in natural law rhetoric” is appropriate, illustrating the importance 
of maintaining a common heritage that enables people to freely communicate with each 
other and express themselves (p. 1607). 
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Strong copyright proponents often rely on the argument that a copyright-
protected media industry system can better protect authors’ welfare and increase media 
diversity. However, as noted earlier, it remains unclear whether there is a causal 
relationship between copyright protection and cultural diversity.11 Contrary to that 
argument, under the current system of copyright such issues as lack of diversity in the 
media market and media concentration have become more prevalent. In this regard, more 
attention should be given to alternative and more empowering approaches to copyright, 
such as “commons-based peer production,” creative commons, and open sources 
(Benkler, 2006). Those empowering approaches to copyright promote the sharing of 
cultural works and support the dissemination of knowledge and creative expression that 
are in line with values supported by democratic copyright theories.   
As Goodrich, Kayal and Tushnet (2013) pointed out, “in the age of copyright 
overbreadth, it actually becomes hard to see how extending copyright outwards and 
further and investing it with a broader level of protection actually promotes social 
welfare” (p. 611). Alternative understandings of the structural relationship between the 
ever-increasing legal protection of copyright and public access to copyrighted works have 
been offered by Lawrence Lessig, Siva Vaidhyanathan, and Jessica Litman, among others 
(Goodrich et al., 2013). In essence, these arguments against strong copyright protection 
and against the property metaphor embrace various benefits that free exchange and use of 
intellectual and creative work contribute.  




This study argues that democratic copyright theories, in general, and in particular 
cultural democracy can further develop the alternative understandings of the current 
copyright regime. Indeed, cultural democracy provides an analytical and normative 
toolkit to pursue normative commitments in copyright law. Before I demonstrate how the 
foregoing discussions of democratic copyright theories apply to issues concerning the use 
of ebooks where the first sale doctrine plays out in the context of digital content, I 
introduce in the next section arguments for and against the access component embedded 
in the first sale doctrine.   
 
WHAT IS THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE? 
 
The first sale doctrine, which extinguishes the copyright owner’s right to control 
the subsequent disposition of that particular copy after its initial distribution, can be 
viewed as a “safety valve” that is recognized by the Copyright Act of 1976, along with 
the fair use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy (Goldstein, 1994). The fair use 
defense allows users of copyrighted works to access and use copyrighted materials 
without obtaining permission from the copyright holder when certain conditions are met, 
thereby this is considered a limitation and exception to the copyright holder’s exclusive 
right granted by the government. The idea/expression dichotomy recognized by copyright 
law protects only original expressions thereby limiting the scope of subjects to which the 
copyright applies. The first sale doctrine is a way to balance the interests of copyright 
holders through control of dissemination while being remunerated for subsequent 
dissemination; it also supports the interests of consumers in receiving reasonable and 
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affordable access to copyrighted works.  
Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act states that “the owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title…is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.”12 It should be noted that the doctrine applies only to the distribution right, 
which means that it does not apply to other exclusive rights accorded to the owner of 
copyright, such as public performance and reproduction rights.13 Based on the first-sale 
doctrine, a lawful owner of a copyrighted work can resell or lend it to another without the 
copyright owner’s consent. However, from the copyright owner’s perspective, this 
doctrine limits opportunities for him or her to make a profit from the sale or loan of a 
particular copy (Goldstein, 1994). In a 2001 report, the U.S. Copyright Office followed 
this view in declining to extend the doctrine to digital transmissions (Davis, 2009). 
 
WHY CARE ABOUT THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE?   
 
Copyright law is about balancing users’ rights and copyright holders’ rights. Why 
does balancing matter? The answer is simple. That is because copyright law governs our 
daily lives virtually on every front, determining the scope and boundaries of cultural 
works with which we interact. As many commentators have argued, if individuals’ self-
determination and freedom are core values that should be protected in a democratic 
                                           
12 17 USC §109 (a) (2008).  
13 Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F. 2d 275, 281 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that “courts 
and commentators likewise agree that the first-sale doctrine has no application to the rights of the owner of 
a copyright guaranteed by 106, except the right of distribution.”).  
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society, we should be concerned about the proper scope of copyright protection. As this 
dissertation demonstrates, for the past few decades, our society has witnessed repeatedly 
the dramatic expansion and extension of copyright protection. Now, the period protected 
by copyright has been extended to 70 years after a creator’s death. Other “safety valves” 
in copyright law are becoming clogged and malfunctioning as well. Consider Stephanie 
Lentz’s case started in 2007. She uploaded onto YouTube a short video clip showing her 
baby dancing to Prince’s song Let’s Go Crazy. Universal Music Group asked YouTube to 
take down Lentz’s video, stating that it violated the record company’s copyright. Today, 
most Internet service providers, such as YouTube, can easily delete allegedly copyright 
infringement materials because if service providers follow copyright holders’ requests, 
they are exempt from copyright infringement under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s notice-and-take-down system. Lentz did not want to follow YouTube’s decision 
and filed a lawsuit, arguing that hers was a self-evident fair use case. Her argument, 
supported by public advocacy groups, was not accepted by the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California (Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2008). Both parties 
appealed to a higher court and this case is still pending as of this writing. That is but one 
anecdotal case, but it raises a profound question: What is the purpose of copyright 
legislation?  
Backed by the economic efficiency paradigm, copyright holders have exerted 
control over their works through judicial decisions along with legislative and/or technical 
solutions that favor the trend toward monetization that benefits only a handful of 
copyright owners, thereby depriving content consumers of opportunities to tinker with 
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cultural works. In that way, the current copyright system is failing in terms of balancing 
competing legitimate interests. This dissertation argues that the “safety valves” of 
copyright law are becoming increasingly clogged, and not properly functioning within the 
current copyright regime. Therefore, this dissertation advocates the expansion of the first 
sale doctrine to digital goods.       
To address the question of the applicability of the first sale doctrine to 
copyrighted works in digital form, this section investigates three instances: the initiative 
to establish a Digital Public Library of America (DPLA), the ReDigi case, and the 
Autodesk, Inc. case. Each captures debates surrounding ebooks, digital music, and 
computer software, respectively. A short explanatory brief for those cases is provided 
here to set the framework for subsequent discussion in this dissertation.14   
An important component of this discussion is that as more content has been made 
available in digital forms, licensing regimes increasingly assumed a gatekeeping role to 
control people’s access to information resources. For libraries, the licensing problem with 
respect to ebooks has raised several issues in the past few years, including limited access 
contingent upon the libraries’ ability to adhere to the license terms, which in turn limits 
the institutions’ ability to donate and sell ebooks and places restrictions on archiving and 
                                           
14 These cases demonstrate how different types of digital content (i.e., ebooks, digital music, computer 
software) relate to the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital copyrighted works. Each case 
represents one specific type of digital content. As of this writing, no legal case has been reported in the U.S. 
with regard to the resale of ebooks. Both ReDigi and Vernor cases have garnered a significant amount of 
attention from the media and academia, given that they have initiated the debate over the resale of digital 
music files and computer software, respectively. Even though the ReDigi case was about the resale of MP3 
music files, ReDigi showed its interest in creating a digital secondary market for ebooks, thereby this case 
holds significance for the discussion of a digital first sale doctrine. It is also worth noting that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the legality of resale of digital content.  
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preserving ebooks. The DPLA was originally intended to create an open platform for a 
wide range of online collections that included books, photographs, moving images, and 
other content from a network of partner libraries, archives, and museums across America. 
Although the DPLA deals with digitalized content from the public domain, some 
librarians envision that the DPLA can potentially make its voice heard by policymakers 
and legislators with regard to the issue of ebook lending.     
ReDigi, a pre-owned digital marketplace where members buy and sell digital 
music, launched its service in 2011. The ReDigi case received attention when users of 
ReDigi services were required to download “Media Manager” to their own computers. 
Once installed, the Media Manager program built a list of “eligible” music files that the 
user possessed. The company then helped the user upload those files to ReDigi’s “Cloud 
Locker,” which is located on a remote server in Arizona. After the uploading process was 
completed, a digital music file became subject to an eligibility verification process. 
According to ReDigi’s explanation, if a ReDigi user sells a digital music file, a request to 
access the file will be declined after which the file will be transferred to the new owner at 
the time of the transaction. Record companies objected to this process. Putting aside 
semantics, Capitol Records argued, a user’s uploading a file “necessarily involves 
copying” the file from the user’s hard drive to ReDigi’s Cloud Locker (Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 2013, p. 2). Regardless of whether the original phonorecord 
ultimately is removed from the user’s computer, the court in the ReDigi case held that the 
transmission of one material object from one place (i.e., the user’s computer) to another 
(i.e., the ReDigi server) causes a reproduction of that material to occur. The court 
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continued that when another user of ReDigi downloads a music file from the ReDigi, 
another reproduction is created on the user’s computer. In support of Capitol Records’ 
argument, the ReDigi decision ruled that the transmission of a digital music file from one 
user’s computer to another constituted copyright infringement by making unauthorized 
reproduction. The ReDigi case has far-reaching implications for the future of digital 
music distribution that go beyond this particular case. As Gautam (2014) notes:  
Most fundamentally, the ReDigi holding calls into question the aptitude of the 
current copyright law framework in the Internet age. Employing a ‘narrow, 
technical, and purely legal’ application of current copyright law, the ReDigi court 
reached a result in which the reproduction right effectively nullifies the first sale 
doctrine for works distributed via download. (Gautam, 2014, pp. 757-758)   
 The Ninth Circuit’s Vernor v. Autodesk test tackled the applicability of the first 
sale doctrine to computer software. Timothy Vernor bought used software through a 
garage sale and attempted to resell a few packages of Autodesk’s AutoCAD software on 
eBay. Autodesk, the copyright holder of the software, threatened Mr. Vernor with a 
lawsuit claiming that Vernor’s activity constituted copyright infringement. The District 
Court in Vernor ruled that the first sale doctrine can be applied to the transfer in question. 
However, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that Vernor was not covered by the first sale 
doctrine since the software in question was licensed, making it virtually impossible to 
resell the software that had been bought under the current restrictive licensing regime. 
The influence of the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision goes far beyond the transfer of 
computer software in ways that require the legal, economic, and social impacts of the 
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case be fundamentally revisited and challenged. The above noted instances demonstrate 
that the application of the first sale doctrine to digital works relates to dilemmas in the 
digital environment. When it comes to the ReDigi case, this case poses a question rooted 
in the nature of digital works that involves the process of making another copy, whereas 
the Vernor case poses a question rooted in the licensing model.15 Those dilemmas that 
are associated with people’s use of digital works have led commentators to engage in a 
growing debate surrounding a digital first sale doctrine.  
A discussion of the arguments for and against a digital first sale doctrine are 
reviewed in the next section. These arguments will carve out the grounds for examining 
the applicability of the first sale doctrine to different types of digital works in subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation.  
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE  
 
Many commentators have provided rationales both for and against a digital first 
sale doctrine. Here, I canvas arguments for and against a digital first sale doctrine. They 
address issues of the longevity of digital copies, and the material and immaterial qualities 
bound up in digital commodities.  
First, opponents of a digital first sale doctrine may argue that it has an implied 
limitation on the number of transfers, given that physical copies degrade with time and 
wear (Asay, 2013). However, digital copies can last without losing quality for a long 
period of time. This feature of digital content leads some commentators to reject the 
                                           
15 It should be noted that licensing issue is not unique to digital works. This issue can also be applied to 
non-digital works.  
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adoption of a digital first sale doctrine, arguing that markets for the original copy will be 
negatively influenced if a digital first sale doctrine is adopted.  
The materiality and immateriality of digital products pose dilemmas for the 
conventional property framework that normally considers a transfer of property rather 
easy. Leonardi (2012) notes that one can confidently say what materials were used to 
make the hammer, but “when one moves from the realm of the physical to the digital, it is 
much more difficult to isolate the materials out of which a technology [is] built” 
(Leonardi, 2012, p. 28). Given that most information technology artifacts such as Ebooks 
and computer software have no physicality, those artifacts may be accessible only with 
the help of technological objects that have physical properties. A growing body of 
scholarship on “materiality”16 has paid attention to identifying “constituent features of a 
technology” that are used in many different ways to support social actors’ various tasks 
(Leonardi, 2012). Indeed, the assumptions and presumptions of material properties 
resident in immaterial forms guide many of the discussions around copyright and digital 
content.  
Such considerations figure in the second argument against digital first sale. Much 
of the scholarship that opposes a digital first sale doctrine has focused on the concept that 
                                           
16 Materiality refers to “the arrangement of an artifact’s physical and/or digital materials into particular 
forms that endure across differences in place and time and are important to users” (Leonardi, 2012). 
Without defining what “materiality” means in the context of copyright, Burk (2010) argues that: 
“Materiality is…key to copyright law…Changes in copyright represent a strategic response to the 
increasing de-materialization of the text that, ironically, rely upon the text’s materiality. Copyright protects 
the intangible, idealized work instantiated in a material substrate. The legal exclusivity of copyright 
subsists only in works fixed in a tangible medium of expression for some substantial duration. This is 
because copyright was intended to reinforce the natural resistance of material instantiation to appropriation; 
copyright assumes that the technological pressure point where control may be asserted is at the point of 
reproduction and so confers upon the author a copyright—that is, not only the right to copy, but also the 
right to prevent copying and related activity” (pp. 225-226).  
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transmitting a digital file necessarily involves a process of reproduction (Plovnick, 2012). 
Diaz (2008) points out that “selling” a digital music file can be considered as selling a 
copy of the file since “uploading it doesn’t really take it off your hard drive” (para. 2). In 
a similar vein, Calaba (2002) notes that transmitting a work in digital form makes the 
transferor generate a duplicate copy of the original work, which is then transferred to a 
recipient. For instance, when one sells the MP3 file, a copy of the MP3 file is transferred 
instead of the particular copy remaining on the seller’s hard drive. If the duplicate copy 
falls within the scope of a “copy” under the Copyright Act, then the process can 
constitute copyright infringement. As noted above, the ReDigi case relied on this point in 
rejecting the applicability of the first sale doctrine to the digital sphere. 
Kupferschmid (1998) argues that digital transmission without permission of the 
copyright owner is an infringement of the copyright owner’s distribution, reproduction, 
and display rights regardless of whether the original copy is destroyed after its 
transmission, a third argument. He opposes an amendment to extend the first sale 
doctrine to digital media for three reasons. First, like other opponents of a digital first sale 
doctrine, he points out that it is impossible to transmit a copy of a copyrighted work 
online without making a copy of the original copy, which infringes the copyright owner’s 
reproduction right. Second, “even if one assumes that transmitting a copy of the work 
does not infringe the copyright owner’s reproduction right, the first-sale exception would 
not apply because the copy being distributed is not the ‘particular copy’ but rather a new 
copy” (p. 838). The first two reasons are related to the issue of temporary reproduction 
discussed above. Third, according to Kupferschmid (1998), applying the first-sale 
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doctrine to digital transmissions online is incompatible with the original intent of the 
doctrine because “it would unduly impinge upon copyright owners’ distribution rights by 
discouraging them from using the Internet as a vehicle for delivering their works to 
consumers” (p. 838). Kupferschmid’s (1998) third point, employed in opposition to a 
digital first sale doctrine, is rooted in the economic efficiency paradigm that is the 
dominant justification for copyright protection.  
In regard to the third point, some commentators argue that the media industries 
will face a severe financial threat if the first sale doctrine is applied to the digital sphere. 
Proponents of the economic efficiency paradigm argue in that situation, creators are 
unlikely to be incentivized and thereby unlikely to create cultural works in ways that 
eventually would be harmful to the general public.  
Acknowledging the benefits of policy outcomes of the first sale doctrine, Gautam 
(2014) provides a cautious and pessimistic prediction about the first sale doctrine after 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Kirtsaeng decision that virtually nullified copyright holders’ 
ability to implement geographic price discrimination. He contends that the Kirtsaeng 
decision may further incentivize content industries, particularly in the case of publishers, 
to resort to a digital distribution model because digital formats allow them to control 
subsequent disposition of and use of their content through licensing agreements. Gautam 
(2014) further argues that given that copyright holders have usually utilized DRM with 
licensing agreements to maximize their profits, further acceleration to switch to digital 
distribution may affect consumers’ benefits in negative ways.        
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ARGUMENTS FOR A DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE  
 
As noted above, opponents of a digital first sale doctrine stress the fact that 
digital copies of copyrighted works create a perfect copy of the work and these copies 
can negatively influence the market for the original work. However, Rothenberg (1999) 
claims that contrary to the common perception of digital content, the longevity of digital 
content is not free from a number of interrelated problems (Rothenberg, 1999). For 
example, digital files are also “vulnerable to loss via decay and obsolescence of the 
media on which they are stored, and they become inaccessible and unreadable when the 
software needed to interpret them, or the hardware on which that software runs, becomes 
obsolete and is lost” (Rothenberg, 1999, p. v). This is particularly true in a rapidly 
changing technology environment. We can still enjoy Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man 
and the Sea published in print in 1952 without problems, but reading a manuscript stored 
in a floppy disk manufactured in 1982 is now virtually impossible for most people. 
Under the current copyright system, a lawful purchaser of copyrighted material 
in digital format is not allowed to freely transfer her copy. Those who favor extending the 
doctrine to copyrighted works in digital format basically value “the right of an owner of a 
legal copy to dispose of it” (Smith, 2005, p. 855). For example, Calaba (2002) introduces 
several proposals for implementing a digital first sale doctrine, including the 
simultaneous destruction proposal written by Representatives Boucher and Campbell, 
which requires the transferor of a copyrighted work to immediately erase the particular 
copy after the transfer is complete. Another way of facilitating a digital first sale doctrine 
is adoption of a registration system that records the serial number for the work and for the 
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computer’s processor used to operate the file. Calaba (2002) argues that the first sale 
doctrine needs to be applied to digital works “through a combination of legislative 
amendment and development of technological measures protecting copyright owners’ 
rights” (p. 35).  
Calaba (2002) raises concerns about the information inequities created by 
schemes that fall short of first sale. He asserts that the first sale doctrine should be 
applied to a work rightfully owned by anyone regardless of the work’s embodiment as a 
digital object, when considering the spirit of the doctrine, arguing that the applicability of 
the doctrine to digital works is closely related to libraries’ mission. Noting the dangerous 
future of an environment without first sale, he writes: “Where libraries lack the ability to 
pay license fees so that its patrons can access the work, some patrons may have the 
means to pay for individual access while others may not, potentially creating an 
informational divide” (Calaba, 2002, p. 24). In most contemporary situations, digital 
works are licensed, not sold to consumers, and additional restrictive terms and conditions 
are usually attached to those licenses. Restrictive license agreements deployed by 
software companies and the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions prohibit users from 
transferring and reselling many forms of digital works, which can lead to detrimental 
effects. As Fred Von Lohmann, then-senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, stated, “We shouldn’t lose our first-sale rights just because the second-hand 
stores involved are online” (as cited in Sandoval, 2008). In other words, the applicability 
of the first sale doctrine should not be determined by the means of distribution.   
Smith (2005) claims that applying the first sale doctrine to digital media can be 
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justified by recent developments in digital rights management (DRM) technology, 
copyright enforcement, and technological concessions. First, DRM enables copyright 
holders to control the sale, distribution, and use of their intellectual property, and, second, 
DMCA copyright holders have enforcement methods available to sue infringers and deter 
illegal downloads. Third, he points out that a fair use exception has already been applied 
to temporary copies stored in RAM during audio streaming. According to Smith (2005), 
these changes make the argument against the digital first sale doctrine less persuasive, 
and he goes so far as to state that by accepting a digital first sale doctrine the music 
industry may end up getting more control of digital copies. Since digital files are finite in 
longevity and format, consumers will increasingly need new versions of digital files. 
Thus, people may turn to a licensing option rather than owning a digital copy if the cost 
for licensing is cheaper than that of ownership (Davis, 2009; Smith, 2005).   
Hess (2013) proposes an architectural solution that makes digital files degrade 
over time, recognizing the limits of “forward-and-delete” technology. For instance, 
IBM’s aging file system “employs a code to receive original digital copies, determine 
their file type, create an aged file according to the file type and preset aging parameters, 
and replace the stored file and associated file metadata” (Hess, 2013, p. 2006). This can 
be seen as a way to mitigate the difference between digital property and physical property. 
The Copyright Office viewed the tangible aspect of the copy as a core element of the first 
sale doctrine. Hess argues that introducing degradation into the digital file can be a good 
way to achieve the original goal of the first sale doctrine, while at the same time 
harmonizing with the Copyright Office’s interpretation of the doctrine.  
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Asay (2013) writes that to preserve the original intent of the doctrine, there is a 
need to abandon both the licensee/owner dichotomy and the formalistic approach to 
extending the doctrine to digital copyrighted works. He criticizes federal court decisions 
that did not apply the doctrine to the licensee by focusing on the distinction between the 
licensee and the owner of the copy (Asay, 2013). Given that the purpose of the doctrine is 
to limit copyright outright, circumventing the doctrine through “semantics” should not be 
allowed. According to Asay (2013), a digital first sale doctrine might help reduce piracy 
as consumers turn to secondary markets instead of pirating digital works. In turn, 
secondary markets might also help boost sales of other copyrighted works through 
increased exposure.  
Another perspective on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital works 
proposes a middle ground solution to please both sides (i.e., the copyright owner and 
users of copyrighted works). Serra (2013) suggests that one might consider a resale 
royalty scheme that “recognizes the unique risks that nondegrading digital formats, 
connected to a vast and limitless distribution system, pose for copyright owners,” and at 
the same time “stays true to the axiom that a consumer has the right to alienate his 
personal property, though it be digital” (p. 1799). Serra points out that historically the 
first sale doctrine sought to balance the interests of both sides.  
The forgoing arguments for and against the adoption of the first sale doctrine to 
digital transmissions and proposed solutions have focused largely on presumed economic 
consequences regarding a digital first sale doctrine or legal issues, such as the question of 
what constitutes unauthorized reproduction during the processes of digital transmissions. 
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To be fair, it should be noted that several previous studies have proposed policy 
recommendations or technical approaches in order to make arguments for adopting a 
digital first sale doctrine more persuasive. However, those studies did not pay adequate 
attention to a normative framework that can guide us to reevaluate the current copyright 
regime within a broader context. This dissertation seeks to fill the academic lacuna.     
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS IN THE DIGITAL AGE    
  
The question of whether the first sale doctrine should be applied to digital media 
becomes increasingly important as more and more transactions are being conducted in 
digital format as a result of people’s greater use of the Internet and digital technologies. 
The ease of making copies in digital format without quality degradation presents many 
issues, including discussion of extending the first sale doctrine to digital media (Smith, 
2005). The issue of temporary reproductions in the digital age is not directly related to the 
first sale doctrine, but without solving that legal controversy we cannot think of a viable 
digital first sale doctrine. Thus, the section below addresses the temporary copy issue 
within the context of copy ownership in the digital age.   
Some commentators argue that digital copyrighted works require a substantial 
reconfiguration of copyright law since the U.S. copyright law originated from a print-
based model (Boyle, 1996; Litman, 1996; Liu, 2001). As noted above, one unique 
challenge presented by digital technology is that nearly all uses of digital content are 
involved in the creation of copies of the copyrighted work. Influenced by a decision in 
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the case of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc.,17 several federal courts18 have 
ruled that the process of loading a digital file into a computer’s RAM (random access 
memory) results in the creation of a copy of the digital work, which might violate the 
copyright owner’s reproduction right. Although some ambiguities associated with the 
statutory fixation requirement were clarified by a decision in the case of Cartoon 
Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,19 there are no applicable guidelines regarding the 
determination of how stable a copy should be in order to constitute copyright 
infringement. It is hard to imagine a situation where modern digital products can work 
properly without passing through a computer’s RAM. In her book “Digital Copyright,” 
Litman (2006) argues that “If temporary copies are [an] unavoidable incident of reading, 
we should extend a privilege to make temporary copies to all” (p. 183). One can 
reasonably argue that “Once I buy my copy I should be entitled to dispose of it as I wish. 
This is, after all, what it ordinarily means to own a piece of physical property” (Liu, 2001, 
p. 1248). Liu (2001) aptly questions why what one can do with a book should be so 
“dramatically” contingent upon whether the person has downloaded the book onto his or 
her hard drive or purchased a copy in a bookstore (p. 1251).  
Recognizing differences between analog and digital environments, Litman 
(1996) argues that “we might most profitably abandon copyright law’s traditional 
                                           
17 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F. 2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).  
18 See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996); NLFC, Inc. v. 
Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Brossard Associates, 
Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D. C. Cir. 1998).  
19 Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F. 3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). (With regard to the buffer 
data, the court held that two requirements should be met in order to say that the buffer data is a copy of the 
original work. According to the court, “The work must be embodied in a medium…and it must remain thus 
embodied ‘for a period more than transitory duration.’” at 127). 
 
 55 
reliance on reproduction, and refashion our measure of unlawful use to better incorporate 
the public’s understanding of the copyright bargain” (p. 48). On the contrary, in support 
of giving copyright holders the right to control access in the digital environment, 
Ginsburg (2006) claims that “the access right is an integral part of copyright, and 
therefore should be subject to exceptions and limitations analogous to those that constrain 
‘copy’-right” (p. 42, emphasis in original).  
The two starkly different perspectives of digital copyright show how difficult 
reaching middle ground on the applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital works has 
been. This can be summed up as a debate between the copyright optimist and the 
copyright pessimist. As Goldstein (1994) aptly puts it, “every major clash over 
copyright…is at bottom a clash between the view that copyright’s cup is half full and the 
view that it is half empty” (p. 13). Ultimately, the debate over “temporary copies” in a 
computer’s RAM closely relates to one’s normative framework for thinking about the 
relationship between the copyright owners and the owners (or users) of copyrighted 
works (Litman, 2006; Liu, 2001). This dissertation argues that the debate also relates to 
questionable automatic translation of material assumptions to immaterial forms. As Burk 
(2010) aptly notes, “Digitization eliminates many physical characteristics of creative 
works, embodying creativity as ethereal bits rather than material atoms” (p. 226). 
However, sufficient attention has not been paid to the link between copyright and 
material assumptions of ownership that have been attached to physical artifacts, a topic 
that needs to be rearticulated in the digital environment. To be fair, it should be noted that 
legal scholarship, policy makers, and the courts have addressed the issue of “temporary 
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copies” in order “to reconcile the traditional understanding of the copy with the 
technological developments that threaten to undermine it” (Perzanowski, 2010, p. 1068). 
However, those efforts have focused on the interpretation of statutory phrases, paying 
little attention to normative accounts of copyright’s original intent and democratic 
principles.  
In conclusion, previous studies have investigated the historical background and 
development of the first sale doctrine as well as its implications in the digital age. 
However, those previous studies did not fully consider normative accounts of copyright 
that allow us to evaluate whether the current copyright regime provides proper 
boundaries for intellectual property protection. Also, they have paid scant attention to the 
increasingly problematic dichotomy between the immaterial “work” and a physical 
“copy” fixed in a tangible medium. Whether this distinction is sustainable has never been 
coherently reviewed, in particular, within the context of the application of first sale 
doctrine. To fill gaps in the literature, this study examines the applicability of the first sale 
doctrine to digital media products, with a particular focus on the question of what 
“owning” a copy of a copyrighted work should mean in the digital environment. This task 









This chapter presents an overview of the origins and development of the first sale 
doctrine, the historical and contemporary court decisions with regard to the doctrine as 
well as the effects of and justifications for the doctrine. In so doing, this chapter provides 
a condensed history of the doctrine. Cultural democracy values and seeks broader social 
goals such as people’s enhanced access to cultural works and more egalitarian 
participation in cultural meaning-making processes, and within that context the first sale 
doctrine is seen as one mechanism by which those broader social goals can be achieved. 
That said, cultural democracy and the first sale doctrine have a mutually reinforcing 
relationship and both are policy objective. In other words, each supports the other. The 
first sale doctrine, on one hand, enables a lawful owner of a copy of a copyrighted work 
to sell, lease, lend, or transfer that particular copy but, on the other hand, limits the 
copyright owner’s right to control that copy once sold.   
The policy outcomes of the first sale doctrine have been well documented in the 
literature (see Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011). Since the doctrine limits a copyright 
holder’s right to her work once ownership of the copyrighted work is transferred, 
subsequent owners of that particular copy can sell or lend it without worrying about 
committing copyright infringement. Without the doctrine, secondary markets of physical 
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copyrighted works could not exist, such as used book stores. The doctrine enables those 
who cannot afford to buy new copies of copyrighted works to access those works at a 
lower price through secondary markets. Libraries are able to fulfill their mission thanks to 
the first sale doctrine, which enables them to lend books to patrons. Secondhand markets 
and public libraries could not exist without the first sale doctrine. Below I discuss further 
the policy rationales for the first sale doctrine.   
JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES  
 
With development of digital technology, the artificial distinction under the 
copyright law between copyright ownership and ownership of a material object 
embodying the copyright owner’s creative expression has been increasingly challenged 
because some people think that separating content from its physical form is easy to 
accomplish in the digital age.20 Here, it is important to recognize the fact that what 
copyright law protects is creative expression itself and that the creative expression cannot 
be transferred without the help of an object, regardless of its format. That is, creative 
expression itself and an object embodying that particular expression are intrinsically 
connected. The connection does not change whether the creative expression is embodied 
in a paper format or in an electronic file. The ReDigi case holds significance in that it 
poses questions about whether digital purchased works can be resold under the first sale 
doctrine. By tracing the development of the first sale doctrine, this chapter reveals how 
this particular provision came into being. Congress, for its part, stated: “First sale is 
                                           
20 From the perspective of copyright holders, the ease of file transfer led to greater worries about the 
negative effects of the first sale doctrine on their revenue.  
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rooted in the common law rule against restraints on the alienation of tangible property” 
(The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law, 2013, p. 25). 
The first sale doctrine itself has been developed and shaped by court decisions, 
rather than statutes, in the U.S. The cases that have had significant importance in the 
operation of the first sale doctrine are discussed chronologically below. Special focus is 
given to three cases: Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
and Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. The first two cases addressed the first sale 
doctrine in the context of physical books. Those cases set the foundation for the operation 
of the doctrine or clarified a gray area by ruling that the doctrine is applied to foreign-
made and later imported copies.   
U.S. courts recognized the doctrine at least as early as 1894 in the case of 
Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co.21 In 1893, a “destructive fire” occurred at a book 
publisher’s warehouse, damaging unbound pages of a book entitled Introductory 
Language Work (Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 1894). The copyright holder 
instructed its bookbinder to sell all the debris as wastepaper with the following condition 
attached: “It is understood that all paper taken out of the building is to be utilized as 
paper stock, and all books to be sold as paper stock only, and not placed on the market as 
anything else” (p. 689, internal quotation marks omitted). A seller of used books, who 
bought those leaves, bound the papers together and sold them as reassembled books. The 
copyright holder brought suit against the used bookseller to stop him from selling the 
                                           
21 Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894).  
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reassembled books. In this, one of earliest of cases related to the first sale doctrine, the 
appellate court ruled that:  
The right to restrain the sale of a particular copy of the book by virtue of the 
copyright statutes has gone when the owner of the copyright and of that copy has 
parted with all his title to it, and has conferred an absolute title to the copy upon a 
purchaser, although with an agreement for a restricted use. The exclusive right to 
vend the particular copy no longer remains in the owner of the copyright by the 
copyright statutes. (p. 691)      
Some commentators argue that this early case can be regarded as “set[ting] the 
stage for a more expansive application of the exhaustion principle” (Perzanowski & 
Schultz, 2011, p. 913; Siy, 2013).22 The exhaustion principle (also referred to as the first 
sale doctrine) extinguishes the copyright holder’s distribution right of a copy after its 
initial sale. More than a decade later, the exhaustion principle was affirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1908 in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus23 discussed below. 
This doctrine, based on common law, had been established by court decisions until it was 
first codified in the Copyright Act of 1909. Section 41 of 1909 Copyright Act reads:  
That the copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, 
and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of 
itself constitute a transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the 
                                           
22 The exhaustion principle in the copyright context refers to the first sale doctrine, and the two terms are 
often used interchangeably. Meanwhile, “under U.S. Patent Law and U.S. Trademark Law schemes, the 
term ‘Exhaustion’ is used to refer to this same concept” (Sardina, 2011, p. 1055).  
23 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  
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copyright constitute a transfer of the title to the material object but nothing in this 
Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a 
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained. (Section 41 
of 1909 Copyright Act) 
The first time the doctrine was referred to as the “first sale doctrine” by a federal 
court was in Judge Freedman’s 1964 opinion in the case of Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. 
Arrow Drug, Inc.24   
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (1908) and Copyright Acts 
 
According to Graham (2002), the doctrine’s conceptual origin can be traced to 
1854. In the case of Stevens v. Royal Gladding,25 “the sole question [was], whether the 
mere fact that the plaintiff owned the plate, attached to it the right to print and publish the 
map, so that this right passed with the plate by sale on execution” (p. 452). In that case, 
the Court ruled that the copyright is severable—that is, the copyright and the plate were 
“distinct subjects of property” (p. 452). More than five decades later, in 1908, the first 
sale doctrine was upheld in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.26  
In the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit arguing 
that the defendant booksellers impinged on their right by selling copies of a novel entitled 
The Castaway for eighty-nine cents. A price-restriction notice was attached to each copy 
of the book, which read: “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed 
                                           
24 Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1964).  
25 Stevens v. Royal Gladding and Issac T. Proud, 58 U.S. 447 (1854).  
26 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  
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to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the 
copyright” (Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 1908, p. 341). The Court ruled that the 
Copyright Act did not “create the right to impose, by notice…a limitation at which the 
book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of 
contract” (p. 350). The ruling was handed down on the grounds that the copyright 
owner’s right does not extend to all subsequent sales of his or her work.  
Following enactment of the Copyright Act of 1790, there were no major revisions 
to the U.S. Copyright Law until 1909. It took a number of years for both houses of 
Congress to pass the Copyright Act of 1909, partly because it was not easy to come to a 
compromise regarding the protection for music composers when particular mechanical 
devices were involved to reproduce copyrighted works (“Copyright bill passed”, 1909). 
The Copyright Act of 1909 extended its coverage to all reproductions of musical 
compositions regardless of whether a mechanical device was involved, adopting a 
compulsory license system so that musicians use others’ songs without obtaining 
permission if they paid a predetermined royalty. Reflecting the Court’s decision in the 
case of Bobbs-Merill Co. v. Strauss, the Copyright Act of 1909 incorporated judicially 
crafted doctrines and the first sale doctrine as represented in Section 41 (above) was one 
of them. The Copyright Act of 1909 was a “consolidation of and amendment to many 
existing statutes, with certain new provisions” (“Copyright law’s enlarged scope”, 1909, 
p. BR132). At that time, the House Report stated that “Section 41 is not intended to 
 
 63 
change in any way existing law, but simply to recognize the distinction, long established, 
between the material object and the right to produce copies thereof.”27  
After the Copyright Act of 1909, no major changes were made to the statute 
during the first half of the 20th century, leaving it outdated and lagging behind 
technological developments (Copyright Law Revision, 1960). In 1947, Congress 
amended the Copyright Act of 1909 as Title 17 of the United States Code. Section 41 was 
renumbered as Section 27 and wording of that section was changed, accordingly. Section 
27 of the Copyright Act of 1947 reads:  
The Copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and 
the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of 
itself constitute a transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the 
copyright constitute a transfer of the title to the material object; but nothing in this 
title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a 
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained. (Section 27 
of the Copyright Act of 1947). 
A more thoroughgoing shift in copyright was central to the Copyright Act of 1976 
particularly in the wake of the American International Pictures case. In 1976, when 
deliberating a first sale-related section in revising the Copyright Act of 1947, the 
Committee on the Judiciary paid attention to this case (American International Pictures, 
Inc., v. Foreman, 1975),28 holding that “the plaintiff in an infringement action had the 
                                           
27 H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).  
28 American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975).  
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burden of establishing that the allegedly infringing copies in the defendant’s possession 
were not lawfully made or acquired under section 27 of the present law” (H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, 1976, p. 80). According to House Representative Report No. 94-1476 (1976), in 
determining whether a defendant could exercise privileges established by section 109(a) 
and (b), the defendant needed to prove that a particular copy of a copyrighted work was 
lawfully made or obtained. The Committee reasoned that “[t]he defendant…clearly has 
the particular knowledge of how possession of the particular copy was acquired, and 
should have the burden of proving this evidence to the court” (H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 
1976, p. 81).    
The Copyright Act of 1976 was the first major revision since 1909. Congress 
officially codified Section 109 in the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 109(a) states that 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without authority by the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.” Litman (1987) captures some of the ambiguity 
and comments that some provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 “purport to adopt 
common law doctrine; others purport to abrogate it” (p. 859). 
Creating Statutory Exemptions to the First Sale Doctrine  
 
Advances in modern technology enabled people to duplicate copyrighted works 
with ease, which led to legislative efforts after the 1976 Copyright Act to generate 
statutory exemptions to the first sale doctrine (Corsello, 1991). As shown below, 
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Congress considered those exemptions medium by medium. In the early 1980s, 
consumers could get a rented phonograph record through music rental stores at prices 
ranging from $0.99 to $2.50, and many consumers engaged in copying the rented music 
record (Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984). In the United States, some 
music rental stores gave their customers free blank tapes for taping at home, and in some 
cases record rental shops’ advertisements encouraged their customers to engage in home 
taping (Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984). For example, one record rental 
shop inserted the following phrase in its advertisement: “NEVER, EVER BUY 
ANOTHER RECORD!!” (Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 30). 
Another record rental shop used more subtle language: “Now, we won’t tell you How 
best to enjoy these albums, but, we figure, if you’re smart enough to come to Dudeff’s in 
the first place, you’re smart enough to figure that one out for yourself” (Audio and Video 
First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 29). The same record rental shop also used the 
following phrase: “OH YEAH! I HAVE GREAT DEALS ON BLANK TAPES AND 
ALBUMS TOO!!” (p. 29).     
With regard to audio record renters’ home taping behavior, evidence from Japan 
was presented during Congressional hearings on the Audio and Video First Sale 
Doctrine. In early 1980s, the record rental business was still in its early stage of 
development worldwide and the first record rental outlet launched its business in Japan in 
1980 and as of 1983, more than 1600 record rental shops existed in Japan (Audio and 
Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984). According to one survey conducted in Japan, over 
97 percent of consumers who used record rental shops engaged in taping the rented 
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records, and those who were in support of creating first sale exceptions to the record 
rental case envisioned that a similar situation would occur in the United States (Audio 
and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984). The record industry considered the prevailing 
phenomenon of home taping as a serious threat to its industry and proponents of creating 
first sale exceptions to commercial record rental pointed out that the industry had already 
experienced a steady decline in revenues between 1978 and 1982 (Audio and Video First 
Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984).  
In her testimony at the 1989 Senate Computer Software Rental hearing, Heidi 
Roizen, then President of the Software Publishers Association, stated that “the software 
industry has had to rely on moral suasion to prevent people from stealing our products 
through software rentals” (Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1989, 1989, p. 
39). The computer and recording industries successfully lobbied Congress to include 
exceptions to the first sale doctrine (Davis, 2009). They wanted to secure revenues from 
the then-burgeoning rental business. Again, the concern over consumers’ engagement 
with copying at home was presented: 
Heidi Roizen also stated in her testimony:  
We believe these “rentals” are just opportunities to copy software…Moreover, 
most applications are really only useful if you store data on them. Again, it is 
difficult to believe that someone would rent a computer program, insert all their 
data, and then erase that same material before returning the diskette. What is 
really happening is that these programs are being copied by the people who “rent” 
them. (Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1989, 1989, p. 39)   
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At Congressional hearings on the topic of creating exceptions to first sale, both 
the record industry and the computer software industry expressed their concerns over 
consumers’ engagement with home taping and copying software, and potential 
detrimental influence on both their business and the American economic community was 
addressed. It was taken for granted that new revenue streams drawn in the future from 
new technological developments should benefit the content industries. It can be fairly 
said that the dominant understanding of copyright protection which served the arguments 
of those industries present at Congressional hearings was the economic incentive 
paradigm. 
Eventually, efforts of the content industries to create exemptions to the first sale 
doctrine worked. In 1984, Congress passed the Record Rental Amendment, which does 
not allow the lawful purchaser of a copy of a sound recording to rent, lease, or lend that 
copy without the copyright owner’s permission.29 A few years later, Congress enacted 
the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990. The software industry had 
successfully lobbied Congress to enact statutory first sale exceptions30 and had adopted 
restrictive licensing practices that preclude consumers from reselling or renting their 
purchased software (McIntyre, 2014). The legislation prohibited the rental, lease, or 
lending of computer software for commercial purposes without authorization from the 
                                           
29 Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000)). 
30 U.S.C. § 109(b) (B) (2012). (“This subsection does not apply to (i) a computer program which is 
embodied in a machine or product and which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation or use of the 
machine or product; or (ii) a computer program embodied in or used in conjunction with a limited purpose 
computer that is designed for playing video games and may be designed for other purposes.”).  
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owner of the copyright in the program, with some exceptions for the rental of console-
based video games and embedded computer programs.  
During the early 1980s, the motion picture industry also lobbied Congress and a 
bill similar to that governing software was introduced (e.g., H.R. 1029) to include 
exemptions to the first sale doctrine with regard to the rental of videocassettes and 
discs.31 However, due to a backlash from both consumers and video rental stores, the 
motion picture industry’s effort to extend statutory exemptions to movie rentals failed.  
It is worth noting that when discussions about creating statutory exceptions to the 
first sale doctrine to control rental of video tapes were underway in the U.S. Congress, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark case in the Universal Studios v. Sony was being 
considered. During Congressional hearings, Robert W. Kastenmeier, a Democratic 
Representative from Wisconsin who represented the interests of consumers, asked the 
following question to Steven Roberts, President of 20TH Century Fox 
Telecommunications, who represented the film entertainment industry: “Do you think the 
enactment of this legislation would render the outcome of Universal Studios v. Sony less 
important either legislatively or in terms of litigation? (Audio and Video First Sale 
Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 206).  
Mr. Roberts replied:  
The Betamax case is being heard by the Supreme Court, and it stands on its own 
in that environment. This, we believe, is a very separate issue. Both issues deal in 
the copyright area but this one addresses a very different problem. And we would 
                                           
31 Consumer Video Sales-Rental Amendment, H.R. 1029, 98th Cong. (1983).  
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like this to stand on its own merits. (Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 
1983/1984, p. 206) 
Congressman Kastenmeier disagreed with Mr. Robert’s statement that the 
proposed legislation governing video rentals and the Supreme Court case governing 
individuals’ home video taping were different. The Congressman noted:  
It is different, but there are also similarities and connections. They both have a 
connection with home tape recording. They both deal with lack of control over 
product; that is, ultimate lack of control. They both attempt through some new 
legislative means or judicial means, to acquire the royalty which is not now due 
studios, except equitably, one could say. In that sense there are some similarities. 
(Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 206, emphasis added) 
The film entertainment industry was concerned that individuals would tape videos 
at home and negatively impact that industry’s revenue stream. Speaking on behalf of the 
film industry, Mr. Roberts’s remark demonstrated why that industry wanted to 
distinguish the two types of home taping as being separate: in order to maximize revenue 
from all streams, including control of the video rental business and restriction on 
individuals’ home video taping. Arguably, the failure of lobbying efforts by the motion 
picture industry was influenced by the Supreme Court’s understanding of individuals’ 
private home taping behavior and the general public’s awareness of the issue. This 
discussion of consumer interests versus content industry’s desire to maximize revenue 
demonstrates why understanding the politics surrounding a particular piece of legislation 
or societal issue is important. Chapter 4 undertakes a positive evaluation of the ebook 
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ecosystem and its politics. Based on a positive evaluation, later chapters make a 
normative argument.  
In retrospect, it is important to note that when the motion picture industry lobbied 
Congress to prohibit the commercial rental of videocassettes and discs without the 
copyright holder’s permission, the industry was becoming aware that lucrative new 
revenue streams could be derived from videocassette and disc rental stores (Audio and 
Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984). The motion picture industry that was already 
benefiting from various other revenue streams, such as box office, cable, airline and 
television sales, realized in the early 1980s that videocassette recorders could create 
another huge market. Arguably, these situations led the motion picture industry to take a 
somewhat different position, compared to that of the record industry, in terms of 
promoting the creation of statutory exemptions to the first sale doctrine.  
“Congress felt that renters would have no desire to own their own copy of the 
rented movies” (Corsello, 1991, p. 193) in contrast to making copies of music or 
computer software. Conventional wisdom holds that people do not usually watch a movie 
over and over again, with the exception of kids’ videos. Thus, Congress focused on the 
level of difficulty in copying a rented video as opposed to copying a music record and 
computer software along with the unlikelihood that consumers would make permanent 
copies of videos for repetitive viewing. Dr. Nina Cornell, an economist, testified at the 
Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine hearing noting: “Most people rent most 
videocassette titles because it is not worth much to them to see the same movie many 
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times, and, therefore, they will not pay a large premium to buy rather than rent” (Audio 
and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 238).   
When the film industry lobbied Congress to include exemptions to the first sale 
doctrine, video retailers collectively expressed their concern over giving the motion 
picture industry a virtual monopoly over film distribution (Harris, 1982). When 
expressing their concerns, the coalition of video retailers along with consumer groups 
effectively employed a rhetorical argument, as well as refuting the motion picture 
industry’s arguments with market data. For example, Jack Wayman, Senior Vice 
President of the Consumer Electronics Group of the Electronic Industries Association and 
Chairman of the Home Recording Rights Coalition, argued:  
Once the small retailer…is subject to Hollywood’s demands, the movie industry 
will be free to gouge the consumer. Hollywood is eagerly awaiting its chance. As 
an MPAA spokesman has candidly put it, H.R. 1029 is a quest for “maximization 
of revenues,” a product of “greed.” Who pays for such greed? The video retailer 
and the consumer (Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 224).  
Corsello (1991), who had observed that consumers do not want to make copies of 
video, noted, “The failure of the motion picture industry to secure passage of the 
Consumer Sales-Video Rental Amendment was not a total loss to film producers, 
however, because revenues from video cassette rentals are today a major source of their 
income” (p. 192). During the 1980s and early 1990s, the movie rental business 
experienced rapid growth in the United States, and the movie industry’s revenue from the 
video business for years exceeded their box office revenue (Corsello, 1991; vanden 
 
 72 
Heuvel, 2012). Not surprisingly, the movie industry initially figured that only a little 
revenue would be secured from video rentals and “first asked for legislation to restrict 
rentals” (Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, 1983/1984, p. 224). However, after 
realizing the potential scope of the video rental business, the motion picture industry 
wanted to control the video rental business. Throughout history, whenever new 
technologies have paved the way for new business models in the market, copyright 
holders such as the motion picture industry have been reluctant to embrace the new 
technologies and have asked Congress to enact legislation that would give them the 
power to control the business model and subsequent revenues. In that way, copyright 
holders have resorted largely to the economic incentive framework. Simply put, their 
arguments have been the same: If we keep losing revenue from the market, we may not 
be able to generate new content. Before we reach that point, Congress should provide a 
legislative solution.      
Legislative Efforts to Adopt a Digital First Sale Doctrine 
 
With the advent of digital technologies and the Internet, the copying question 
became whether the first sale doctrine could be applied to digital transmission. In 1995, a 
presidential task force pondered the question and eventually concluded that the first sale 
doctrine does not operate in the case of digital transmissions.32 The task force argued that 
“the first sale model…should not apply with respect to distribution by transmission, 
                                           
32 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information 




because transmission by means of current technology involves both the reproduction of 
the work and the distribution of that reproduction” (p. 95). In 1997, Representatives Dick 
Boucher (D-VA) and Tom Campbell (R-CA) introduced a new House Bill entitled 
“Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act” (H.R. 3048) in an effort to update the 
Copyright Act for the digital age.33 The proposed bill considered that the digital first sale 
doctrine makes legal the transmission of a lawfully acquired copy of a copyrighted work 
under the copyright law as long as that person who acquired the work deletes the original 
copy from her computer when transferring it. According to the proposed bill, if in the end 
only one original copy exists, the transmitter is not subject to copyright infringement. In 
addition, the proposed bill sought to address the issue of restrictive licensing terms that 
abrogate consumers’ rights as well as broader reproduction and distribution of un-
copyrightable materials. Although the bill was not enacted by Congress, the proposed 
legislative initiative indicates an effort to rebalance the interests of consumers and 
copyright holders (Long, 2008; Newman, 2010).   
In 2003, three bills were introduced to extend the first sale doctrine to digital 
works. Those bills were the Digital Consumer Right to Know Act (2003), the Benefits 
Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act 
(2003), and the Consumer, Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness 
Act (2003).34 The Digital Consumer Right to Know Act had a provision that would 
                                           
33 See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105: H.R. 3048: 
34 The BALANCE Act included a provision that legalize the resale of digital goods. Under the proposed 
bill, Section 109 of Copyright Act is amended by adding the following: “(f) The privileges prescribed by 
subsections (a) and (c) apply in a case in which the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work in 
 
 74 
require a producer or distributor of a copyrighted work to inform consumers of any 
technological protection measures that prevent the consumer from “engaging in the 
secondhand transfer or sale of legally acquired content to another consumer.”35 The other 
two bills specifically applied the first sale doctrine to digital goods under the condition 
that the seller does not retain his or her digital work after the sale, virtually abrogating 
licenses that limit consumers’ right to the resale of their digital works (Serra, 2013). As 
Serra (2013) contends, the failed proposals did not pay enough attention to balancing the 
copyright holders’ interests against the interests of the public. Although the intent to 
benefit the public by expanding the first sale doctrine to digital goods and thereby 
allowing their resale took a step in the right direction in terms of enhancing consumer 
welfare, the proposed bills did not fully consider concerns of the content industries 
regarding unprecedented levels of copyright infringement that might result from such 
resales. As I will explain in Chapter 5, when a “forward-and-delete technology” was first 
discussed in the above-mentioned bills, people were not sure whether that technology 
was even feasible. More importantly how to implement that particular technology was 
not sufficiently discussed either within or outside the Congressional forum. Architecture-
only solutions that do not fully consider sociopolitical contexts are necessarily limited in 
terms of their feasibility in society. Therefore, a holistic approach to policy research that 
considers all concerned modalities is recommended.          
                                                                                                                             
a digital or other nonanalog format, or any person authorized by such owner, sells or otherwise disposes of 
the work by means of a transmission to a single recipient, if the owner does not retain the copy or 
phonorecord in a retrievable form and the work is so sold or otherwise disposed of in its original format.”  
35 S. 692 § 3(c)(5).  
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The Copyright Office’s Recommendation 
 
Various forms of media content are easily and cheaply copied and distributed due 
to the availability of Internet and digital media technologies. Moreover, some of the 
constraints that are latent in the technology involved in the copying of tangible property 
are not present in digital creative works. For example, one has to spend a considerable 
amount of time and expense to copy an entire book. However, digital copyrighted works 
can readily be copied and mass distributed at almost no cost and with no degradation over 
time. Thus, along with ever-developing digital technologies, the first sale doctrine can be 
seen as a threat to content industries, including Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Congress 
passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to make adjustments to the 
Copyright Act in light of these technological developments as well as potential 
implications for copyright holders. Since the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
enacted in 1998, made it illegal to circumvent technical protection measures, some 
commentators have argued that Congress failed to give due weight to the issue of 
copyright balancing (e.g., Gillespie, 2007).  
Many people argue that the U.S. Copyright Office has consistently sided with the 
copyright authors and content providers over the past several decades. As mandated by 
Section 104 of the DMCA, in 2001, the U.S. Copyright Office evaluated impacts of the 
copyright law and amendments on electronic commerce and technology developments 
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and recommended that Congress not expand the first sale doctrine to digital media.36 In 
its report on digital first sale, the U.S. Copyright Office viewed an automatic “forward-
and-delete” mechanism as not being practical, justifying their recommendation that the 
first sale doctrine not be applied to the digital realm. The office was concerned about 
those who do not delete their copies after selling or transferring ownership of copies to 
others.  
As described below, the Copyright Office gave weight to the economic incentive 
argument presented by the content industry and recommended not adopting the digital 
first sale doctrine: 
Physical copies of works degrade with time and use, making used copies less 
desirable than new ones. Digital information does not degrade, and can be 
reproduced perfectly on a recipient’s computer. The “used” copy is just as 
desirable as (in fact, is indistinguishable from) a new copy of the same work. 
Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the movement of copies, 
since digital copies can be transmitted nearly instantaneously anywhere in the 
world with minimal effort and negligible cost. The need to transport physical 
copies of works, which acts as a natural brake on the effect of resales on the 
copyright owner’s market, no longer exists in the realm of digital transmissions. 
The ability of such “used” copies to compete for market share with new copies is 
thus far greater in the digital world. (DMCA Report, 2001, pp. 82-83)  
                                           




Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2013)  
 
After noticing large price differences between textbooks sold in the U.S. and 
textbooks sold in Asia, Supap Kirtsaeng asked his relatives and friends in Thailand to 
purchase copies of foreign edition textbooks published by John Wiley & Sons and to send 
them to him. He intended to sell these imported books online to help defray his living 
expenses and educational costs. He sold them through online marketplaces such as eBay. 
John Wiley & Sons filed a suit against Supap Kirtsaeng, arguing that Section 109 did not 
apply to this case because Section 602 (a)(1) states that “Importation into the United 
States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or 
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an 
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 
106….”  
Imposing statutory damages of $600,000 ($75,000 per work) on Kirtsaeng, the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the first sale doctrine did not apply to 
“foreign-manufactured goods” even though those goods were produced with the 
copyright owner’s permission. On appeal, the Second Circuit supported the District 
Court’s decision. Kirtsaeng appealed to the Supreme Court, pointing out that there is 
disagreement among appeals courts with regard to the interpretation of Section 109 of the 
Copyright Act.  
The Supreme Court was asked to address the question of whether “lawfully made 
under this title” imposes a geographical limitation with regard to the applicability of the 
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first sale defense. The Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine did apply to copies 
of copyrighted works produced in foreign countries as long as they were manufactured in 
accordance with the U.S. Copyright Law. Before the decision, it was unclear whether the 
doctrine applied to a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad.  
The Supreme Court noted that 1) “geographical interpretations create more 
linguistic problems than they resolve,” 2) “[b]oth historical and contemporary statutory 
context indicate that Congress, when writing the present version of §109(a), did not have 
geography in mind,” and 3) the Supreme Court is subject to interpret a statute in a way 
that retains the essence of the common law when the statute deals with issues previously 
ruled by the common law (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013). The majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court held that if “under this title” included geographical 
limitation, it would cause a “parade of horribles.” Section 109 had used the same phrase 
in two additional places, and other provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law also included 
the same phrase. Thus, interpreting “under this title” to include geographical limitations 
caused problems in terms of consistency within the U.S. Copyright Law.  
An amici curiae brief, submitted to the Kirtsaeng Court by 25 intellectual 
property law professors, also noted that §109(a) should be read in accordance with the 
doctrine’s historical and statutory contexts which disfavor imposing constraints on “the 
customary rights of legitimate owners of non infringing copies to use and sell those 
copies” (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013, p. 3). Moreover, the brief pointed 
out that interpreting section 109 as having geographical limitations could get libraries, 
secondhand book stores, computer companies, and museums in trouble by limiting their 
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ability to fulfill their missions. For example, if section 109 were interpreted as not 
applying to foreign-made products, libraries would not be able to lend books to patrons 
unless they received permission in advance from the copyright owner.  
In sum, the Supreme Court reasoned that interpreting Section 109 as it did was 
reasonable from a linguistic perspective. It was also reasonable given statutory and 
historical contexts and in terms of respecting the common law tradition that disfavors 
imposing restrictions on subsequent transactions of copyrighted works after their initial 
distribution. It should be noted that the Kirtsaeng case, which addressed cross-border 
transactions, still concerned physical objects (paper books). Although this case did not 
address the online transmission issue of the first sale doctrine, “it could have an impact 
on the ability of right holders to offer their works at different prices and different times in 
different countries, and may result in legislative reexamination of the doctrine as a 
whole” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013, p. 37).      
 
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. (2013) 
 
The implication of the Kirtsaeng case does not extend to the resale of digital 
goods. To date, no first sale case has been reported in the context of ebooks. The first 
case exploring this issue returns to the fraught environment of digital music, a domain 
that had been rocked by other problems related to digital and Internet-based copying 
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schemes in the Napster and Grokster cases.37 The legality of reselling digital goods was 
debated in the ReDigi case, specially addressing the MP3 format as one instance of the 
digital form. When it comes to copyrighted physical works, the doctrine has been applied 
without great difficulty. However, the digital environment poses a number of questions 
pertaining to the applicability of the doctrine to that domain.   
Established in 2011, ReDigi, an online marketplace for preowned digital music 
files, allowed its users to sell their legally purchased digital music files and buy other 
used digital music files from other users. When a user sold her file, she would earn 20% 
of the sale price, while another 20% was allocated to an “escrow” fund for artists, with 
ReDigi retaining 60%. This process functioned like a second hand record store. In the 
transactions, sellers of digital files received credit for future purchases so that no money 
changed hands. ReDigi argued that “ReDigi’s structure ensures that no copies of an 
eligible file are made when one ReDigi user sells an Eligible File in the user’s Cloud 
Locker to another ReDigi user through the ReDigi Marketplace.”38 The online 
marketplace for pre-owned music files established a mechanism that accessed the user’s 
computer and checked to make sure music files were legally purchased and that the user 
had not kept copies of those files on her computer after transferring the files.   
Capitol Records contended that ReDigi’s activities were not compatible with 
copyright laws. Capitol claimed that uploading music files necessarily involved 
                                           
37 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (2001), MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913 (2005). 
38 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9-
12, Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi Inc., Case No 12 Civ 0095 (RJS) (SDNY 27 January 2012).  
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reproduction and thus violated Capitol’s exclusive reproduction right. In addition, Capitol 
argued that MP3 files in the ReDigi case were not “material objects” and further pointed 
out that ReDigi did not purchase those files (Plovnick, 2012, p. 44). Capitol contended 
that all of those factors disqualified ReDigi from using the first sale doctrine as a defense.  
The ReDigi court held that ReDigi was liable for copyright infringement. 
According to the court’s logic, the first sale doctrine was not applicable unless the hard 
drive itself was transferred to the new lawful owner of the digital files. The court said that 
“the plain text of the Copyright Act makes clear that reproduction occurs when a 
copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object” (Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi 
Inc., 2013, p. 5, emphasis original). It did not matter whether only one file existed during 
the file transfer process in determining ReDigi’s violation of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive reproduction right. In other words, ReDigi court’s logic is that digital transfers 
amount to reproduction regardless of the number of copies in existence.   
The ReDigi court held that if a file is moved from one place to another, a 
reproduction occurred. ReDigi tried to refute this conclusion by resorting to the 1973 case 
of C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, wherein the defendant lifted images from greeting cards 
with the help of chemicals and placed those images on ceramic plaques for sale. The 
court held that the defendant was not infringing on the copyright holder’s reproduction 
right because “should defendant desire to make one hundred ceramic plaques…, 
defendant would be required to purchase one hundred separate…prints” (C.M. Paula Co. 
v. Logan, 1973, p. 191). In a similar way, ReDigi users had to buy a digital music file in 
order to make a sale and ReDigi terminated the seller’s access to that particular file after 
 
 82 
the file was transferred. Regardless of the similarity between the two cases, the ReDigi 
court rejected that argument without any further explanation of what fundamental 
differences existed between the two cases, saying simply “no new material object was 
created” (Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 2013, p. 7).    
 It is worth noting that Canada takes a different approach regarding a copyright 
holder’s reproduction rights. The Supreme Court of Canada held that transferring a 
copyrighted work from one medium to another does not violate the copyright owner’s 
reproduction right if only one copy is left in the end (Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit 
Champlain Inc., 2002). While Canada has developed its own Copyright Act, which 
differs from that of the U.S., Canada has also adhered to the Berne Convention for 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and other international treaties regarding 
copyright protection. Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of 
reproduction presents implications for the United States. Chapter 6 considers the 
“forward-and-delete” technology as one of the technological solutions for justifying a 
digital first sale doctrine, following the logic of the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision 
on the reproduction issue and granting more practical feasibility to technology advances.  
The decision in the Canadian case holds significance for both the resale of digital 
goods and the future of cloud-based computer services that enable users to transfer their 
digital files (Plovnick, 2012). It should be noted that as long as digital transfers are 
considered as infringing on copyright by producing a reproduction, regardless of the 
number of copies in existence, most of digital transfers can constitute copyright 
infringement, meaning that a viable digital first sale doctrine and cloud-based 
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technological innovations are not likely to be accomplished. As I explain in Chapter 6, 
even though a digital first sale doctrine applies to digital goods, temporary reproduction 
issues should be resolved in order to make a digital first sale doctrine viable in the 
marketplace. It is also worth noting that in the case of UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp. (2012), the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the 
exhaustion principle applies to both physical objects and downloaded software, making it 
legal to resell used software licenses in the second-hand market.39 The debate over the 
resale of digital goods is far from over and the public debate over a digital first sale 
doctrine is still in its early stages. In July 2013, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
Internet Policy Task Force published a Green Paper on “Copyright Policy, Creativity, and 
Innovation in the Digital Economy,” providing insight on the need to address a digital 
first sale doctrine issue as well as other digital copyright issues.40 Although this Green 
Paper called for the need to further develop policy on several issues including a digital 
first sale doctrine, it did not provide any conclusion on a digital first sale doctrine but 
recommended the Department seek further public comments and hold multi-stakeholder 
dialogue. In response to the call for seeking public comments, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce sought public comment from various stakeholders with regard to the scope 
and relevance of the first sale doctrine in the digital environment context.41 As part of 
                                           








this effort, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force hosted public 
roundtable discussions in cities across the country concerning digital copyright policy, 
including the digital first sale doctrine.42  
POLICY OUTCOMES OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the first sale doctrine applies only to distribution 
rights for copies and consequently is examined here in terms of how distribution markets 
function. First, the doctrine plays a critical role in improving the public’s access to 
copyrighted works at greater affordability and availability (Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011; 
Reese, 2003). The existence of secondary goods facilitates competition between 
copyright holders who produce new products and secondary market players, such as used 
bookstores or online auction sites like eBay. The existence of these latter markets in turn 
puts pressure on copyright holders to lower the price of their products due to price 
competition.43  
Second, those who purchase new products at a high price also can recoup some of 
their investment by selling those products later. Hence, when those markets function 
well, copyright holders cannot form a monopoly in the market because consumers have 
other options. Secondhand markets, including movie and video game products, still 
                                           
42 See https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/04/16/2014-08627/notice-of-public-meetings-on-
copyright-policy-topics-as-called-for-in-the-department-of-commerce 
43 It should be noted that there is a debate about whether overall lower prices are a good thing in terms of 
incentivizing market innovation and seeking ultimate consumer welfare. However, in the context of the 
first sale doctrine, one matter is clear: the existence of lower-tiered prices can allow those who cannot pay 
for original products at a higher price to access cultural works, and this benefit should not be disregarded.    
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generate substantial revenues. As of November 2012, nearly 40% of GameStop’s revenue 
came from used game products (Team, 2012). In 2013, Redbox, the nation’s largest 
DVD, Blu-Ray, and game rental business, earned $1.97 billion (Fritz, 2014). Redbox’s 
business model would be impossible without the first sale doctrine. In short, the doctrine 
helps consumers benefit from secondary markets that would not otherwise exist, which 
eventually contributes to the development of a broader market economy by creating new 
sectors.  
Third, preservation of copyrighted works, such as literary works, could be 
hampered if the first sale doctrine did not exist (Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011; Reese, 
2003). The doctrine limits the copyright holder’s right over subsequent dispositions of 
her work. This means that creative works already available on the market are likely to 
exist elsewhere over time regardless of copyright holders’ interest in keeping it in 
publication. When authors and publishers do not want to republish out-of-print books 
anymore or when they have to retrieve books for various reasons, the first sale doctrine 
insures that such books are still available.  
Fourth, privacy can be better protected due to the existence of the doctrine 
(Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011). Consumers do not have to disclose information about 
subsequent transactions about the product or their use of it. Video rental businesses have 
existed due to the doctrine and relevant laws, such as Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988, that were enacted to protect consumers’ privacy against unauthorized data 
collection. If consumers have to get permission from the copyright holder before they 
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resell or lend copies of copyrighted works, their privacy cannot be protected.44 For 
example, people who bought vulgar novels or books might want to protect their 
anonymity when transferring ownership of those books.   
Fifth, the doctrine is useful in terms of enhancing transactional clarity. Market 
participants benefit from the doctrine through reduced information and transaction costs 
because successive purchasers of a copy of a copyrighted work can “lawfully” own the 
work without identifying and negotiating with the copyright owner. If a purchaser were 
required to check all terms and conditions and copyright ownership of copyrighted 
works, the purchaser would face high costs to purchase a copyrighted work in the market 
that would result in fewer market transactions. Consumers should be able to purchase 
copyrighted works directly, trusting the fact that the original copyright holder’s control 
over the disposition of his or her work is prohibited.   
Finally, some commentators argue that first sale promotes both innovation and 
platform competition (Hess, 2013; Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011). They argue that 
copyright holders are likely to make efforts to compete with secondary markets that sell 
used goods as their products. Such competition can bring innovations to market. 
Consumer lock-in takes place “when the costs of switching to a new vendor or 
technology platform are sufficient to discourage consumers from adopting an otherwise 
preferable competitive offering” (Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011, p. 900). The first sale 
doctrine reduces consumer lock-in with respect to device platforms by enabling 
                                           
44 In addition, it is very likely that copyright holders would have no incentive to process these permission 
requests in the first place, which already raise issues with regard to fair use exemptions.  
 
 87 
consumers to resell past purchases and recover a portion of their initial investment when 
switching to a new platform and by encouraging secondary markets that can affect the 
market price of new platforms (Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011). For example, when a 
consumer, who has enjoyed Sony’s video game console Playstation, wishes to switch to 
Microsoft’s Xbox console, if she spent a lot of money on purchasing software and 
hardware from Sony, it might be a hard decision for her to switch to Microsoft’s Xbox. 
However, if she can resell her video games on a secondary market, such as eBay, and 
recover a large portion of her previous investment, then her decision to switch to 
Microsoft’s system might be easier. In determining the benefits of this aspect of the 
doctrine, interoperability issues need to be considered. As discussed earlier, barriers to 
compatibility between devices, imposed by device makers and content distributors, can 
limit the doctrine’s effects through consumer lock-in.  
THEORETICAL RATIONALES FOR THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE  
 
 
Copyright is a government-granted limited monopoly, and the first sale doctrine is 
a limitation to the monopoly given to the copyright holder. In recognition of the need to 
limit the copyright holder’s monopoly, the U.S. Congress introduced the first sale 
doctrine in the Copyright Act. Subsequently, scholars and courts have adopted, often 
implicitly, the rationale that underlies theories discussed below to explain the first sale 
doctrine. The theories reviewed below—the “Just Rewards” Theory, the Theory of 
Transaction Protection, and the Ownership Theory—commonly acknowledge that the 
monopoly of copyright owners should be limited and that balancing interests between the 
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public’s wide access to and use of copyrighted goods with those of the copyright holders 
is a good thing.  
However, the theories, which can be found in U.S. court decisions pertaining to 
the first sale doctrine, fail to provide an overarching and cohesive explanation for their 
necessity. That is, missing from the theories is a normative framework that explains why 
that particular theory ought to exist. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to explain cultural 
democracy in the U.S. relative to the context of the first sale doctrine. That is, theoretical 
justifications for copyright protection have been actively discussed by U.S. scholars. 
However, conversations about the theoretical rationales used to justify the first sale 
doctrine have been largely overlooked in favor of considerations that center mostly on 
policy effects of the doctrine. By contrast, in Germany and elsewhere, the theoretical 
rationales discussed in this chapter have been raised (Ahn, 2004).  
The U.S. legal system and the German legal system stem from two starkly 
different traditions. The civil law system of Germany, also used in Korea which drew 
heavily from the German model, is based on statutory law while the legal system of the 
U.S. is derived from common law. Under the common law system, judges’ decisions play 
a significant role in making laws based on precedent, and courts are usually expected to 
follow the reasoning developed and adopted in relevant precedents. Subsequent to 
significant judicial doctrines, complementary statutory law is often enacted. By 
comparison, in a civil law system, the role of judges is largely limited to applying the 
provisions of a codified set of laws, based on their judgment of the facts of the case.  
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A cautious argument can be made that differences in the degree of interest paid to 
specialized theory regarding the first sale doctrine can be explained by differences in the 
two legal system (i.e., common law v. civil law). Hence, for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1908 decision in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus laid the groundwork for 
legislative efforts to adopt the first sale doctrine but was not the single factor that led to 
enactment.   
It is important to note that the three theories have been largely developed in 
Germany. Given that the focus of this dissertation is to investigate the applicability of the 
first sale doctrine to digital goods in the context of the U.S. system, my discussion about 
the three theories is intentionally brief. Having said that, after reviewing those theories, I 
explain why having an overarching normative framework is important. In Chapter 5, I 
show in what ways a cultural democracy framework can justify the first sale doctrine in 
the context of copyright law.       
The “Just Rewards” Theory45  
 
Courts have examined the balancing of interests of inventers with those of the 
public. In 1895 in the case of Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that lawfully purchased patented products become “the absolute, unrestricted 
property of the purchaser, with the right to sell as an essential incident of such 
ownership.”46 As Diacovo (1994) noted, “it is important that once the patentee receives 
                                           
45 This theory is called “Belohnungstheorie” in German (Ahn, 2004). 
46 Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895).  
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his ‘just reward,’ the patented product passes outside the scope of the monopoly” (p. 61). 
The same logic can be applied to copyright law, given that copyright law was developed 
to balance the interests of the copyright holder and the interests of the public.   
Similar reasoning was applied in the early 20th century case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
v. Straus, where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the notion that “the nature of the 
property and the protection intended to be given the inventor or author as the reward of 
genius or intellect in the production of his book or work of art” (Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 1908, p. 347, emphasis added). Often the term “return” has been used instead of 
reward, when discussing economic incentive for creators. For example, Emanuel Celler, 
former Representative in Congress from the State of New York and chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee, said in the context of revising the Copyright Law of 1909 
that included exemptions for “coin-operated machines”:  
Since 1946 our Committee on the Judiciary has had primary legislative 
jurisdiction, under the rules of the House, of all measures affecting copyrights. 
Our committee thus shoulders the solemn responsibility of guarding the 
intellectual property of authors and composers and making sure, in an 
increasingly complex society, that American creative talent will continue to 
receive encouragement in the form of just return from the commercial 
exploitation of its works. (cited in Hanson, 1968, E17, emphasis added)       
The “just rewards” theory, when applied to copyright-related cases, claims that if 
the copyright owner was rewarded from his or her first disposition of the copyrighted 
work, the copyright owner has no reason to control subsequent dispositions (Choderker, 
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1999; Diacovo, 1994; Moon, 2014). In the U.S., this theory has been supported on the 
grounds that it is well in line with the original purpose of the copyright law to seek a 
balance between the rights of copyright holders and copy owners (Moon, 2014). Under 
the “just rewards” theory, the subsequent purchaser should be entitled to resell the 
copyrighted work, given that the copyright owner has already been rewarded from the 
initial sale. There is an underlying notion that allowing the copyright owner to 
continually benefit from the product is not just. As noted above, this theory is also well 
suited to patent law which was developed to promote innovation. 
Theory of Transaction Protection47  
 
The treatment of first sale has developed in connection with property law 
frameworks. In the case of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
clarified that the first sale doctrine is rooted in “the common law’s refusal to permit 
restraints on the alienation of chattels”48 (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013, p. 
1363).49 The theory against restraint on alienation of property is not just for the first sale 
doctrine itself but applies also to any issues relating to tangible property (Diacovo, 1994), 
given that alienability is an essential element of tangible property. To ensure that markets 
function properly and, in turn, that the welfare of society is achieved, the purchaser of a 
                                           
47 This theory is called “Verkehrssicherungstheorie” in German (Ahn, 2004).  
48 The alienation of chattel refers to transferring title of a tangible property.  
49 In property law, alienation refers to “the transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or 
other things, from one person to another” (see http://thelawdictionary.org/alienation/). “Alienation of 
intellectual property can take one of two basic forms. The first is its entire alienation by selling, at one time, 
all rights to the property. The second is the complete alienation of copies of the property with limitations on 
how those copies may be used: the selling of copies of copyrighted works, objects displaying trademarks, 
or licenses to use patented technology” (see 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/Philosophy/88hugh4.txt.htm).   
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copyrighted tangible object should be entitled to exercise the right of alienation 
(Choderker, 1999). This rationale of free alienability has served well in property law, 
given that putting restraints on alienation of property can be considered an intrinsic 
limitation to the stream of commerce (Moon, 2014; Singer, 2006).  
This principle underscores the idea that the utility value of a tangible copyrighted 
object would be substantially diminished if the object’s original owner was the only 
individual who could exercise control over it, not allowing subsequent purchasers or 
society as a whole to benefit from that work (Choderker, 1999). As the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the right of alienation 
“is one of the essential incidents of the right of general property in movables, and 
restraints upon alienation have generally been regarded as obnoxious to public policy, 
which is best served by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to 
hand.”50 Thus, this theory is well suited to the English common law tradition that abhors 
restraints on alienation of property (Diacovo, 1994).  
Ownership Theory51  
 
The idea of ownership is a residual category that many have looked to in order to 
resolve distribution rights. According to this theory, the first sale doctrine is needed in 
order to resolve the tension between a copyright holder’s distribution right and a copy 
owner’s property ownership of the copyrighted work. This theory claims that transferring 
ownership of a copyrighted work should naturally entail the process of extinguishing the 
                                           
50 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911).  
51 This theory is called “Eigentumstheorie” in German (Ahn, 2004).  
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copyright holder’s right of distribution. However, this theory has been criticized on the 
ground that ownership and copyright protect intrinsically different subjects (Ahn, 2004).  
Some commentators criticize this theory further on the ground that copyright law 
protects creative expression but not a physical copy that embodies the copyrighted 
expression; therefore, property ownership does not necessarily conflict with the copyright 
holder’s distribution right (Ahn, 2004). According to this criticism, given that there exist 
no conflicting legal interests between an owner of a copyrighted material object and a 
copyright holder, to seek a rationale for the first sale doctrine from the avoidance of a 
conflicting situation is unreasonable. Section 202 of the 1976 Act states that “Ownership 
of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from 
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.” Even in Germany 
where that theory was first introduced, it did not gain traction (Kim, 2013).  
CALL FOR A NORMATIVE COPYRIGHT THEORY  
 
Some commentators have used the “just rewards” theory or the theory of 
transaction protection to explain the necessity of adopting the first sale doctrine (see Ahn, 
2004; Choderker, 1999; Diacovo, 1994; Moon, 2014), while the majority of U.S. legal 
scholars have made arguments for the first sale doctrine based on the doctrine’s socially 
desirable outcomes. However, the above noted theories in this chapter can be considered 
“empty formalism,” which by themselves convey next to nothing about what the law 
ought to be. Although each theoretical justification provides its own logical outcomes—
with the exception of ownership theory—the justifications do not explain why a 
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particular theory is needed. The justifications do not substantially explain why a certain 
theory is desirable in the context of intellectual property in general, and copyright 
protection in particular. A normative legal theory should be able to answer what the law 
ought to be. In that regard, normative copyright theories discussed in Chapter 2 should 
have something to say about the first sale doctrine. Before applying the notion of cultural 
democracy to the first sale doctrine, Chapter 3 has sketched a portrait of the judicial 
history and legislative responses to the first sale doctrine to date. The history of the first 
sale doctrine reviewed in this chapter shows that when it comes to physical copyrighted 
works the first sale doctrine has served as a tool to balance copyright holders’ rights and 
copy owners’ rights. When applied to physical copies, the underlying rationale of the 
doctrine, which does not allow copyright owners to control downstream distribution of 
his or her work, has been supported without any difficulty. However, this balancing 
mechanism has been challenged by unique features of digital works, such as easy 
copying, perfect copy, non-degradability, and risk of piracy, that have raised questions 
regarding how to address the content industry’s concerns while preserving the policy 
outcomes of the first sale doctrine in the digital age.     
CONCLUSION  
 
Chapter 3 has shown that the cost-benefit market calculation backed by the 
economic incentive framework has prevailed at Congressional hearings that considered 
issues of the first sale doctrine. Given that copyright holders have, for the past few 
decades, sought ever-stronger copyright protection, it is more crucial than ever to draw 
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upon a normative theory that can problematize a dominant understanding of copyright 
protection and suggest an overarching framework for copyright reforms.  
It is important to note, as shown in the ReDigi court, the courts are not likely to 
take an active role in expanding the application of the first sale doctrine to digital goods. 
The ReDigi court said: “…the first sale doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease 
and speed of data transfer could not have been imagined…It is left to Congress, and not 
this Court, to deem them outmoded” (Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 2013, p. 656). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have relied 
largely on precedents to justify the doctrine’s viability (Even, 2009), and across cases one 
notable penetrating rationale with regard to the first sale doctrine has been an abhorrence 
to restrict a transfer of a copy. Also, as shown in the Bobbs-Merrill case and elsewhere, a 
similar rational has been set forth to support the “just reward” theory. However, it is 
difficult to determine what “just reward” means and, especially, what the term “just” 
means in that context.   
In sum, theoretical justifications that have been used to explain the need to adopt 
the first sale doctrine do not fully address the question of what a desirable law ought to 
be, as pertains to intellectual property rights and copyright protection. Therefore, this 
dissertation argues that normative theories in copyright are essential for the purpose of 
guiding much needed copyright reforms in the digital age. Chapter 4 will examine the 
specific case of ebooks as a way to demonstrate how copy owners’ experience with 
ebook usage has been limited by various socio-cultural and market factors. Based on this 
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positive evaluation, in Chapter 5, I will explain how the distribution and cultural goals of 




Chapter 4: The Politics of Ebooks 
 
 
In our country’s first year of war, we have seen the growing power of books as 
weapons… 
 
This is proper, for a war of ideas can no more be won without books than a naval 
war can be won without ships. Books, like ships, have the toughest armor, the 
longest cruising range, and mount the most powerful guns. I hope that all who 
write and publish and sell and administer books will…rededicate themselves to 
the single task of arming the mind and spirit of the American people with the 
strongest and most enduring weapons.52—Franklin D. Roosevelt  
 
 
The Internet and digital technologies mediate modern life, enabling individuals 
to access information without geographical and temporal constraints and at relatively low 
cost. Nevertheless, these “distributive gains” are limited (Baker, 2007, p. 122). Especially 
in the Internet age, audience attention is concentrated and arrested by media content 
generated by a few corporate entities (Baker, 2007). That is, media concentration goes 
against furthering democracy by limiting the variety of culturally diverse voices and 
perspectives (Baker, 2007). In addition, sundry impacts of market innovations through 
technological developments have been sidestepped by endless efforts of content 
industries to make profits from new areas of innovation. As I explain in Chapter 5, 
copyright holders have relied on the justification of economic efficiency framework 
                                           
52 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s remarks were cited in Frederick Stielow’s essay, Reconsidering 




whenever they needed to step into new areas of innovation and recapture their revenue by 
controlling how their creative works are circulated and consumed by users. This chapter 
considers how one especially significant category of media content, the book and the 
ebook, functions against the backdrop of corporate concentration and digital 
technologies.   
Notwithstanding the iconic and historical value of books embedded in the 
democratic principles of the U.S., relatively little is known about whether the publishing 
industry is furthering or hampering the foundation of democracy, what President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt envisioned as the “task of arming the mind and spirit of the American 
people” (as cited in Stielow, 2001, p. 11). Especially, little is known with regard to the 
long-term effects of moving to an electronic form of books, even though various forms of 
electronic publications have become ubiquitous and appear to inexorably usurp the 
dominance of the hardcopy page.  
One of the primary purposes of this dissertation is to advocate the democratic 
value of copyright law, a purpose that includes promoting “expressive diversity” and 
furthering “public education,” among others (Netanel, 1998). I argue that in the age of 
licensing and ever-strengthening copyright protection, it is significant to recognize the 
problem of diminishing rights for consumers, particularly copy owners. The applicability 
of the first sale doctrine to digital goods relates directly to the balancing of copyright 
issues. This dissertation argues that the balancing mechanism should be sustained in the 
digital age.    
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Once the significance of the topic of ownership rights is recognized, it is 
important to examine how contemporary issues pertaining to copyright law either 
advance or limit those rights. The viability of the first sale doctrine in the digital age is 
one of the key issues that warrants further investigation. While various focal points can 
be chosen to undertake an investigation, this dissertation focuses on ebooks to explore the 
applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital goods.  
As noted above, notwithstanding the iconic value of ebooks in furthering 
democratic principles, insufficient attention has been paid to the following question: 
What political and social factors have shaped the current economic conditions and 
copyright regime with regard to ebooks? Cultural democracy advocates the 
decentralization of cultural meaning-making processes and promotes ordinary citizens’ 
active participation in cultural meaning-making processes.    
To achieve “a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the 
public sphere and safeguards to the democratic system” (Baker, 2007, p. 53), one might 
question the tendency of media concentration and other factors that might invisibly 
impact democratic values of the American society. With respect to books, institutions 
such as libraries, and more generally the act of reading and literacy along with the 
terms—devices, availability, formats, sharing options—under which people access books 
all constitute important elements of a democratic system considered essential to preserve 
and extend knowledge fundamental to the bedrock of democracy and citizenship.  
As of January 2014, the percentage of American adults over 18 who read an 
ebook in the past year was 28 percent (Pew Research Center, 2014). According to a 
 
 100 
report from Nielsen Books & Consumers, in the first half of 2014, ebook sales in the 
United States accounted for 23 percent of total consumer book sales (Abrams, 2014). The 
popularity of ebooks is radically changing the relationships between stakeholders 
including publishers, retailers, and libraries as well as ebook users and library patrons. 
Such a shift raises questions about the social, political, and economic factors at play in 
the transition from printed books to ebooks.  
Ebooks can be defined as a combination of hardware and software working 
together for the purpose of serving people’s reading habits (Morgan, 1999). Morgan 
(1999) distinguishes ebooks from e-texts, which refer to hypertext markup language that 
can be viewed on a computer. More inclusive is Hawkins’s (2000) definition that defines 
ebooks as any book in its electronic form. Rao (2003) defines ebooks as “text in digital 
form, or digital reading material, or a book in a computer file format, or an electronic file 
of words and images” (pp. 86-87). 
In this chapter, I lay out first a brief history of the development of the ebook and 
then explore salient characteristics and implications of the ebook ecosystem through the 
lens of Lessig’s (2006) four modalities of regulation. Changes in one modality, according 
to Lessig, can cause changes in the other modalities. All four constraints, namely law, 
markets, social norms, and architecture, should be considered holistically when 
examining new technologies such as the ebook, rather than grappling merely with the 
language in the law (Lessig, 2006). This chapter seeks to broaden and deepen our 
understanding of the politics of ebooks by addressing the factors that have shaped the 
current ecosystem of ebooks and examining how these factors affect how people can 
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obtain and use ebooks, what they can do with them, etc. This chapter demonstrates 
reasons to adopt a digital first sale doctrine with regard to people’s use of ebooks. 
Understanding how the current ebook ecosystem is being shaped by various socio-
political and economic factors is important in order to come up with a normative vision 
that can guide discussions about copyright reform.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EBOOK  
 
The idea of a portable electronic book dates back to before World War II 
(Manley & Holley, 2012). In his 1945 essay “As We May Think,” Vannevar Bush 
recognized the need for personal computers to be able to store increasing amounts of 
information to make it possible to read at one’s convenience (Manley & Holley, 2012). 
The origin of the ebook is closely related to the development of early computers and to 
newer technologies that have enhanced ebook usability. However, it was not until the 
1970s that the idea of a notebook-sized computer began to take form (Manley & Holley, 
2012).  
Around the same time that ebook hardware was in its embryonic stages, Michael 
Hart in 1971 launched Project Gutenberg, a digital library for books that belong to the 
public domain.53 By addressing technical issues of digitizing books, Project Gutenberg, 
along with other similar endeavors, played a significant role in the development of the 
ebook. Project Gutenberg was launched with the visionary goal of enabling people to 
                                           
53 Litman (1990) defines the public domain as “a commons that includes those aspects of copyrighted 
works which copyright does not protect” (p. 968).  
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gain access to a digital library at no cost. That project has continued to develop and 
evolve since the Internet went live in 1974 (Lebert, 2009).  
The number of books published in digital format continues to soar. As of 2014, 
the Project was offering more than 49,000 free ebooks and the voluntary initiative 
continues to spread across the globe. Books in the collection are available either on 
ereaders or computers. Additionally, people can access more than 100,000 free ebooks 
through the Project’s partners and affiliates. All the free ebooks that Project Gutenberg 
provides are available to the public with the help of thousands of volunteers who value 
the ideal of free and equitable access to literary cultural works (Widdersheim, 2015).  
Indeed, Project Gutenberg’s ebook efforts embody the utopian dream of making 
books freely available to all, no matter where the books are located. Coupling the 
promises of Internet freedom and an almost countercultural devotion to public goods 
(Streeter, 1999; Turner, 2006), Project Gutenberg represents a halcyon promise of the 
Internet’s collaborative benefits. Having said that, the ever-shrinking scope of public 
domain, coupled with the continued broadening of copyright protection, poses a threat to 
the future of Project Gutenberg.54 The trajectory of the ebook is, therefore, something 
like a “canary in the coal mine” for considering how the social benefits of copyright can 
be sidestepped by content creation industries.  
                                           
54 Although the scope of the public domain has been shrinking due to the copyright extension, as noted 
above, efforts by volunteers, partners, and affiliates that agree with the project’s mission to make books 
available for free have grown so that the number of free ebooks available through Project Gutenberg’s 
website, partners and affiliate institutions have also increased. 
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Consider another promising project, the Google Books Library Project, launched 
in 2004. Initially greeted with optimism and securing the collaboration of prominent 
academic libraries, Google launched a massive scale project to scan books in partnership 
with libraries and to make digital versions of those books available to the general public 
for reading and purchasing (Helft & Rich, 2008). This utopian vision later was subject to 
criticism on grounds that the tech giant’s intention was commercialization of that massive 
book repository since Google allowed the public to read only about 20 percent of the 
texts for free; additionally, Google made little or no effort to correct any errors in its 
digitized products. Thus, it comes no surprise that authors and the publishing industry 
raised copyright infringement lawsuits against Google.55  
Consider another example surrounding an effort to sidestep proprietary 
technology with regard to ebooks and its relationship to copyright law. Adobe Systems 
Inc. invented the Portable Document Format (PDF) which was first released in 1993; the 
PDF is currently used as one of the ebook formats. As an early market innovator in the 
ebook ecosystem, Adobe Systems introduced the Adobe eBook Reader in January 2001. 
Like other software companies leading market innovation, Adobe Systems also 
                                           
55 In November 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that 
Google’s project to scan more than 20 million books from libraries without the permission of copyright 
holders can be considered as a fair use. After reviewing the four factors used to determine whether a 
particular use of a copyrighted work is a fair use, then Judge Denny Chin said that “In my view, Google 
Books provides significant public benefits. It advances the progress of the arts and sciences, while 
maintaining respectful consideration for the rights of authors and other creative individuals, and without 
adversely impacting the rights of copyright holders” (Authors Guild et al. v. Google, 2011, p. 26, emphasis 




implemented a Digital Rights Management (DRM) system on its Adobe eBook Reader to 
prevent users’ uncontrolled use and circulation of ebooks.    
In the same year that Adobe System introduced its eBook reader with DRM 
technology, a Russian company, ElcomSoft, released its Advanced eBook Processor, 
known as AEBPR (Postigo, 2012) that allowed its users to circumvent copy protection 
measures of the Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader software. Later, Dmitry Skylarov, a 
programmer who worked at ElcomSoft, the Russian company, was arrested and 
prosecuted by the U.S. government on charges of violating the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA). That case was recorded as the first criminal lawsuit for violation 
of the DMCA that was enacted in 1998 (Ardito, 2001). The arrest of Sklyarov boosted a 
pre-existing controversy about the U.S. government’s approach to digital copyright issues 
by demonstrating ways the DMCA can be used to negatively influence free speech, 
thereby increasing unfavorable attitudes by the general public and copyright activists 
toward the DMCA (Postigo, 2012). Media reports that described the use of the DMCA 
for criminal prosecution along with public awareness of this issue empowered activist 
groups and hackers to pursue issues of freedom of speech and fair use rights. That 
incident demonstrates that ways for distributing cultural works and resources are 
commonly related to copyright law. The distribution of ebooks is no exception.    
Both Google Books Library Project and the arrest of Skylarov illustrate how the 
utopian vision of making books freely available has been hampered by the content 
industry’s efforts driven to maximize profits. An accompanying tactic has taken shape as 
licensing agreements which enable copyright holders to maximize gains from their 
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creative works by retaining ownership over their works and not allowing consumers to 
actually “own” digital content. These initiatives directly counteract the early assumptions 
about a world of books being made universally and freely available to all populations.   
The development of ebooks has been propelled mainly by two industries: 
hardware manufacturers that produce ebook readers and content providers that publish 
specific formats that enhance their proprietary interests (Henke, 2001). The enactment of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the strengthening of copyright 
protection have facilitated development of proprietary formats that limit users “to their 
ebook inventory and readers and [make] it impossible to sell ebooks through the doctrine 
of first sale because the ebooks are licensed rather than purchased” (Manley & Holley, 
2012, p. 300). 
When it comes to ebook readers, eInk technology has played a significant role in 
the evolution of electronic readers. The eInk technology dates back to the late 1970s 
when it was introduced by Xerox (Merkoski, 2013). In 2003, Sony began to use this 
game-changing technology when in 2004 it launched the Sony e-reader. The company 
encountered various problems in Japan, such as a lack of available ebooks and the 
difficulty of rendering content in Japanese, so in 2006 Sony launched in the U.S. a new 
version of e-reader. In 2007, having learned valuable lessons from Sony’s mistakes and 
building on its leverage of book transactions, Amazon launched the Kindle (Merkoski, 
2013). The success of Kindle in the ebook market was accelerated by its having a 
network connection and other functions, such as an embedded cell phone (Merkoski, 
2013). Many concerns and issues have been raised with regard to usability and price of 
 
 106 
ebook readers, yet numerous devices for reading ebooks have been introduced, most 
eventually having been subsequently withdrawn (Manley & Holley, 2012). For example, 
Sony announced its withdrawal from the ebook reader market in the U.S. and Canada 
(Loveridge, 2014). Market speculation circulated that Barnes & Noble would close its 
Nook business, but it appears the company is still trying to save its Nook business 
(Wahba, 2015).   
The Kindle rapidly expanded the ebook market (Pike, 2012a). Technologies 
surrounding ebooks have continued to develop and users’ experiences have improved. In 
2011, Amazon announced that its ebook sales exceeded those of hard-covers (Miller & 
Bosman, 2011, para. 1). According to reports from the Association of American 
Publishers, ebook trade revenues increased 5.1% to $404.8 million in the first quarter of 
2014, representing a slowdown in ebook revenue in the U.S. that until 2013 had shown 
sharp increase (“Adult ebooks,” 2013). Despite the recent slowdown, major U.S. 
publishers anticipate gains from ebooks and believe ebook revenues will drive overall 
growth. According to a recent report that surveyed 475 educators, the respondents 
suggest that K-12 classrooms materials are in transition from print books to digital books 
(Kozlowski, 2015), and indeed big publishers such as McGraw-Hill, Pearson, and 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, have made an effort to incorporate ebooks into formal 
curricula for K-12 schools. The ebook educational market will doubtless make huge 
contributions to publishers’ revenues, particularly if these ebooks are licensed rather than 
offered for purchase.   
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The publishing industry has historically been challenged by shifts in consumer 
reading patterns in addition to technological challenges and innovations, market 
competition from both inside and outside of the publishing industry, and relevant laws 
and regulations. Thus, current issues facing the publishing industry are nothing new, yet 
the current chaotic situation associated with electronic publications is clearly 
disconcerting to the book publishing industry (Greco, Milliot, & Wharton, 2014).  
In an effort to understand better the evolving ebook ecosystem, this study 
employs Lessig’s (2006) theory of four modalities of regulation. This study poses the 
following questions: What are the social norms, market forces, architecture, and laws that 
shape how people use ebooks? And how, with regard to ebooks, have those modalities 
shaped the current political and economic conditions and the copyright regime? 
LESSIG’S FOUR MODALITIES ANALYSIS  
 
Lessig’s (2006) theory of regulation provides a helpful framework for 
understanding the ecology that surrounds ebook development, also offering suggestions 
as to how the ebook future may unfold relative to society’s existing social, economic, and 
regulatory choices.  
Lessig (2006) proposes four distinct but interdependent modalities that play a 
role in regulating individuals’ behavior and in shaping digital socio-technical systems. 
The four consist of the market, the law, social norms, and architecture. The basic premise 
of his argument, as reproduced in the title of his major book, is that “Code is law.” 
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Although Lessig (2006) argues that the modalities work together in shaping one another, 
he directs attention especially to the architecture, which remains a mostly under-
examined facet of many technological developments. The architecture refers to the 
combination of software and hardware that determines and structures how individuals 
interact with technology or that exist in a certain social system (Mayer-Schönberger, 
2008). 
The proliferation of ebooks raises concerns about a few companies dominating 
the market, and discussions of media ownership and control is a topic of concern among 
political economists (Bettig, 1996; Murdock & Golding, 1979). This has begun to be 
played out in the legal arena; for example, in 2013 a federal judge ruled that Apple and 
five big publishers collectively conspired to raise ebook prices (Raymond & Stempel, 
2013).  
Several commentators, raising similar market power questions about Amazon’s 
leveraging its power over publishers, have criticized the U.S. Department of Justice’s suit 
against Apple and the big five publishers (Hansen, 2012; Hiltzik, 2012; Pearlstein, 2012; 
Shermer, 2012). In 2010, Amazon accounted for about 80 percent share of the ebook 
retail market (Hansen, 2012). Simply put, those commentators who criticized the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s suit against Apple and the big five publishers shared concern that 
the U.S. Department of Justice had picked the wrong “monopoly” in the name of 
protecting consumers’ benefits. The real monopoly issue had something to do with 
Amazon’s market dominance and, accordingly, critics contended that the U.S. 
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government should have investigated Amazon’s behavior as well as implications of the 
company’s behavior on the ebook ecosystem.       
Amazon contended that ebook prices of $14.99 or more are “unjustifiably high” 
and that lower prices can generate greater total revenue, satisfying all parties involved 
(“Amazon/Hachette business interruption,” 2014). In other words, Amazon believes that 
the price of $9.99 for ebook content generates higher revenue for all parties. Amazon’s 
argument, based on assumptions of consumer interest in lower prices, calls for academic 
investigation. After all, consumer benefits are not measured solely by price. In fact, lower 
prices can potentially limit choices available to consumers, market innovations, and 
quality publications.56 By critically examining the economic structure and market of 
ebooks, this chapter recommends a more balanced approach to the four modalities that 
regulate the ebook ecosystem.  
While the general public and the media have directed attention toward the 
shaping of the ebook market, only limited discussion rises about restrictive licensing 
agreements demanded by publishers under Terms of Service. Licensing issues relate also 
to laws, social norms, market structures, and technological architecture. These, in turn, 
influence individuals’ experience with ebook usage. Using Lessing’s typology as an 
analytical framework, this chapter examines how the four modalities have shaped the 
                                           
56 Carr (2012) notes, “From the very beginning and with increasingly regularity, Amazon has used its 
market power to bully and dictate. It leaned on the Independent Publishers Group in recent months for 
better terms and when those negotiations didn’t work out, Amazon simply removed the company’s almost 
5,000 e-books from its virtual shelves” (para. 8).   
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current ecosystem of ebooks, and how these modalities affect regulation of the ebook 
ecosystem.  
The Law  
 
Various laws, including copyright laws and antitrust laws, influence the ways in 
which the ebook ecosystem operates. Laws have effects on market structures, citizens’ 
social norms, and architectural structures relating to the ebook ecosystem and vice versa. 
Two sets of laws—antitrust law and copyright law—are the focus of this section of the 
current study. Over the past few years, ebook market players, such as Amazon and Apple, 
have been involved in high profile antitrust cases that warrant further investigation. 
Copyright law also influences the ways that individuals consume content on their ebooks.  
Antitrust Law   
 
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act, the first antitrust law, as a 
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered 
competition as the rule of trade” (Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 1958, p. 
4).57 Later in 1914, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton 
Act. These three federal antitrust laws are still in effect. The ever-deepening conflict 
between Amazon, which continues to exert its unprecedented market power, and other 
                                           
57 The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that antitrust law “rests on the premise that the unrestrained 
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, 
the highest quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions” (Northern Pacific 
Railway Co. v. United States, 1958, p. 4).   
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ebook market participants has raised a set of questions regarding application of antitrust 
laws.  
In June 2015, the European Commission announced that it has recently opened 
an investigation of Amazon regarding the tech giant’s allegedly anticompetitive behavior 
in the region’s ebook market (Streitfeld & Scott, 2015). Increasing complaints from 
European publishers and booksellers with regard to Amazon’s monopoly-like position in 
the region’s ebook market presaged the European Commission’s investigation. In June 
2014, a complaint was filed by the German Publishers and Booksellers Association 
regarding Amazon’s allegedly monopolistic behavior in the ebook market, and later that 
summer an open letter, signed by hundreds of writers from various countries including 
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, was sent to Amazon, claiming that Amazon had 
manipulated its recommended reading lists and lied to customers regarding the 
availability of books published by Bonnier, a leading publishing group in Germany, as 
retaliation by Amazon against Bonnier, that was in a dispute with Amazon (Streitfeld & 
Scott, 2015).   
When Amazon started selling books online, publishers welcomed the new 
distribution system, assuming that Amazon’s system would lead to enormous sales 
revenue “without siphoning off revenue from the old brick-and-mortar stores” (Marcus, 
2013, p. 101). However, publishers soon realized their predictions were wrong because 
when Amazon secured significant portions of the market, it started pressuring publishers 
to charge lower prices (Marcus, 2013).  
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Amazon often sold best sellers at prices lower than other independent booksellers 
by offering deeper discounts, a practice that continues in the ebook market where new 
books and best sellers sell for $9.99 (Pike, 2012a). This strategy propelled Amazon to 
become the dominant ebook vendor and e-reader seller in the ebook market, allowing the 
company to eventually provide around 90% of all ebooks sold (Pike, 2012a). Amazon’s 
early 90% share created a competitive advantage for the company.  
Then, Apple entered the market. Instead of using Amazon’s wholesale model of 
pricing, Apple adopted an “agency” model of pricing. The agency model allows the 
publishers to set the price and then pay a 30% commission to the retailer. Under the 
wholesale model, publishers are not allowed to exert power over the ultimate pricing of 
their books but rather simply receive half of the list price (Carr, 2012). Recent lawsuits 
challenge the shift from the “wholesale” model to the “agency” model (Cooper, 
Cushmac, Morse, Farringer, & Istrail, 2012). The basic assumption underlying the recent 
lawsuits is that Apple and major publishers adopted the agency model in an effort to 
force Amazon to abandon its below-cost pricing strategy and thereby increase Amazon’s 
ebook prices.  
Based on investigations by the U.S. Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, the 
Department of Justice in April 2012 filed a class action lawsuit against Apple Inc. and 
five publishers, accusing them of colluding to increase and fix the price of ebooks. The 
Justice Department assumed a routine position in the case: “Stripped of the glitz 
surrounding e-books and Apple, this is an unremarkable and obvious price-fixing case 
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appropriate for per se condemnation.”58 The antitrust case, filed by the Justice 
Department, resulted in settlements with the big five publishers, but Apple appealed in 
2014 (Streitfeld & Scott, 2015). In June 2015, the Second Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
the district court’s decision that Apple and the big publishers collectively conspired to 
raise ebook prices in the market.59 One of the most established rules in antitrust cases is 
that horizontal price fixing is almost automatically regarded as anti-competitive (Sagers, 
2014), and this reasoning was applied to Apple’s ebook antitrust case.60  
However, as Jacobs (1995) points out, it is difficult to resolve normative antitrust 
questions objectively since any final decision is political in nature. One normative 
question that warrants attention in the Apple case is whether enforcing vigorous price 
competition is desirable when market innovation or changes are occurring. In other 
words, in some circumstances, whether publishers should be allowed to collude in order 
to counteract the monopolistic power of Amazon (Kirkwood, 2014).  
Diverging from the Chicago School’s definitions that rely exclusively on 
economic terms and calculations to detect anticompetitive behaviors, scholars who have 
taken a critical position argue that the purpose of antitrust laws is “to combat deeply felt 
social and political problems” (Jacobs, 1995, p. 220). It is important to note that those 
who are critical of the Chicago School’s exclusively economic approach do not exclude 
                                           
58 Plaintiff’s Pretrial Memorandum of Law, United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 12-cv-2826 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 14, 2013).  
59 See http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/13-3748_Documents.pdf 
60 In the United States, “certain acts are considered so harmful to competition that they are almost always 
illegal. These include plain arrangements among competing individuals or businesses to fix prices, divide 
markets, or rig bids. These acts are ‘per se’ violations of the Sherman Act; in other words, no defense or 




economics in antitrust analyses. Rather, they tend to argue that socio-political 
perspectives can help decision-makers gain a more accurate understanding of the 
marketplace, in turn, assisting decision-makers to reach a more refined decision in 
determining anticompetitive conduct (Jacobs, 1995). Following that line of thought, 
Jacobs (1995) further argued that “decisions about antitrust policy must not hinge on 
inadequate economic data, but rather on the acceptance or rejection of normative, 
political assumptions” about the marketplace (p. 219).  
Kirkwood (2014) claimed that when several conditions are met, collusion among 
suppliers can be justified. According to Kirkwood (2014), colluding suppliers (i.e., in this 
case publishers) should be able to demonstrate that their customer’s buying power is 
monopsony power and that the power was legally obtained and has been substantially 
persistent. If the buying power fails to reach monopsony power, the suppliers need to 
further prove their action is desirable by showing the powerful customer’s behavior is 
limiting market innovation. Finally, suppliers’ collusion does not have to do with creating 
downstream market power.  
Many commentators have criticized that federal regulators are benefiting 
Amazon, the emerging monopolist in the ebook market, by leaving free Amazon to fully 
exert its market power and dominance and by not regulating its detrimental effects on 
consumers (Carr, 2012; Hiltzik, 2012; Pearlstein, 2012; Turow, 2012).  
Their reasoning is that permitting a little anti-competitive behavior may yield 
pro-competitive results, thereby benefiting consumers by reducing the monopolistic 
power of Amazon. Hence, one might believe that it is desirable to consider all the 
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relevant circumstances to reach a refined decision about whether the behavior of Apple 
and the big five publishers was ultimately pro-competitive behavior or anticompetitive. 
Considering all the circumstances involves a demanding fact-finding process for the 
court. By contrast, simply judging the Apple case as a price-fixing case and thus not 
paying attention to what was actually going on the market is not desirable, given that 
Amazon was arguably exerting its monopolistic power in the ebook market. In sum, in 
the Apple case it was desired that the court consider the relevant socio-political 
perspectives as well as the economic analysis, given that data about the ebook market 
continues to be incomplete and Amazon adopted below-cost pricing as a way to continue 
its market dominance. However, by limiting its analysis to an economic one, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York did not consider broader socio-
political conditions. Reaffirming the district court’s injunction against Apple, the Second 
U.S. Circuit of Appeals in Manhattan ruled that “Apple orchestrated a horizontal 
conspiracy among the Publisher Defendants to raise ebook prices is amply supported and 
well-reasoned, and that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1 of 
the Sherman Act” (p. 7).61 By characterizing the agreement between Apple and the five 
publishers as a horizontal price-fixing effort, the court easily relied on the Per Se rule that 
virtually automatically condemns any horizontal price-fixing agreements as illegal.     
It is important to note that several commentators have argued that price 
competition may potentially bring harmful effects to society as a whole by discouraging 
the creation of literary works. Scott Turow, President of the Authors Guild, argued that 
                                           
61 See http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2015_0630_apple_2nd.pdf 
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“Amazon was using e-book discounting to destroy bookselling, making it uneconomic for 
physical bookstores to keep their doors open” (Turow, 2012). Given the changes 
currently underway in the market, arguments both for and against enforcement of 
vigorous price competition lack empirical evidence. As of now, one thing is clear: 
Amazon’s price-cutting strategy can potentially eliminate its competitors in the ebook 
market. This possibility may be further accelerated if Amazon tries to lock in Kindle 
users to its e-book ecosystem by making it difficult for Kindle users to purchase ebooks 
elsewhere. That possibility should be closely watched as it is relates to the discussion of 
architecture, one of four modalities that regulate the ebook ecosystem. 
In addition to antitrust law, copyright law is also pertinent. It governs the scope 
of behaviors that consumers can employ with their ebooks. Specifically, with regard to 
printed books, the first sale doctrine of copyright law allows the owner of a copy of a 
copyrighted work to exercise her property right over that particular copy. By limiting the 
copyright holder’s distribution rights, the copy owner can exercise her property right 
(e.g., to sell, lend, or give her property away) notwithstanding the fact that the copyright 
holder’s creative expression is embedded in the tangible object. By contrast, with regard 
to ebooks, the first sale doctrine does not apply so that people cannot resell, rent, or lease 
the ebook content. Below I explain this relationship in connection with the licensing 
regime.  




How people obtain and use ebooks is largely determined and conditioned by the 
restrictive licensing schemes that publishers impose on consumers. To understand the 
ways people interact with ebooks, it is essential to examine the current licensing scheme. 
The first sale doctrine applies only to a lawful “owner” of a copyrighted copy. Therefore, 
if an individual does not have an ownership interest in a particular copy, then the 
individual cannot resell or transfer that copy without the copyright holder’s permission. It 
is increasingly common that copyright holders do not transfer the ownership of their 
content but license them in order to control a broad range of consumer activities. 
Moreover, copyright holders often use a boilerplate agreement that does not allow 
consumers to negotiate with regard to specific terms and conditions. What matters in real 
world situations is that consumers usually do not read the boilerplate agreement closely 
or they do not even know agreement exists. In addition, the actual language used in 
transaction processing often offers “misleading or incomplete information about 
[consumers’] rights and options” (Stein, 2013, pp. 359-360).62 The rights of lawful 
purchasers of digital content are unreasonably disadvantaged by contractual clauses that 
impose restrictive licensing agreements, in particular with regard to resale. As a result, 
through licensing agreements, copyright holders can make changes to consumers’ digital 
content without the consumers’ permission or they can even delete content at any time, if 
the need arises from the copyright holder’s perspective. These limitations can work to the 
disadvantage of consumers’ rights.  
                                           
62 It is worth noting that consumer rights groups may need to put pressure on content industries to use 
more transparent language on the face of the transaction. Or, there may be a need to adopt an “ebook 
consumer bill of rights” to prevent copyright holders from deleting purchased content.      
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Amazon’s Kindle Terms of Use reads: 
We may change, suspend, or discontinue the Service, in whole or in part, at any 
time without notice. We may amend any of this Agreement’s terms at our sole 
discretion by posting the revised terms on the Amazon.com website. Your 
continued use of a Kindle, the Software or the Service after the effective date of 
the revised Agreement terms constitutes your acceptance of the terms.63 (Kindle 
Terms of Use, 2014)   
Libraries’ Struggles with Ebook Lending 
 
Some publishers are concerned about their revenues being reduced due to the 
longevity of ebooks and this concern has caused them to limit the licensing of their ebook 
content to libraries (Manley & Holley, 2012). Ebook licensing arrangements can be 
grouped into several categories. Rice (2006) proposes three basic models of ebook 
licensing agreements, recognizing several variations and one notable exception.  
The first model of ebook licensing, referred to as the print model, treats ebook 
licensing the same way that libraries treat a printed book. Once a book is checked out to 
one user, another user cannot access it. The second model is the so-called “database 
subscription” model that is based on an annual subscription fee with unlimited, multiple 
simultaneous access. Database subscription models are one of the most frequently 
employed licensing arrangements. A good example of this model is ebrary 
(www.ebrary.com) that helps libraries’ effectively order and administer ebook 
                                           
63 See http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200506200 
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collections, although the vendor also provides other options, including the database 
model.64 Ebook vendors, such as Gale Virtual Reference Library (GVRL) and 
OverDrive, offer a few different types of access, including vendor managed access (e.g., 
Follett, Baker and Taylor, OverDrive), aggregator managed access (e.g., EBSCO, 
Mackin), publisher managed access (e.g., Facts On File, Chelsea House, Rosen, 
Britannica), and acquisition of titles via bundlers (e.g., GVRL, EBSCOhost, ProQuest 
ebrary and Questia) (American Association of School Librarians, 2013). Finally, there is 
a free and open access model that allows anyone to access ebook collections online. 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology is not applied to open access ebooks. 
Under the free and open access model, many books are freely available online with 
varying degrees of restrictions on use. For example, the Project Gutenberg 
(http://www.gutenberg.org) provides users with more than 49,000 free ebooks. Most of 
the collections belong to the public domain because their copyright has expired. The 
National Academies Press (NAP), created by the National Academy of Sciences, offers 
more than 4,000 books in PDF format for free and, in addition to selling numerous books 
covering a wide range of topics. In terms of restrictions, the freely available books on the 
National Academies Press website are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences 
with all rights reserved. 
Regardless of which licensing model libraries use when purchasing an ebook, no 
libraries actually own ebooks (Vaccaro, 2014). Instead, the libraries merely purchase a 
license that allows them to offer access to ebooks in their collections. The distinction 
                                           
64 In 2011, ebrary was acquired by ProQuest.  
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between owning a book and purchasing a license is important because publishers can 
impose various restrictions on content that is licensed to libraries. Given that libraries 
have sought to enhance their service capabilities by providing more ebooks, it is possible 
they may face difficult situations in the future since publishers often put restrictions on 
which ebooks libraries can offer and on how those ebooks can be made available to 
patrons (Vaccaro, 2014). For example, some publishers, such as HarperCollins, limit the 
number of times their ebooks can be loaned, thereby forcing libraries to repurchase a 
content license to continue serving its patrons with the same content (Greenfield, 2014). 
This is a huge contrast with the traditional mode of library operations, in which a printed 
book is owned in perpetuity and loaned on terms the library itself determines.  
The current licensing scheme with regard to ebooks is even more problematic 
because it poses profound questions about the future lending activities of libraries. Given 
that libraries have historically played an important role in furthering democracy by 
providing the public with exposure to diverse expressions of cultural works and 
information, an investigation is warranted into the ways that the current licensing regime 
restricts the ability of libraries to fulfill their missions.  
As Palfrey (2015) argues, “Libraries…function as essential equalizing 
institutions in our society. For as long as library exist in most communities, staffed with 
trained librarians, it remains true that individuals’ access to our shared culture is not 
dictated by however much money they have” (p. 9). For libraries that cannot afford the 
costs of renewing licenses for ebooks, the licensing regime is imposing a heavy burden. 
Due to publishers’ pricing strategies, libraries often have to pay significantly more for 
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ebooks than consumers pay (Vaccaro, 2014).65 More significantly, copyright holders can 
always delete ebooks from public libraries’ virtual shelves based on licensing 
agreements. By contrast, publishers cannot put such restrictions on libraries with regard 
to physical books, due to the first-sale doctrine that allows lawful purchasers to resell or 
lend purchased books.  
It is worth noting that “until very recently [publishers have] been mostly 
unwilling to sell e-books to libraries to lend, fearful that doing so would hurt their 
business” (Marx, 2013, para. 2). Publishers are able to dictate any restrictive licensing 
terms including a refusal to offer ebooks to libraries. In addition, libraries that cannot 
purchase or renew a license for the content in question are likely to struggle to fulfill their 
mission to the public in a democratic society. Neither is it easy to share ebooks among 
libraries. As of now, statewide ebook inter-library lending is limited due to restrictions 
imposed by publishers.  
Yet, ebooks are becoming an increasingly popular format for individuals to 
access cultural works that support democracy. As Mark (2013) notes, “as the nature of 
reading changes, access to [ebooks] is essential for libraries to remain vital” (para. 8). 
Especially for individuals who cannot afford to buy ebooks or subscribe to broadband 
Internet access at home, libraries remain the primary source of content to improve 
literacy and support meaningful civic engagement. In that regard, the current licensing 
                                           
65 Consider this incident. In February 29, 2012, Debra Oberhausen, manager of collection services at the 
Louisville (Ky.) Free Public Library, paid $40 to purchase an ebook entitled Eisenhower in War and Peace. 
Publishers raise prices for ebooks too easily. On March 1, the price for the same ebook was $120. At that 
time, if the library’s discount rate is applied, the print version of the book could be purchased at 




regime limits the ability of libraries to serve the public, thereby posing deeply profound 
concerns for a well-informed democratic society.    
The Market  
Ownership Concentration and Amazon Power  
 
People’s access to and use of ebooks is influenced by market forces. Market 
forces, such as Amazon’s monopsony power, regulate business practices and condition 
the potential for business success in the ebook market. That impact is evidenced by an 
increasingly large volume of printed books being displaced by ebooks (Wollman, 2011). 
Stakeholders in the ebook market include publishers, authors, retailers, distributors, 
libraries, and users. In examining the ebook market through the lens of political economy, 
particular attention needs to be directed toward emerging structures and shifting power 
relationships. 
Online retailers such as Google, Apple, and Amazon are becoming increasingly 
involved in shaping the ever-evolving ebook market. In a battle with Hachette, a major 
publisher, Amazon removed pre-orders of Hachette books, delayed the shipping of 
Hachette books without reasonable cause, and reduced discounts on Hachette’s titles in 
the U.S. (Garside, 2014). The recent conflict between the Hachette publishing group and 
Amazon demonstrates that Amazon is capable of exerting market dominance over 
publishers in the ebook market, potentially limiting the diversity of cultural expression as 
well as dissemination of information in society. As a counter to Amazon, the big five 
publishers have considered collective countermeasures. As discussed earlier in this 
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chapter, the question of whether the collusion among publishers can be justified as a 
countermeasure to Amazon’s monopolistic practices is difficult to ascertain. The ongoing 
debate concerning ownership concentration in the publishing industry and its implications 
for society is currently moving into another phase with the meteoric rise of new key 
players, such as Amazon. 
Similar to other industries, for example, the film entertainment industry, the 
publishing industry has long been described as oligopolistic. The big six publishers (now 
big five) publishers, owned by media conglomerates such as News Corporations and CBS 
Corporation, have accounted for the bulk of the industry’s revenue and market share 
while countless small publishers have struggled at the periphery. According to Hannaford 
(2007), those major publishers accounted for more than 80 percent of book sales at some 
point in the past. The five largest publishers in the U.S. account for more than 60 percent 
of the revenue generated by the publishing industry (DeMasi, 2014). Ownership 
concentration in the publishing industry is strengthening. In July 2013, there was a 
historical merger between Penguin Group and Random House so that the Big Six became 
the Big Five and another merger may be on the horizon. HarperCollins considered a 
merger with Simon & Schuster (Greenfield, 2014), although the merger has not yet 
happened as of this writing. Both HarperCollins and Hachette acquired Thomas Nelson 
and the adult list of Hyperion, respectively (Greenfield, 2013). The decades-long 
concentration of ownership in the publishing industry has not come without cost. Dozens 
of formerly independent publishers have been bought out by a conglomerate that includes 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, a publisher that had previously provided readers with books of 
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numerous Nobel Prize winners, Pulitzer Prize winners, and famous writers such as T. S. 
Eliot and Flannery O’Connor (Kachka, 2013). 
Table 1 illustrates corporate linkages within the publishing industry. It is 
important to note that most of these major publishers are owned by media conglomerates, 
and media conglomerates exert influence over multiple sectors at the same time 
(Murdock & Golding, 1979). This has been an ongoing trend over the past several 
decades. Thus, debate over the impact of ownership concentration in the publishing 




Table 1. Big Five Publishers in the United States 
Publisher Mother Company Publishing Divisions (Imprints) 
Hachette Book Group Lagardère SCA (French 
media group) 
Grand Central Publishing; Little, 
Brown and Company; Little, 
Brown Company Books for 
Young Readers; Faith Words; 
Center Street; Orbit; Yen Press; 




News Corporation HarperCollins; William Morrow; 
Avon Books; Broadside Books; 
Harper Business; 
HarperCollinsChildrens; 
HarperTeen; Ecco Books; It 
Books; Newmarket Press; Harper 
One; Harper Voyager US; Harper 
Perennial; HarperAcademic and 
Harper Audio 
Macmillan Publishers Verlagsgruppe Georg von 
Holtzbrinck (German based 
publishing holding company) 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Henry 
Holt and Company; Picador; St. 
Martin’s Press; Tor/Forge; 
Macmillan Audio; and Macmillan 
Children’s Publishing Group 
Penguin Random House  Pearson and Bertelsmann 
(Pearson is a publishing and 
education company and 
Bertelsmann is German 
based media conglomerate) 
Some of its imprints include: 
Random House Publishing Group, 
Knopf Doubleday Publishing 
Group; Crown Publishing Group; 
Penguin Group U.S.; Dorling 
Kindersley; Mass Market 
Paperbacks, Penguin Group U.S.; 
Random House Children’s Books; 
Penguin Young Readers Group, 
U.S.  
Simon & Schuster CBS Corporation Atria, Folger Shakespeare 
Library, Free Press, Gallery 
Books, Howard Books, Pocket 
Books, Scribner, Simon & 
Schuster, Threshold Editions and 
Touchstone 
Note. Not all imprints were included in this table. For instance, Penguin Random House has more than 250 
imprints. Adapted from Kelley (2012). A guide to publishers in the library ebook market. Retrieved from 





Similarly, the ebook market is also oligopolistic. In 2013, Amazon held 60 
percent of the ebook market, followed by Barnes & Noble (27%) and Apple (less than 
10%) (Book House of Stuyvesant Plaza et al v. Amazon.com et al, 2013). In 2013, the 
Book House of Stuyvesant Plaza and two other independent “brick-and-mortar” 
booksellers filed a lawsuit against Amazon and the nation’s six largest book publishers 
(i.e., Random House, Penguin Group, Hachette Book Group, Simon & Schuster, 
HarperCollins, and Holtzbrinck), arguing that Amazon and the other major publishers 
have created a monopoly over the way ebooks are sold (Albanese, 2013). The plaintiffs 
claimed that Amazon’s use of proprietary digital rights management (DRM) in its own 
ebook reader platform, which again comprises the majority of the ebook device market, is 
shutting out a portion of the ebook market for independent booksellers by eliminating 
their opportunities to sell content for use on Kindle (Book House of Stuyvesant Plaza et al 
v. Amazon.com et al., 2013). In this case, federal Judge Jed Rakoff dismissed the class 
action lawsuit sought by three independent booksellers on the grounds that the plaintiffs 
did not provide supporting evidence regarding the alleged conspiracy between the then 
big six publishers and Amazon as well as a lack of plausible motives for the conspiracy 
(Albanese, 2013). Judge Rakoff ruled:  
…nothing about [the] fact [that the publishers agreed with Amazon with regard 
to requiring DRM] suggests that the publishers also required Amazon to use 
device-restrictive DRM limiting the devices on which the Publishers’ e-books can 
be displayed, or to place restrictions on Kindle devices and apps such that they 
could only display e-books enabled with Amazon’s proprietary DRM. Indeed, 
 
 127 
unlike DRM requirements, which clearly serve the Publishers’ economic interests 
by preventing copyright violations, these latter types of restrictions run counter to 
the Publishers’ interests, as they restrict the ability of paying customers to obtain 
the Publishers’ e-books from Amazon or on Kindle devices or apps. (Book House 
of Stuyvesant Plaza et al v. Amazon.com et al., 2013, pp. 8-9, emphasis in 
original) 
What was not substantially discussed in the suit was the question of how 
Amazon controls the ebook market and, as a result, how Amazon may be responsible for 
harm to consumers. All in all, the publishers failed to meet legal criteria related to 
antitrust law. Amazon has been competing with independent “brick-and-mortar” 
booksellers. Unlike in Europe where there exist more vigilant anti-trust regulation and 
enforcement, American corporations are allowed to leverage market dominance unless 
they are considered to be exploiting their dominance in explicitly anticompetitive ways 
(Streitfeld & Scott, 2015).  
Although the U.S. and the European Union have laws in common that protect 
competition in their jurisdictions, when it comes to defining “what constitutes a dominant 
firm and the types of conduct that constitute violations of law” major differences exist 
between the United States and the European Union (Fox, 1997, p. 343). As Fox (1997) 
notes, “market power (even monopoly power) alone is not enough to violate American 
statutes; there must be an element of unacceptable conduct to achieve or maintain that 
position” (p. 343). On the contrary, the European Commission’s Article 82 reads: “Any 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
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in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market 
insofar as it may affect trade between Member States” and further spells out examples of 
dominant-firm abuse.66 Arguably, Amazon is competing with both independent “brick-
and-mortar” booksellers and publishers, enjoying the U.S. competition law’s approach to 
anticompetitive behavior. However, as noted, Amazon’s monopoly-like behaviors are 
relatively open to antitrust investigation in other jurisdictions.      
Meanwhile, as Amazon’s sales have increased, Barnes & Noble’s Nook ebook 
reader business and its digital content sales business have continued to lose money, and 
on July 2 2015, Barnes & Noble announced it had hired a new CEO to revive its faltering 
Nook business (Wahba, 2015). In March 2014, Sony closed its Sony Reader Store in the 
United States and Canada, advising customers to transfer their accounts to Kobo, an 
eReading service that serves millions of customers worldwide (“Reader store closure,” 
2014). Amazon’s success in the ebook market is attributed to its ability to understand and 
satisfy customer needs and demands, especially based on Amazon customers’ previous 
purchases. 
There is little doubt that more books are published now than ever before. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the dissemination of culturally diverse content is 
able to flourish as ownership in the publishing industry becomes more densely 
concentrated, producing potentially harmful effects for both writers and consumers 
(Kachka, 2013).67 Under oligopoly, it is difficult for writers to negotiate with publishers 
                                           
66 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art82_en.html 
67 It should be noted that measuring content diversity is extremely difficult.    
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because alternative negotiation partners are usually limited. Indeed, fewer imprints 
bidding for a writer means less competition among publishers. Writers are restricted to 
lower advances and fewer options to publish books. Furthermore, as Anders (2012) notes, 
“if imprints do merge or come under a single editorial management, that means 
eventually you have somewhat fewer approaches…at least, within mainstream 
publishing” (para. 6). Fewer publishers can lead to less variety in “the ‘semiotic’ realm of 
meaning-making” (Bracha & Syed, 2014, p. 255). This trend, in turn, could negatively 
impact a “democratic culture” where “individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in 
the forms of meaning making that constitute them as individuals” (Balkin, 2004, p. 3).  
 
The Architecture  
The Interoperability of Ebook Formats  
 
In taking stock of the ebook ecosystem, one must consider the sales platform, 
ebook devices (i.e., eReaders), ebook formats, distribution channels, production tools, 
contractual agreements, and so forth. Particularly important among those elements is the 
platform. Unless a user is technically adept, transferring or exporting ebooks from one 
reader to another is virtually impossible. Amazon’s Kindle makes it difficult for users to 
read ebooks other than Kindle’s applications. The same is true for Apple’s iBooks. Thus, 
ebook consumers are stuck with a series of closed ecosystems produced by major ebook 
players. It is important to note that these closed ecosystems for ebooks exert a negative 
influence on expressive diversity by limiting consumers’ free choice to purchase ebooks 
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across a wide spectrum of topics and authors unless they invest in an array of platforms 
and devices. 
Proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
 
What prevents the free exchange of ebooks between different ecosystems are 
primarily the barriers created by proprietary DRM systems. There is a growing global 
consensus that one should be able to read his or her ebook regardless of time, place, and 
device (Bläsi & Rothlauf, 2013). The European Commission considers “interoperability” 
one of the key goals to be sought in the digital age (European Commission, 2013). 
Establishing effective interoperability between devices and applications including 
ebooks, is essential to protecting consumers’ rights to read and communicate with others. 
However, through license agreements such as the “click-wrap” license that requires 
consumers to agree to license terms and conditions before using the product by clicking 
an “I Accept” button, copyright owners can easily adopt DRM-enforced licenses to better 
protect their copyrighted works and to maximize profits from distribution of those works 
in the process eliminating interoperability.  
Downstream Alteration in the Digital Age  
 
Another issue that digital technologies have brought up in connection with how 
the ebook ecosystem is taking shape is what is referred to as downstream alteration. In 
July 2009, Amazon remotely deleted George Orwell’s “1984” and “Animal Farm” from 
users’ Kindles after discovering those ebooks had been added to Amazon’s Kindle store 
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by a company that did not first obtain permission from the copyright owner. A lawsuit 
against Amazon was filed by two high school students who found their annotations were 
gone along with their ebooks. In October 2009, Amazon agreed to pay $150,000 and 
admitted that it had acted wrongly (Kellogg, 2009). Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, posted 
the following “apology” to the Kindle forum:  
This is an apology for the way we previously handled illegally sold copies of 
1984 and other novels on Kindle. Our ‘solution’ to the problem was stupid, 
thoughtless, and painfully out of line with our principles. It is wholly self-
inflicted, and we deserve the criticism we’ve received. We will use the scar 
tissue from this painful mistake to help make better decisions going forward, 
ones that match our mission. (“An apology from Amazon,” 2009) 
 
Amazon also is alleged to have closed several Kindle users’ accounts without 
providing detailed information (Doctorow, 2012). One Kindle user living in Norway, 
where Amazon does not operate, found her account deleted without a detailed 
explanation but, instead, with the following email message from Amazon:  
 
We have found your account is directly related to another which has been 
previously closed for abuse of our policies. As such, your Amazon.co.uk 
account has been closed and any open orders have been cancelled. Per our 
Conditions of Use which state in part: Amazon.co.uk and its affiliates 
reserve the right to refuse service, terminate accounts, remove or edit 




As Bekkelund (2012) notes, the Amazon incident demonstrates that if “the 
retailer, in this case Amazon, thinks you’re a crook, they will throw you out and take 
away everything that you bought” (para. 9). Putting aside the question of whether 
Amazon should be entitled to have the authority to delete something that users “own” 
without the user’s permission, in practice, Amazon can delete all of a user’s content 
remotely under the licensing terms the user was forced to agree with in order to use 
Amazon’s services. According to the Kindle Store Terms of Use, “Kindle Content is 
licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider.” Put in the legitimacy of 
“browsewrap” terms, Amazon can reach into its users’ Kindles and delete all files, an act 
not deemed illegal in the age of licensing. 
Another example of downstream alteration in the realm of ebook use poses a 
profound question about changing history. One publisher decided to remove “the n-word” 
from new editions of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Kindle users found that in 
their ebooks n-words were replaced with other words (Chan, 2013). Setting aside the 
question of whether the n-word should be banned, changing literary works that hold 
historical value is a hazardous endeavor. Chan (2013) argues that “this category of 
revisions is the most problematic because it both threatens the preservation of cultural 
history and amounts to private censorship” (p. 272). People often say that preserving 
historical places and knowing history is important to avoid repeating past mistakes 
(Karpyn, 2015). Of similar importance is the preservation of literary works, such as The 
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Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Gone with the Wind, in their original form to also 
help society avoid repeating mistakes of the past.   
Still another example illustrates that owners can alter material on their licensed 
devices even if that material was not purchased from them. In 2010, Sony remotely 
updated its users’ PlayStation 3 to delete other operating systems that users were allowed 
to install on users’ original models of PlayStation 3 (Chan, 2013). If a user refused to 
update the system, the user’s access to PlayStation Network was denied and the user was 
unable to run new video games and Blu-Ray movies on his or her PlayStation 3. 
Downstream alteration is not some abstract concern but an issue that continues to 
take concrete shape in the age of licensing. Under the current legal system, copyright 
owners are allowed to use licenses, but whether copyright owners’ rights are asserted in 
an appropriate manner warrants critical investigation as increasingly more digital content 
is being licensed, rather than sold to users. Possible abuse of downstream alteration 
capabilities reflects on the new parameters of copy ownership. Historically, in the U.S., 
copy ownership has been regarded to include: “(1) the ability to read, play, use, or 
otherwise access a copy, and (2) the ability to lend, rent, sell, or otherwise transfer a 
copy” (Liu, 2001, p. 1286). Even in the age of licensing agreements, copy owners’ rights 
need to be preserved and property rights over their purchased digital copies need to be 
protected.         
 




Copy Ownership and Materiality  
 
People’s expectations and behaviors regarding the use of their digital artifacts 
reflect their experience with physical artifacts. For example, when people purchase 
ebooks, they tend to believe they own their ebooks in the same way they own their paper 
books. In other words, an individual’s perception of copy ownership is likely to be the 
same regardless of the format (i.e., paper book v. ebook). Additionally, copyright owners 
commonly use boilerplate agreements to which buyers pay little or no attention and 
oftentimes do not even know the existence of due to presentation tactics, such as click-
wrap licenses and the use of language that is nontransparent, misleading, and incomplete. 
Therefore, upon discovering they do not actually own their purchased ebooks and cannot 
transfer those ebooks, consumers often feel deprived of their legitimate rights.  
Although many people acknowledge that digital goods are different from physical 
goods, such as paper books, when it comes to their rights as copy owners, they may see 
no difference. Lessig references this phenomenon as the effect of social norms. People 
and institutions have cultivated expectations regarding their practices and conventions 
accruing to owning books and working with them. To the extent that copy owners have 
moved toward schemes such as licensing that undercut those expectations, a certain 
amount of outrage and discomfort can be expected.  
A growing body of scholarship contends that it is important to understand the 
interaction between people and technologies in terms of better predicting and planning 
for changes (Epstein, 2008; Leonardi & Barley, 2008; Leonardi, 2010). Additionally, 
Leonardi and Barley (2008) observe:  
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Understanding how people deal with an information technology’s materiality 
seems essential for developing a broader and fuller understanding of organizing. 
By bringing materiality more centrally into theories of change we should be able 
to speak more precisely about why people do the things they do with technology 
and why organizations and practices acquire the forms they acquire. (p. 172)  
When society is conceptualized as consisting of people and organizing forces that 
include rules and regulations, a clearer understanding of how people interact with 
technologies will likely influence the adjudication of contemporary societal problems, 
including copyright issues. However, U.S. courts and legal scholarship have paid little 
attention to understanding how people actually interact with technological artifacts in 
their daily lives.68 That slippage may be particularly irresponsible with respect to ebooks, 
given their cultural status on many societies.  
Before the introduction of digital technologies, it was generally taken for granted 
that properties are tangible and touchable, like paper books, buildings, and paintings. 
However, with the introduction of digital technologies, questions have been posed as to 
whether digital artifacts, such as software, have “materiality” because people tend to 
associate materiality with physical matter—tangible stuff (Leonardi, 2010). Given the 
                                           
68 One notable exception can be found in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 landmark ruling in the case of 
Sony Corp. of American v. Universal City Studios, Inc. How people actually used technologies figured 
prominently in the Betamax case. Recognizing that millions of VTRs were in use in America and the VTRs 
can be used for both infringing and substantial non-infringing uses, the Court ruled: “If there are millions of 
owners of VTR’s who makes copies of televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational 
programs such as Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the 
practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copyright feasible should not be stifled 
simply because the equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions of 
respondents’ works” (Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc., 1984, p. 446).    
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conceptual ambiguity with regard to materiality, copyright law’s distinction “between the 
immaterial ‘work’ and its fixation in a physical ‘copy’” has been increasingly challenged 
(Burk, 2013, p. 1).  
Scholars across disciplines, including sociology, science and technology studies, 
communication, and management among others, have sought to characterize materiality 
and in the process have experienced difficulty coming up with a working definition 
(Leonardi, 2010). Yet, a growing number of scholars question the conventional narrow 
understanding of “materiality” (Leonardi, 2010, Sterne, 2014).   
Building on multiple meanings of the adjective “material” as defined in the 
Oxford English Dictionary, Leonardi (2010) argued that the concept of materiality can 
hold different meanings, given that the adjective “material” has other meanings, such as 
“practical instantiation” and “significance” as well as having physical substance. 
According to Leonardi (2010), immaterial things such as abstract ideas, beliefs or values 
can become material if they instantiate theoretical constructs in one way or another. If we 
adopt this definition of material, then software has materiality. Sterne (2014) defined 
materiality as “both physical things and the irreducibly relational character of reality” (p. 
121). In another study, Sterne (2012) argued that “Software and data have their own 
materialities, even if their scale seems inhuman…hard drives are designed to hide their 
process of magnetic inscription from users’ sight, and the result is that invisibility has 
been conflated with immateriality” (Sterne, 2012, pp. 6-7).  
Following that line of thinking, this dissertation argues that the notion of 
materiality should not be limited to the tangible feature of an object, given the importance 
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of interaction and expectations between people and material objects that shapes the legal 
terrain surrounding copyright. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, the conventional 
understanding of a material object led the one court (in the ReDigi case) to differentiate 
digital music files from CDs, although both MP3 files and CDs consist of a series of ones 
and zeros. Here, the concept of materiality becomes relevant. Regardless of whether a 
copyright owner’s original creative expression is embodied in a CD or in digital form, 
both the CD and MP3 file translate what the creator generates into a form of creative 
expression. Moreover, the users of those files expect them to behave similarly (to sound 
alike).       
What do the debates about materiality have to do with ebooks? The creative 
expression of a creator is not protected under copyright law until it is fixed or embodied 
within an object so that people can recognize it. What copyright protects does not differ 
in terms of whether the creative expression is embodied in a tangible object or in digital 
form. If a first sale doctrine is applied to CDs and DVDs, there is no compelling reason to 
deny applying the doctrine to other digital artifacts such as ebooks. This argument is 
reasonable in light of an expanded notion of materiality in the context of copyright.  
Ebook Piracy 
 
Individuals use ebooks in three ways. They can purchase an ebook online, for 
example, through Amazon’s Kindle store or Apple’s iBooks. They can visit online or 




According to Lessig (2006), a social norm governs “how we are to behave” (p. 
341). When it comes to the social norms of people’s ebook experiences, ebook piracy is 
of concern. People expect to share and lend books, and they also expect relatively easy 
access. They also expect that actually own a book when they “purchase” it.  
Like music files, ebooks are easily pirated due to their relatively small file size 
(Hoorebeek, 2003). Various interest groups, particularly copyright holders, have reacted 
to this threat through legal remedies such as “strike” systems, which have been 
implemented in some countries to track down illegal file-sharers and warn them that 
those activities are unacceptable, and through technological protection measures. 
Recently, HarperCollins in collaboration with LibreDigital, a provider of 
distribution and warehousing services for ebook publishers, adopted a new watermarking 
system from the anti-piracy company Digimarc to embed digital information into their 
ebooks. HarperCollins takes two different approaches to pre-and post-consumer piracy. 
The watermark solution is adopted to address any leaks occurring within its supply chain 
rather than targeting the end consumer. Other anti-piracy solutions such as DRM and the 
takedown procedures of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act are employed to address 
individual users’ behaviors or pirate sites that warehouse digital copies of books.  
Preventing users’ unauthorized access to copyrighted works through DRM 
technologies has become a widely adopted practice in many content industries, 
particularly after the DMCA was enacted. This approach assumes that all users can 
potentially engage in illegal downloading. However, another school of thought maintains 
that people are not likely to engage in illegal downloading if they can pay with ease and 
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prices are reasonable (Pogue, 2013). Some even argue that DRM-free strategy can 
eventually increase content creators’ revenue because consumers who are exposed to 
quality content will happily pay for new content or introduce what they’ve experienced to 
their friends and family (Pogue, 2013; Burkart & McCourt, 2006).  
In April 2012, Tor Books UK made its ebooks DRM-free (Crisp, 2013). One 
year later the company made an announcement regarding the results of its new 
experiment:  
DRM-protected titles are still subject to piracy, and we believe a great majority 
of readers are just as against piracy as publishers are, understanding that piracy 
impacts an author’s ability to earn an income from their creative work. As it is, 
we’ve seen no discernible increase in piracy on any of our titles, despite them 
being DRM-free for nearly a year. (Crisp, 2013, para. 6)   
   
Changing Habits of Consumption  
 
Following trends in other culture industries, a few ebook subscription businesses 
such as Safari have been launched. In 2014, Amazon launched its own ebook 
subscription service, Kindle Unlimited, which is available only in the U.S. Similar ebook 
subscription services such as Oyster and Scribd are currently available in the market. 
With a monthly fee, those services provide consumers with “unlimited access” to titles 
available through their service but do not allow consumers to own those titles. Once 




Although those services are not the same as Netflix or Spotify, the transition to 
subscription-based services is a trend that continues to grow. Following similar trends in 
music and television programs that circumscribe ways that people consume digital 
content, Amazon has reached out to more users by initiating its own subscription service. 
As a result, more users are consuming content via streaming or subscription services as 
opposed to downloading. According to Amazon, users of Kindle Unlimited can access 
over 800,000 ebooks and thousands of audiobooks for the price of $9.99 a month.69 The 
major issue accompanying these services remains the latitude available for people to 
exercise ownership-like rights. A second issue concerns how subscription services 
channel taste and selections according to market potential.   
Despite its popularity, the subscription model is not likely to provide enough 
“common spaces and public forums for sharing tastes and experiences” (Burkart & 
McCourt, 2006, p. 134). It is difficult to think about unexpected exposure to new books 
that do not easily fall into one’s typical book purchasing categories. How can this 
narrowed targeting facilitate and promote “the progress of science and useful arts?” 
Barber and Fox (1958) note that “by its very nature, scientific research is a voyage into 
the unknown by routes that are in some measure unpredictable and unplannable. Chance 
or luck is therefore as inevitable in scientific research as are logic and what Pasteur called 
‘the prepared mind’” (p. 129). Turow (2012) points out that when individuals enter 
physical bookstores, they are more likely to be exposed to new genres or new authors 
                                           
69 See http://www.amazon.com/b?node=9578129011 
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than when they shop online. This concern captures well the ways that social norms for 
purchasing books can be influenced by architectures that shape consumer behavior.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter explores ebooks as a way to chronicle contemporary content 
creation industry mores and goals. The book, an iconic information product strongly 
identified with exercising informed democratic rights, morphs into a commodity 
embedded in a digital ecosystem when it becomes an ebook. To examine the ebook 
ecosystem, this study has utilized Lessig’s four modalities of regulation. The results show 
that each modality works both independently and in collaboration with other modalities. 
As Lessig (1999) notes, “To understand how a regulation might succeed, we must view 
these four modalities as acting on the same field, and understand how they interact” (p. 
510).  
The current ebook ecosystem limits users’ rights on many fronts. Amazon and 
other major players in the ebook market have built their own closed ecosystems by 
making it difficult for consumers to freely exchange ebooks across different ebook 
platforms and to participate in secondary markets. In addition, based on licensing terms, 
architectural structures allow Amazon and other ebook players to remotely delete a 
consumer’s ebooks or make changes to users’ ebooks. The U.S. legal system is built on 
the premise that “freedom of contract is a core value” (Radin, 2013, p. 56). Thus, ebook 
distributors, such as Amazon, use boilerplate agreements that can potentially eliminate or 
limit users’ rights through so-called “click-wrap” license agreements. Addressing the 
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debate surrounding the click-wrap agreement is not the purpose of this study, which 
would require a separate study. It is sufficient to mention that, as Radin (2013) aptly 
pointed out, “a boilerplate rights deletion scheme may involve significant unknown losses 
of your entitlements” (p. 85), and those include rights normally accorded by the first sale 
doctrine.  
In the digital age, consumers do not “own” their ebooks; rather, they are merely 
licensed to use their purchased ebooks. The first sale doctrine does not currently apply to 
ebooks. Consumers are not allowed to resell or lend their ebooks without the copyright 
holder’s permission because the current copyright law does not recognize a digital first 
sale doctrine. In the future, whether consumers can resell, lend, or rent their digital works 
is likely to have a clear impact on the market of digital works. Social norms regarding the 
unauthorized sharing of digital works, including digital content and architectural design, 
are likely to affect attitudes of the content industries toward proprietary DRM and 
subsequent legal arrangements.  
Based on the “Celestial Jukebox” model that allows consumers to enjoy digital 
cultural works of their choice without transferring ownership of content, the culture 
industry continues to transform users of copyrighted works from the category of owners 
to the category of tenants by locking users into the company’s own service system 
(Burkart & McCourt, 2006). In the ebook market, users are increasingly forced to follow 
restrictive licensing agreements. Indeed, users are treated as renters not owners of ebooks 
and, in the process, users of ebooks are losing rights previously given to copy owners of 
printed books. As shown in Chapter 5, this trend runs against maximizing individuals’ 
 
 143 
self-authorship regarding how to interact with their “purchased” cultural works; also, the 
current licensing regime imposes an undue burden on libraries in terms of limiting their 
ability to fulfill their mission to serve the public and further democratic values and 
destroys more affordable secondary markets.   
It is important to note that copyright law is related to the four modalities 
regulating the ebook ecosystem. Throughout history, copyright law has steadily carved 
out space where competing normative perspectives and conflicting interests compete with 
one another. Over the past few decades, copyright protection has increased at an 
unprecedented rate, serving copyright holders’ interests rather than also serving the 
public’s interests in a balanced way. Recent trends that support greater protection of 
copyright are catalyzed by influential lobbyists, such as the content industry. However, 
those stakeholders face new countervailing forces advanced by “the periphery” that 
involves parties who are in support of digital piracy, creative commons, and open source 
movements. Especially pertinent to the ebook context, lawmakers in the State of 
Connecticut passed a bill that enables the state library’s Board of Trustees to generate a 
statewide ebook collection that allows anyone with a Connecticut library card to access 
that collection.  
Issues related to the ebook industry should be further explored through normative 
copyright theories. Historically, the dominant justification of copyright protection has 
been the economic incentive argument. However, an increasing number of studies 
suggest that other normative perspectives on the protection of copyright can better 
address the original intention of copyright legislation. Cultural products, such as books, 
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have an acknowledged role in facilitating core values of democracy and enhancing the 
diversity of cultural expression as well as widespread distribution of information. That 
role justifies public intervention beyond market-based solutions (De Prato & Simon, 
2014).  
When someone purchases a printed book, the individual continues to own the 
book and no one takes it away, even if the publisher or bookseller closes its business. 
That is not the case with ebooks because consumers have the right to access the content 
but do not actually “own” ebooks.  
The first sale doctrine allows a copy owner to exercise his or her property right 
over that copy. The underlying rationale of the doctrine that protects the rights of a 
property owner needs to be asserted regardless of the type of format that embodies the 
creative expression of the copyright owner.  
Whether the current copyright regime can be “fixed” so that it supports 
advancements in science and art, rather than serving merely the interests of copyright 
holders, depends on action being taken to extend the doctrine of first sale to copy owners 
of digital content. One thing is clear: The time has come to find a way to balance 





Chapter 5: Cultural Democracy and Copyright 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that cultural democracy can provide an 
alternative framework for a broader and fuller understanding of the goals of copyright 
law. By bringing the normative concept into the debate surrounding the establishment of 
a digital first sale doctrine, this dissertation explores ways the concept is presented in the 
copyright law context. The argument here demonstrates how the values promoted by 
cultural democracy are synonymous with the socially beneficial effects of the first sale 
doctrine. With that goal in mind, this chapter contextualizes and further elaborates the 
notion of cultural democracy by providing more concrete examples of how cultural 
democracy plays out in practice. In doing so, this chapter focuses on individuals’ use of 
ebooks and the role of public libraries in the digital age.   
BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY  
 
Over the past several decades in the U.S., the protection of copyright has 
continually been expanded and extended. In addition, copyright owners have expanded 
their monolithic control over their works through contractual arrangements such as a 
click-wrap license. The ever strengthening copyright protection has been supported by 
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exponents of the dominant law-and-economic theory of copyright law,70 treating 
copyright as “the result of buyers’ and sellers’ undertakings, which the government 
simply enforces” (Netanel, 1998, p. 108). Judge Frank Easterbrook, one of leading 
exponents of this view, puts it thus: “A federal law of intellectual property may promote 
enforcement while duplicating the terms that would (presumptively) be set by contract. If 
Congress misunderstands the optimal terms, any of the entitlements pre-set in the law 
may be eliminated by contract” (Easterbrook, 1990, p. 114). This line of thinking helped 
copyright owners easily turn to contract law, resorting to licensing agreements that 
favored the owners and limited consumers’ rights.  
Proponents of economic efficiency (e.g., Breyer, 1970; Easterbrook, 1990; Landes 
& Posner, 2003) claim that the goal of copyright legislation is to maximize the wealth of 
society. Thus, when considering the consequences of copyright protection, these 
proponents value highly the economic “efficiency” or “welfare” of society as a whole 
(Brach & Syed, 2014). This narrow economic reasoning has been the dominant 
understanding of intellectual property, and many scholars view intellectual property 
“solely as a tool to solve an economic ‘public goods’ problem: nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable goods such as music and scientific knowledge will be too easy to copy and 
                                           
70 In this study, I use the following terms interchangeably: utilitarianism, law-and-economics approach, 
and incentive paradigm. This is not to imply they share exactly the same meaning, but for the purposes they 




share…unless a monopoly right in the ideas is provided for a limited period of time” 
(Sunder, 2012, pp. 24-25).71  
The law and economics paradigm has ignored other normative values including 
the issue of distribution and furthering cultural participation of ordinary citizens. As 
Sunder (2012) argued, “(1) [the law and economics paradigm] fails descriptively as a 
comprehensive account of extant legal doctrine, (2) it fails prescriptively as the exclusive 
basis for deciding the important intellectual property conflicts of the day, and (3) it fails 
to capture fully the dynamics of cultural creation and circulation” (p. 25). The paradigm 
only focuses on the overall welfare, measured by money value, in the aggregate. The 
basic tenet of this economic efficiency approach is the “maximization of cultural output” 
(Sunder, 2012, p. 29). And this calculus does not confront “distinctions between the 
developed and developing worlds, the urban and the rural, and women and men, or 
among blacks, Asians, Latinos, and whites” (Sunder, 2012, p. 30). As Jenkins (2006) 
noted, “Current copyright law simply doesn’t have a category for dealing with amateur 
creative expression…It surely demands reconsideration as we develop technologies that 
broaden who may produce and circulate cultural materials” (p. 198). The real issue is the 
drive toward monetization that benefits only a handful of copyright owners, depriving 
content consumers of opportunities to tinker with cultural works. Recognizing the 
limitations of the dominant economic account of copyright law, a growing body of 
                                           
71 Intellectual works are nonexcludable, in that once they are created and made available to another person 
other than the creator, it is difficult to prevent others from enjoying them. Intellectual works are also 
nonrivalrous, in that one person’s use of a creative work does not reduce others’ ability to enjoy it. In other 
words, my use of creative expression does not compete with that of others.    
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scholarship on copyright has called for the necessity of outgrowing the dominant 
paradigm’s narrow focus: having more goods circulate within society as a whole by 
giving incentives to creators.  
As Sunder (2012) pointed out, alternative understandings of copyright law have 
paid attention to the word “culture.” For example, such phrases like “cultural 
environmentalism” (Boyle, 2008), “free culture” (Lessig, 2004), “democratic culture” 
(Balkin, 2004), and “cultural democracy” (Bracha & Syed, 2014) elaborate normative 
values in the context of copyright. Democratic copyright theorists view copyright as a 
tool for protecting democratic values. One example of a normative value other than 
economic efficiency can be found in Yochai Benkler’s argument on commons-based 
methods of production. He argues that commons-based methods of production can 
provide ordinary people more meaningful opportunities to participate in cultural 
meaning-making processes (Benkler, 2006). As I show below, the notion of cultural 
democracy has also been developed to provide an alternative understanding of copyright.   
It is important to note that these alternative understandings of copyright law do 
not intend to supplant the underlying rationale of copyright legislation: giving creators 
incentive to create. The basic insight is still useful in formulating copyright policy and 
balancing legitimate competing interests between users of copyrighted works and 
copyright holders. Most proponents of alternative understandings of copyright law do not 
deny the importance of economic analysis in determining who gets the rewards of 
creative expression and how the “output” is distributed. Rather, challenging the 
dominance of the economic efficiency paradigm, they argue that the narrow economic 
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discourse needs to be supplemented by other “democratic” approaches to copyright law. 
Normative values such as self-determination and cultural democracy are valued by 
democratic copyright theorists. Some commentators argue that the economic efficiency 
paradigm needs to be complemented by insights from other disciplines, such as 
anthropology, cultural studies, philosophy, science and technology studies, and sociology 
(Cohen, 2012; Sunder, 2012). This chapter seeks to contribute to this tradition by 
showing that the notion of cultural democracy can provide theoretical justifications for 
adopting a digital first sale doctrine in particular and in general for reforming copyright 
laws. Below I provide a detailed description of cultural democracy, demonstrate what 
values the concept promotes, and illustrate the ways the concept can be understood in 
connection with ordinary citizens’ engagement with cultural works.  
THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL DEMOCRACY  
 
Many intellectual property scholars are devoting more of their attention to the 
term culture (Sunder, 2012). Culture is the sphere in which individuals’ decisions about 
their own lives and collective decisions are made and various alternative options are 
considered. In the early twentieth-century, Rachel Davis DuBois developed the concept 
of “cultural democracy” while addressing the importance of intercultural education and 
the sharing of cultural values (DuBois, 1943; Graves, 2005). Dubois (1943) defined 
cultural democracy as “a conscious sharing of our cultural values—a creative use of 
differences” (p. 54). In the process of advocating the importance of promoting ethnic 
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heritage and cultural diversity, DuBois founded several groups, including the Inter-
Cultural Education Workshop and Workshop for Cultural Democracy (Lambert, 1993).  
DuBois (1943) argued that only in a democracy can a space be carved out where 
“a creative use of differences” can happen, and she called that type of cultural sharing 
cultural democracy (p. 5, emphasis in original). She contended further:  
To hold that each of these [various cultural and religious groups], as each 
individual, is entitled to its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of its particular 
kind of happiness, as long as it does not interfere with the welfare of the whole, is 
the virtue of tolerance. But this is to be merely tolerant. Because society is one 
organic whole, it must be sustained by more than tolerance. It requires integration. 
Society needs to make a creative use of differences. (DuBois, 1943, p. 6, 
emphasis in original) 
Her unique American voice in the 1940s resonated with other peace efforts 
underway during wartime and with civil rights. Arguably, cultural democracy has not 
received sufficient attention compared to political and economic democracy, although the 
notion of cultural democracy is equally important and these three domains are 
inextricably related (Graves, 2005).  
Echoing DuBois, the 1976 Oslo Conference of the European ministers of cultural 
affairs offered that “Cultural democracy implies placing importance on amateurs and on 
creating conditions which will allow people to choose to be active participants rather than 
just passive receivers of culture. A cultural policy which aims at creating cultural 
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democracy must necessarily be decentralized. Decentralization must be considered both a 
means and an end in cultural policy” (as cited in Langsted, 1989).   
DuBois advocated the importance of differences when the dominant philosophy 
of the time focused on assimilation; she argued for accepting and benefiting from diverse 
perspectives and cultures. Evrard (1997) explored the origin of, philosophical roots of, 
and links between the two paradigms: the democratization of culture and cultural 
democracy. Democratization of culture aims to “disseminate major cultural works to an 
audience that does not have ready access to them, for lack of financial means or 
knowledge derived from education” (Evrard, 1997, p. 167); this paradigm is concerned 
about outcomes rather than opportunities. By contrast, cultural democracy valorizes 
individuals’ freedom to make their life choices based on their own preferences. The 
cultural democracy paradigm implies “an equality of opportunities, in which the market 
structure needs to be varied enough to respect taste diversity and satisfy each segment of 
taste” (Evrard, 1997, p. 173). That is, cultural democracy supports the value of individual 
tastes and encourages the acceptance of and benefits derived from the diversity of 
perspectives and cultures.  
In a copyright context, cultural democracy refers to “an eclectic yet loosely 
connected group of normative accounts of intellectual property” (Bracha, 2007, p. 1843). 
This normative vision provides individuals with various life choices by ensuring that they 
can effectively participate in “the semiotic shaping of one’s own subjectivity” (Bracha & 
Syed, 2014, pp. 255-256, emphasis in original). This dissertation also suggests cultural 
democracy as a normative value that seeks the maximization of individuals’ self-
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authorship and decentralized cultural meaning-making processes. Ensuring people have 
rights to participate critically in cultural meaning-making processes is important because 
culture plays an instrumental role in structuring our society and our lives (Sunder, 2012).    
Balkin (2004) defined democratic culture as a culture where “individuals have a 
fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as 
individuals” (p. 3). He argued that individuals’ ability to participate in cultural meaning-
making processes is the core of democratic culture. This line of thinking is related to the 
concept of self-determination which values one’s ability to effectively pursue his or her 
life choices and revise them freely (Bracha & Syed, 2014). Building upon liberal 
democratic theories, cultural democracy takes the notion of self-determination to the 
cultural sphere (Bracha & Syed, 2014). In that regard, cultural democracy and democratic 
culture are similar in terms of its core goals.  
As long as one of primary goals of cultural democracy is considered to be 
promoting cultural diversity and the sharing of diverse cultural experiences to build a 
richer culture, books (and ebooks) should come to the forefront in terms of supporting the 
value of cultural democracy. Also important is acknowledgement that public libraries 
have played a significant role in realizing the ideal of cultural democracy in real life. 
Without access to knowledge and cultural works, meaningful participation in processes of 
cultural meaning-making cannot be guaranteed, not to mention the critical issue in a 
democratic society of supporting an informed citizenry. Below I describe in greater detail 
the particular values that are promoted by the concept of cultural democracy and their 
link to copyright’s democratic values.  
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CULTURAL DEMOCRACY VALUES    
 
Furthering Individuals’ Self-Determination   
 
The concept of cultural democracy expands the concept of self-determination to 
the cultural sphere (Bracha & Syed, 2014) and the realization of self-determination 
requires individuals’ freedom of expression (Baker, 2002). It is important to note that 
self-expression liberties include not only individuals’ freedom to express but also their 
ability to use copyrighted expressions based on existing cultural works (Baker, 2002).  
Access to information is prerequisite to the realization of speech rights (Stein, 
2006). The First Amendment protects and supports the speech rights of individuals, 
promoting access to media. Copyright laws also can define the boundary across which 
one can access information and enjoy creative works. Accordingly, the interrelationship 
and tension between free speech and copyright law has continually garnered attention 
(Goldstein, 1970; Netanel, 2008; Nimmer, 1970; Patterson, 1975; van Caenegem, 1995). 
Although many scholars have consistently claimed that copyright does not act as a 
roadblock for the realization of the public’s speech rights, “free speech defenses are 
inconsistently interpreted and dismissed without due consideration” in intellectual 
property cases (Coombe, 1998, p. 77). Free speech activities, including making parodies 
or Internet memes, can be considered copyright infringement when fair use defense is not 
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applied. U.S. courts have often dismissed too easily free speech defenses when dealing 
with copyright infringement cases.72  
Free speech and self-determination issues are intrinsically related to the question 
of how far or to what extent one can use and consume copyrighted expression by others. 
Bracha and Syed (2014) defined self-determination as “the ability of individuals 
reflectively to form and revise their own conception of the good, and effectively to 
pursue a life plan for realizing it” (p. 251). Several conditions should be met when one 
fulfills one’s self-determination: 1) a variety of available options, 2) people’s capability 
of understanding and evaluating those options, and 3) people’s capability of critically 
revising their options (Bracha & Syed, 2014).  
Without freedom of expression, self-determination would mean next to nothing. 
As Balkin (2004) contends, “[f]reedom of speech allows ordinary people to participate 
freely in the spread of ideas and in the creation of meanings that, in turn, help constitute 
them as persons” (p. 3). In other words, freedom of expression is a necessary condition 
for individuals to meaningfully engage with and participate in cultural meaning-making 
processes. Democratic theorists, including those in support of cultural democracy, assign 
weight to individuals’ autonomy and active participation in meaning-making processes.  
Continuing this line of thought, Bracha (2007) noted that one of the key themes of 
cultural democracy is “the maximization and empowerment of individual 
autonomy…[I]ndividual autonomy includes the freedom to interact in an active way with 
                                           
72 Most notably, in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme Court did not accept free speech 
arguments presented to the Court. Opponents of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
argued that the Act was unconstitutional (Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2003). However, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not accept that argument and ruled that the Act is constitutional.  
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existing cultural materials, to recreate and reshape them, and to express one’s own voice 
through a dialogue with those of others” (pp. 1846-1847). This idea directly intersects the 
ways people access information, cultural products, and content. It is important to note 
that individual property ownership relates to the further development of individual 
autonomy. Macpherson (1973) viewed property as something “instrumental to a full and 
free life,” arguing that individual property needs to include “a right to a set of power 
relations that permits a full life of enjoyment and development of one’s human 
capacities” (p. 138). According to Amazon’s Kindle Store Terms of Use, the purchase of 
ebooks through the Kindle Store is defined as simply use of content, thus essentially 
misleading consumers on the face of the transaction.73  
As previous chapters have shown, consumers’ rights are limited or restricted by 
the current licensing regime represented by “click-wrap,” “browse-wrap,” or “shrink-
wrap” licenses (Radin, 2013; Reis, 2015). These licensing schemes usually employ 
boilerplate terms that require us to be bound by them (Radin, 2013). According to 
Amazon’s Kindle Store Terms of Use, purchasing ebooks through Kindle Store is being 
                                           
73 It is important to note that a property right is somehow socially constructed and subject to change, 
although the law does not really focus on people’s expectations in transactions. People’s expectations can 
also change over time as their social experience changes. We are increasingly moving toward a society 
where more and more people tend to enjoy cultural works through a Netflix-style subscription model. 
However, it is not entirely clear whether this trend is desirable for society as a whole. Clearly, one notable 
concern is the gap between the rich and the poor in terms of being informed with knowledge and being 
exposed to cultural works. Those who cannot afford to pay for information and cultural works will become 
more marginalized. The concept of cultural democracy values egalitarian opportunities for individuals to 
gain access to cultural works. It is worth noting that having a normative framework can be helpful for better 
keeping socially desirable values regardless of changing social experiences of individuals. A normative 
framework sometimes allows us to have stopgap models that are compatible with the chosen normative 
concept. A digital first sale doctrine can be considered one mechanism for accomplishing the goal of 




defined as use of content, and essentially misleading on the face of the transaction. In the 
majority of cases, boilerplate terms prevent digital content consumers from selling or 
transferring their legally obtained digital media. On the other hand, allowing digital 
content consumers to resell or transfer lawfully purchased files can be understood as 
giving them more autonomy and facilitating transactions of cultural works, in effect 
reinforcing a vision of cultural democracy.    
Decentralizing the Cultural Meaning-Making Process  
 
When it comes to traditional cultural policy, decentralization has mainly focused 
on geographical decentralization (Langsted, 1989). For example, decentralization has 
been referenced as relocating cultural venues such as theaters or sharing the state’s 
economic responsibilities with local authorities. Langsted (1989) points out that in a new 
cultural policy, decentralization means paying increased attention to those groups that 
have been underserved in terms of the opportunity to participate in cultural activities. In 
addition, decentralization encourages interaction between consumers and producers of 
cultural works, and those cultural works need to be diverse in terms of form and content 
(Langsted, 1989). From a cultural democracy perspective, digital content consumers are 
not just passive consumers but regarded rather as active participants in cultural meaning-
making processes. Participatory culture matters because it is linked to “promoting 
freedom, engendering equality, and fostering human and economic development” 
(Sunder, 2012, p. 64).  
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As Netanel (2008) contends, “From feminist fan fiction to mashups that meld 
white-bread music with hip-hop, creative appropriation gives individuals a voice, a 
means to challenge the ubiquity of mass media culture and the prevailing mores, 
ideology, and artistic judgments it represents” (p. 160). Creative appropriation of 
copyrighted works or the so-called participatory culture that Henry Jenkins and Yochai 
Benkler address allows individuals to raise their voice and in so doing contest the 
dominant cultural discourses. This possibility holds particular significance when we try to 
challenge or demystify taken-for-granted constructs (Sunder, 2012; Tang, 2011). As 
Sunder (2012) notes, “The liberty to contest hegemonic discourses has particularly 
profound possibilities for women and other minorities who have not traditionally had 
power over the stories that dominate our lives” (pp. 65-66). Cultural democracy 
intrinsically relates to engendering diverse voices and portraits of our culture by 
promoting ordinary citizens’ active participation in cultural meaning-making processes, 
rejecting the passive consumption of cultural works.  
While the law-and-economics paradigm gives weight to individuals’ willingness 
and ability to pay for cultural works, distribution schemes appropriate for those unable to 
pay fall outside the paradigm’s primary concerns. Due to the lack of purchasing power of 
the poor, lower income individuals do not greatly benefit from the creation of more 
cultural works under the strong economics approach. In this respect, when it comes to 
issues such as inequality in access to cultural works, the law and economics paradigm, 
which values the creation of more creative works and overall increase of people’s welfare 
measured by individuals’ willingness and ability to pay, cannot fully address distributive 
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concerns. Cultural democracy can, on the other hand, justify distributive equity 
considerations in the context of copyright (Brach & Syed, 2014).  
Today ordinary citizens’ interaction with cultural works is largely mediated by 
access to the Internet and broadband. Yet even as broadband seems to be an integral part 
of our daily lives, not all Americans are enjoying its economic, social, and cultural 
benefits. As of 2013, a high-speed Internet connection is not available among 31.4% of 
U.S. households with an annual income less than $50,000 and children ages 6 to 17 (Pew 
Research Center, 2015). In addition, a broadband disparity between rural and urban areas 
of the country has been well documented (Strover, 2001, 2011). A recent study by 
Whitacre, Gallardo, and Strover (2013) examined the broadband adoption gap between 
metro and non-metro areas and reported that there was a consistent 13% gap in household 
broadband adoption between 2003 and 2010.  
Given this reality, until recently, policy efforts for bridging the digital divide have 
largely focused on increasing broadband access and adoption. However, it is important to 
note that “if policy efforts directed to remediating the digital divide continue to focus 
primarily on access, which is easier to measure, compared to digital literacy and 
competency, the divide is liable to continue” (Strover, Flamm, & Sang, 2013, p. 29). A 
great deal of attention should be directed to increasing digital literacy and competency. 
Particularly public libraries’ role in “cultivating opportunities for participatory learning 
and co-creation that are hallmarks of digital culture” deserves more attention in the 
context of cultural democracy (McShane, 2011, p. 393). If individuals do not know how 
to participate in cultural meaning-making processes in a connected society, they are 
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likely to remain unconnected and apart from others, which runs against the normative 
ideal of cultural democracy.  
Helping Libraries Fulfill Their Mission  
 
Public libraries are central cultural institutions in many western democracies. 
They exist “to promote a public good” (Darnton, 2009, p. 11). As Palfrey (2015) notes, 
“The knowledge that libraries offer and the help that librarians provide are the lifeblood 
of an informed and engaged republic” (p. 10). Libraries can be central to cultural 
democracy. In addition to preserving cultural works, public libraries have provided 
access to them, facilitating people’s engagement with and contributions to the nation’s 
cultural heritage and help their life-long learning experiences. The notion of cultural 
democracy is synonymous with the mission of public libraries. Because participating in 
cultural meaning-making processes first requires access to cultural works, libraries have 
played a significant role in providing access points for ordinary citizens. However, as 
culturally significant works are increasingly distributed in digital formats, addressing 
digital content effectively in terms of transferring cultural works over time and space, 
whether in libraries or other institutions, is of paramount importance.  
The threats to the first sale doctrine and the ebook licensing thus figure in 
libraries’ future mission. In the age of licensing, libraries are facing difficulties in 
addressing various licensing models imposed by content distributors, significantly 
limiting libraries’ capacity to provide access to culturally significant digital content. The 
availability and pricing of ebooks has been a major concern of library communities. As 
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shown in Chapter 4, when it comes to ebooks, publishers often impose much higher 
prices on libraries; they can choose not to sell ebooks to libraries; they can even eliminate 
library access to their new releases. In November 2011, Penguin made its new ebook 
titles inaccessible to library patrons.74 Libraries cannot maintain access to content 
equivalent to what they can in cases where the first sale doctrine is applied to them 
(Lipinski, 2014). They have encountered problems associated with adding ebooks to their 
service catalogs so that patrons are able to access them (Breeding, 2013; Brook & Salter, 
2012). Given that libraries have provided individuals who cannot afford the primary 
markets with free and unfettered access to knowledge and cultural works, the current 
problem libraries are facing warrants serious attention.   
The increasing reliance on licensing presents a problem to libraries because 
licensing tends to employ restrictive agreements. Licensing agreements are regulated by 
contract laws, which make it difficult to impose legal limits on those contractual 
agreements between the libraries and content distributors (Lipinski, 2014). That said, 
some efforts have tried to address the problem. Collecting culturally significant works 
among digital content licensed by Creative Commons or by the Digital Public Library of 
America’s initiative are good examples of those efforts. Based on the “free to all” 
principle, the Digital Public Library of America, since its official launch in 2013, has 
served as a core digital platform for a wide range of hub-libraries and hub-institutions 
that hold digital collections; additionally, it provides access to digital cultural works for 
                                           




those that use hub-organizations (Palfrey, 2015). The primary goal of the Digital Public 
Library of America is to encourage “the active participation of citizens” (Palfrey, 2015, p. 
101). In addition to providing access to digital cultural works, the Digital Public Library 
of America helps citizens “contribute materials in their possession to a national data” 
(Palfrey, 2015, p. 102). Contributions by ordinary citizens involve their active 
participation in the process of cultural meaning-making, thereby helping to achieve 
another value promoted by cultural democracy.   
One of the key features of cultural democracy is facilitating ordinary citizens’ 
participation in cultural meaning-making processes which is in accordance with the 
mission of public libraries. This dissertation argues that the best way to incorporate 
cultural works both exhaustively and effectively in the digital age is to challenge the 
current copyright legislation and to enable libraries to better meet the needs of the public. 
The goals of providing access to information and enabling people to participate in 
cultural meaning-making processes are particularly important to libraries’ mission of 
serving economically vulnerable populations, because in many cases the poor and 
homeless cannot afford to purchase cultural resources and public libraries are only places 
where they can access cultural works. As the American Library Association (2014) noted 
in one of its policy statements, it is “crucial that libraries recognize their role in enabling 
poor people to participate fully in a democratic society, by utilizing a wide variety of 
available resources and strategies” (“Library Services to the Poor,” n.d., para. 1). The 
Copyright Act also recognized the necessity of having exemptions for public libraries and 
archives. For example, Section 108 allows libraries and archives to reproduce 
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copyrighted works and distribute copies of those copyrighted works, with exemptions 
from copyright infringement under certain conditions. In 2006, an independent committee 
of the American Library Association under sponsorship of the United States Copyright 
Office and the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of 
the Library of Congress sought to update Section 108 in response to the challenges of the 
digital age. The “Section 108 Study Group” issued an independent report in 2008 that 
includes a set of recommendations.75 However, the Study Group’s report did not reach 
agreement on several controversial issues. For example, it provided no suggestions 
regarding the digital first sale doctrine or temporary copies of digital works made in the 
process of accessing unlicensed works. Inasmuch as public libraries have functioned as 
core institutions that further democracy, their mission should continue to receive support 
under the copyright law even in the digital age.     
CULTURAL DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE   
 
Understanding the cultural sphere is germane to a vision of cultural democracy 
(Bracha & Syed, 2014). The very essence of self-determination is the ability of 
individuals to critically and independently consider and reconsider various life choices 
and pursue their own life plans (Dworkin, 1988). Thus, applying the basic conditions of 
self-determination to the cultural domain necessitates the following conditions: that 
                                           




meaningful choices are available to individuals as well as equal opportunity for everyone 
to participate in cultural meaning-making processes.  
This brings us back to earlier concerns with digital first sale. Basically, adopting a 
digital first sale doctrine provides users of digital goods with freedom to resell, rent, or 
lend their lawfully purchased goods. From the perspective of self-determination, such 
provisions are desirable consequences as they bestow more freedom on individuals with 
regard to their possessions (or what they believe are their possessions). However, from 
the perspective of copyright holders, the adoption of a digital first sale doctrine may be 
viewed as favoring copy owners over copyright holders because of limitations placed on 
the distribution rights of copyright holders.   
One may ask why we should care about ordinary citizens’ freedom to transfer the 
ownership of their lawfully purchased works and why we should favor the freedom of 
users over that of copyright owners. Proponents of the law-and-economics approach may 
ask: Is there any good justification for granting users this right? The cultural democracy 
response is that giving digital content consumers more freedom to tinker with and interact 
with their possession—including transferring ownership of their lawfully purchased 
works—promotes one’s self-determination.  
The normative concept of self-determination may not be enough to fully address 
the question of favoring users’ freedom because if we treat everyone’s opportunity to 
maximize their own subjective preferences equally, we may need to “equally” protect 
copyright holders’ freedom to earn more money by exerting their control over their 
copyrighted works. Here the notion of cultural democracy provides a justification for 
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favoring ordinary citizens’ freedom to access and use cultural works. When weighing the 
simple earning of more money through copyright protection and realizing one’s life goals 
(such as a musician or writer) by being exposed to and consuming more cultural works, 
cultural democracy gives more importance to the latter. Those life goals do not have to be 
professional. Creating and distributing user-generated content can be considered the 
realization of one’s life choice. Allowing broader access and cheaper access is good thing 
because it helps ordinary citizens define and form their life plans without constraints. In 
addition, cultural democracy puts a great deal of value on promoting a participatory 
culture. Thus, giving favor to digital content consumers is justified.   
Recent developments in the cultural domain provide a concrete context in which 
the notion of cultural democracy can play out. One implication of cultural democracy is a 
more robust working environment because it might open up the possibility for people to 
choose creative occupations or careers. In today’s cultural sphere, with the help of the 
Internet and digital technologies, ordinary citizens are increasingly exerting their right to 
participate in various forms of cultural meaning-making processes. The growing 
literature in participatory media, whether it be the creation of fan fiction or peer-to-peer 
collaboration efforts or remixing, ably documents this (Burgess & Green, 2009; Scott, 
2015). As Fisher (2010) notes, “[technology] has radically increased the ability of 
innovating users to communicate with each other—to exchange ideas concerning 




 The “innovating users” can even make a lot of money through social media 
outlets such as YouTube. Consider Sweden’s Felix “PewDiePie” Kjellberg, one of the 
biggest stars among YouTube users. By posting his videos to YouTube, this Swedish 
video-game commentator made, in 2013, over $4 million through ad revenue (Moss, 
2014). He started uploading his videos “motivated primarily by a combination of 
curiosity and passion” (Fisher, 2010, pp. 1433-1434).  
Now it is difficult to tell whether the “innovating users” are amateurs or 
professionals. It is not difficult to find ordinary people who make several millions from 
his or her own YouTube channel by commenting on or making derivative works based on 
preexisting videos or other creative works (Jacobs, 2014). Not only are they making 
money by participating in cultural meaning-making processes, their activities sometimes 
enable them to find a new profession. Michelle Phan, for example, has several million 
YouTube subscribers for her videos about how to shop and use cosmetics. She was hired 
by Cosmetics company Lancome to be the company’s official “video makeup artist” 
(Farnham, 2012). As of September 2014, she had over 6.9 million subscribers, her own 
line of makeup and online subscription service called Ipsy (Brouwer, 2014).  
The ubiquitous presence of user generated content is important because it opens 
up opportunities for other users to build on preexisting creative works, generate new 
cultural works, and share them, which eventually serves as a catalyst decentralizing 
cultural meaning-making processes. In this sense alone, the digital environment, with its 
“relative ease of commenting on others’ cultural expressions and making one’s own 
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content destabilizes traditional cultural authorities, making that authority more 
transparent and contingent” (Sunder, 2012, p. 58).76  
In pre-digital media worlds, the participation by individuals in the process of 
cultural meaning-making often was mediated by books and other print material. Even 
today, books serve as the primary source for individuals to access knowledge and cultural 
expression by offering a wide range of perspectives and experience across time and 
space. Books provide opportunities for individuals to become informed citizens in a 
democratic society and in that way books have enjoyed a deep and long-lasting influence 
on people’s entire lives. Individuals’ literacy is enhanced as a result of their interaction 
with books, regardless whether her literacy was gained through formal or non-formal 
education or through meaningful conversations with other readers. Consequently, reading 
books has served as a prerequisite for individuals to participate in the processes of 
meaning-making processes, politically as well as culturally. Below I describe examples 
of contemporary participatory culture that are “instrumentally and intrinsically related to 
promoting freedom, engendering equality, and fostering human and economic 
development” (Sunder, 2012, p. 64). As shown in previous chapters as well as in this 
chapter, the core values that cultural democracy promotes are synonymous with the 
values of participatory culture advocates. Based on liberal political theories, the notion of 
cultural democracy provides a theoretical explanation of why “participation” matters.    
                                           
76 Having said that, it is important to note that the democratic potential of user-generated content online is 
often hampered by the censorship of platform providers who are governed by the DMCA notice-and-




Although not all types of cultural activities are directly attributable to books (or 
ebooks), literacy and education that enable citizens to participate in activities all stem 
from the fact that books (or ebooks) play a significant role in furthering a participatory 
culture. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine active and meaningful discussions in 
classrooms, cafes, book clubs, and elsewhere without the mediation of books. Consider 
the Harry Potter Alliance (http://thehpalliance.org/). Cultural democracy looks upon 
consumers as active participants in cultural meaning-making processes rather than 
viewing them as merely passive consumers.  
The Harry Potter Alliance is a good example of how people are actively 
interacting with cultural works in a meaningful way. This real-world organization was 
established in order to bring positive changes to society by encouraging readers of the 
Harry Potter book series to become engaged with societal issues, such as human rights, 
equality, and literacy. Sunder (2012) notes, “Through the Alliance children are coming 
together to form an army of young citizens dedicated to upholding the Potter books’ 
values of being kind, having the courage to question authority and cultural norms, and 
fighting for justice in the real world” (p. 69). As of this writing, members of the 
organization are scattered across 25 countries and 43 states in the U.S. and among tasks 
they have accomplished so far include the shipment of life-saving supplies to Haiti, the 
donation of books to build community libraries, the partnering with public advocacy 
groups such as Public Knowledge to raise public awareness of important social issues 
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like network neutrality, the initiation of public campaigns, and the establishment of funds 
to support people who are suffering in Sudan and Burma.77   
Below I discuss other examples of user activity related to participatory culture. 
Having access to preexisting works and consuming them come before the creation of 
cultural works. Creators, including writers, need to quote something or borrow characters 
or narrative structures from previous novels, plays, or folktales. This is particularly true 
in the case of fan-fiction writers. A large portion of fan and user-generated content is 
created based on preexisting cultural works. On the Internet, memes78 are generated by 
adding brief and humorous phrases to preexisting videos or images and circulated to 
share cultural ideas or messages. Digital mashups are also made by mixing two or more 
preexisting cultural works to create new digital works (Fisher, 2010). One notable 
example of digital mashup is The Grey Album by Brian Burton which combined a 
portion of the Beatles’ The White Album with hip-hop musician Jay-Z’s The Black 
Album (Fisher, 2010). Later, Laurent Fauchere and Antoine Tinguely created the Grey 
Video by integrating a portion of The Grey Album with some parts taken from the 
Beatles’ movie, A Hard Day’s Night, and a video performance by Jay-Z (Fisher, 2010). 
Teamed with iTunes and GarageBand, Radiohead has allowed its fans to remix the 
band’s own musical tunes (Sunder, 2012; Ubben, 2011). These digital mashups allow 
people to rework preexisting cultural works and some creators like to share their remixes 
                                           
77 See http://thehpalliance.org/what-we-do/success-stories/ 
78 The online version of the Merriam Webster dictionary defines meme as “an idea, behavior, or style that 
spreads from person to person within a culture” (See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme).  
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with others under Creative Commons licenses (Sunder, 2012), which is in line with the 
core of cultural democracy.  
A host of culturally meaningful user-generated contents (YouTube videos, 
memes, mash-ups, fan fiction stories and so forth) exist in a legal grey area (Sunder, 
2012). To be a creator, people need to access, as much as possible, to preexisting creative 
works. This is also true for any writer. To promote cultural progress, it is critical that 
access to creative works is assured. Under the current copyright law, it is not clear to 
what extent remixes, mashups, and derivative works fit within the copyright law.  
THE LINK BETWEEN CULTURAL DEMOCRACY AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE   
 
As shown in Chapter 2, a large number of scholars have called for a broader 
application of copyright’s first sale doctrine in the digital context because it advances 
desirable social outcomes (see Asay, 2013; Calaba, 2002; Hess; 2013; Mattioli, 2010; 
Perzanowski & Schultz, 2011; Reis, 2015; Serra, 2013; Smith, 2005). As I demonstrate 
below, drawing on the notion of cultural democracy would more fully achieve copyright 
legislation’s goals (i.e., balancing competing legitimate interests between copyright 
holders and users of copyrighted material, promoting advancement in science and useful 
arts, etc.).  
The desired effects of the first sale doctrine include ensuring greater access to 
informative, scientific and cultural works, protecting consumer welfare and privacy, and 
promoting market innovation. These were the motivations in enacting the principle. To 
illustrate the relationship between the first sale doctrine and the notion of cultural 
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democracy, I discuss the policy effects of having a digital first sale doctrine, particularly 
on ebooks. While this discussion does not address all nuances of the ebook ecosystem, it 
does consider some of the key policy effects: enhancing availability, affordability, 
innovation, and preservation.   
Availability  
 
Copyright owners may want to make their copyrighted works unavailable for a 
variety of reasons. One possible scenario is that copyright owners may allow their books 
to go out of print when they think printing those books is not economically viable (Hess, 
2013). More than 97 percent of books published in the United States between 1927 and 
1946 were “commercially dormant and inaccessible” in the early 2000s (Hess, 2013, p. 
1973). In addition, copyright owners sometimes change their views on their work and 
want to suppress the distribution of that work (Reese, 2003). For example, Tony Kaye, 
British film director, attempted to remove his name from his film American History X 
and even tried to impede the success of the film (Hess, 2013). However, the presence of 
secondary markets allows people to access out-of-print books or other creative works. A 
digital resale market could help digital works be more easily accessible and make it 
difficult for copyright holders to completely control the availability of their works (Reis, 
2015).  
Previous studies have shown that one of the most common reasons for people 
getting involved in illegal downloading is related to practical concerns such as cost and 
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availability (Kozlowski, 2012; Sang, Lee, Kim, & Woo, 2015).79 Consider this example. 
Official ebook versions of the Harry Potter series were not available on the Pottermore 
ebookstore until early 2012 (Owen, 2012). Founded by the author of Harry Potter series, 
Pottermore has been providing Harry Potter fans ebook versions of the Harry Potter 
novels. When Harry Potter ebooks were available for the first time through Amazon, 
people could only complete their purchasing process by visiting Pottermore ebookstore 
through a link provided by Amazon (Jones, 2012). Before the Harry Potter series was 
officially available in digital format, the series comprised the most pirated books of all 
time (Kozlowski, 2012). The connection between piracy and the potential effects of 
digital secondary markets has not garnered enough attention yet. By having more 
affordable and accessible digital secondary markets, piracy of digital goods may decrease 
given that previous studies have reported that people tend to illegally download content 
when they cannot find legitimate and affordable routes to purchase digital goods.  
                                           
79 The legality of peer-to-peer file sharing is also not entirely clear under the current copyright regime. In 
the Betamax case, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that millions of VTRs were in use by Americans and 
those VTRs can be used for both infringing and substantial non-infringing uses. However, when dealing 
with peer-to-peer file sharing cases, courts did not follow the Betamax court’s reasoning. The Supreme 
Court’s approach with regard to the “substantial non-infringing” uses deserves more attention when courts 
deal with peer-to-peer file sharing cases. In addition, the Betamax court’s attention to how people actually 
use a particular technology deserves more attention in subsequent cases. The notion of cultural democracy 
encourages the sharing of knowledge and cultural works, however, it does not support “illegal 
downloading.” It is important to note that democratic copyright theories do not deny the fact that one of the 
primary purposes of copyright legislation is to incentivize creators to create cultural works. Democratic 
copyright theories acknowledge the usefulness of economic analysis in the context of copyright. Therefore, 
support for the notion of cultural democracy is not directly related to support for illegal peer-to-peer file 
sharing activities. Scholars have addressed the issue of peer-to-peer file sharing. For example, Professor 
Lawrence Lessing suggested that the peer-to-peer culture might be addressed by adopting compulsory 
licenses (Rainsford, 2003). Nearly two decades ago, Litman (1996) noted that we may need to “refashion 
our measure of unlawful use” of copyright works in the digital age (p. 48). This dissertation extends 
Litman’s observation by arguing that core values encouraged by cultural democracy can and should 
provide the framework for copyright reform. When updating and revising copyright laws, policymakers 
should be alerted that “one central goal of copyright is to limit the monopoly given to the copyright owner 





As McKenzie (2013) aptly noted, “Libraries and second-hand markets serve as 
crucial, low-cost sources of knowledge for many underprivileged or undereducated 
individuals, and we should not justify a policy that would inhibit their growth in the 
digital age” (p. 70). The existence of a digital resale market promotes retail price 
competition, which in turn benefits consumers. In a market where consumers can 
purchase secondary digital goods that are no different from original goods in terms of 
quality, secondary digital goods drive prices down, as well as facilitate the exchange of 
used digital works due to the fast, effortless, and costless transactions among transaction 
participants around the globe (Mattioli, 2010). More importantly, the first sale doctrine 
allows people to choose between two tier markets through the mechanism of price 
differentiation, giving more affordability to consumers.  
One may argue that consumers may end up paying even higher prices for 
purchasing digital goods because digital goods do not (as far as we know) degrade over 
time, which may lead producers to increase retail prices. Although that possibility does 
merit concern, it is unlikely to be the case. Publishers can, after all, use a price 
differentiation strategy.    
College students also can benefit from digital resale. It is well known that 
textbooks are quite expensive in the United States. The average U.S. college student pays 
approximately $655 per year to purchase textbooks and supplies, while, after financial 
aid, the average student attending a four-year public college pays about $2,900 for their 
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annual tuition (Weissmann, 2013). The Bureau of Labor Statistics’s data shows that as of 
2013 the cost of course materials had increased more than 800 percent since 1978, while 
the same data indicates a 325 percent increase in home prices, a 250 percent increase in 
consumer price index, and a 575 percent increase in medical services (Weissmann, 2013). 
At semester’s end, college students often resell their textbooks to help offset these costs. 
As long as the first sale doctrine is not applicable to ebooks, physical textbooks carry 
economic advantages because students can resell their paper textbooks and recoup their 
previous investment so that the prohibition of resale of digital copies may serve as a 
barrier to the wider adoption of ebooks in schools (Mattioli, 2010).    
Publishers put restrictions on which ebooks are available at certain libraries and 
control the ways in which library patrons consume ebooks (Vaccaro, 2014). For instance, 
some publishers such as Harper Collins do not allow a library to lend ebooks out more 
than 26 times unless the library repurchases the license. Libraries had to pay $74.85 to 
buy Sheryl Sandberg’s best-selling ebook titled Lean In, released in 2013, while 
consumers could purchase it at $12.99 (Vaccaro, 2014). If the first sale doctrine applied 
to digital goods, publishers would be less likely to make it difficult for libraries to buy 
and lend ebooks, although the possibility is largely contingent upon whether the current 
licensing regime is changed. By imposing enough restrictive language when providing 
libraries access to ebooks through licensing, copyright holders can foreclose the 
legitimate rights of purchasers and libraries. However, a digital first sale doctrine will 
allow libraries to purchase secondary ebooks from the market at a low price. There is no 
 
 174 
doubt that this will, in turn, allow people who could not otherwise afford to buy ebooks to 
be able to enjoy them through libraries.  
The broader argument is that for those who cannot afford to purchase new ebooks, 
secondary markets for ebooks can provide a way to fulfill their needs:   
Many pensioners and people who faced life changing disabilities are 
downloading and pirating ebooks. They simply are in a position where their 
monthly income is not enough to sustain their entertainment needs, which 
become more expensive every year. After bills, food, and expenses, there is not 
enough money left over to entertain yourself. It is easy to feel sympathy towards 
this demographic of people, but in effect it hurts the entire industry. (Kozlowski, 
2012, para. 6)  
In sum, consumers can benefit from secondary markets because they can more 
easily obtain copyrighted works at cheaper prices. Libraries will be in a better position if 
they can purchase pre-owned ebooks through secondary markets when they have to 
negotiate with publishers. All in all, as long as we are concerned about the development 
of our culture, making more creative works available is critical. As Cohen (2012) notes, 
“without the raw materials necessary for social and cultural participation, one cannot 
participate meaningfully in the development of culture and community” (p. 224).  
Promoting Innovation 
 
The existence of secondary markets leads to product innovation because 
producers of original products must constantly provide updated products in order to 
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compete with lower-priced products available in secondary markets. Consumers also can 
tinker with their copies without worrying about copyright infringement, and through this 
process product innovation can occur. The discussion of adopting a digital first sale 
doctrine brings to the fore the issue of ebook interoperability. It is important to note that 
interoperability can increase the overall value of a given technological ecosystem because 
it can lead to more transactions and it can lower costs for producers. For instance, if 
technological standards were applied to the ebook ecosystem, those who would purchase 
an ebook on iBooks would not have to worry about whether his or her ebook can be read 
on Kobo or Nook. Thus, consumers are likely to purchase more ebooks. The existence of 
secondary markets also could promote more transactions (Mattioli, 2010). If consumers 
can resell their ebooks, the possibility of recouping one’s money spent on ebooks would 
allow consumers to buy more ebooks.  
Once secondary markets exist, content providers, platform providers, and other 
pertinent stakeholders would be likelier to consider various ways in which they could 
enhance their competitiveness in the market. As McIntyre (2014) aptly noted, “the first 
sale doctrine and competition are intrinsically linked” (p. 45). In addition, some argue 
that interoperability generally tends to yield, in most conditions, innovation, although the 
relationship between interoperability and innovation is highly complex and context-
specific (Gasser & Palfrey, 2007).   
To explore an often assumed causal relationship between interoperability in ICTs 
and innovation, Gasser and Palfrey (2007) examined three cases in which the issue of 
interoperability played out: digital rights management in music distribution both offline 
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and online, various forms of digital identity systems, and web services. Based on in-depth 
case studies of the three cases along with in-depth interviews and expert workshops, they 
concluded that “increased levels of ICT interoperability generally foster innovation. But 
interoperability also contributes to other socially desirable outcomes,” such as the 
positive impact on “consumer choice, ease of use, access to content, and diversity, among 
other things” (Gasser & Palfrey, 2007, p. 12).  
Currently, major ebook retailers such as Amazon and Apple are operating closed 
ebook ecosystems that limit customers’ freedom to choose other retailers’ products. 
Providing access to ebooks has become increasingly a common way to deliver 
monographs in many libraries, but the lack of standardization in ebooks can limit 
libraries’ ability to serve their patrons. For instance, if a certain digital book is only 
available through a particular format, libraries should purchase other books that can be 
read in a different format.   
Preservation   
 
Not surprisingly, copyright holders, while providing users with access to digital 
copies through restrictive license agreements, are largely silent about facilitating 
preservation of cultural works. Both individuals and society as a whole benefit from 
preservation of cultural works because preservation helps people access copyrighted 
works that may not be available through copyright owners anymore (Perzanowski & 
Schultz, 2011). Many books are only available in digital format, which in terms of 
preservation is problematic. For example, an author of a novel can publish her book as an 
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ebook-only option and later decide to eliminate it from the market. In this case, if that 
book is licensed under, for example, the Kindle Store Terms of Use, there is no way for 
individuals to legally access that ebook. Libraries are challenged because they cannot 
preserve cultural works if they do not purchase a license. As shown in the Table 2 below, 
licensing periods vary and in most cases are not perpetual.  
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Table 2. Library Lending Terms and Pricing 
 
Publisher Library lending 
terms 





All titles available 
under perpetual 
licensing. No loan 
limits or period of 
use limits.  
Varies, but is 
generally 3 to 4 
times hardcover 
price for the ebook 
Overdrive, 3M 
Cloud Library, 

















License must be 
renewed after 26 
loans. 
Varies, but 
generally not more 
than the cost of 
hardcover 
equivalent and 

















Macmillan All titles are 
available for a 2 
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The issue of making duplicate copies for archival preservation can be addressed in 
the context of fair use, but the first sale doctrine clearly helps libraries and archives to 
fulfill their mission of preserving cultural works (Reis, 2015). As Perzanowski and 
Schultz (2011) points out, “if we wish to preserve the benefits of access, preservation, 
privacy, transactional clarity, user innovation, and platform competition, we must find a 
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way to reinvigorate exhaustion in the face of digital distribution and technological 
protection measures” (p. 945). 
CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the ways in which the notion of cultural 
democracy can promote socially beneficial policy effects of the first sale doctrine, such as 
promoting affordability and availability, preservation, and innovation of creative works. 
The implications of the concept for digital content consumers and their access also is 
addressed. Cultural democracy embraces the realization of ordinary citizens’ self-
determination through active participation in the cultural domain. It also implies a 
commitment to the decentralization of meaning-making power (Bracha & Syed, 2014). In 
addition, the values advocated by cultural democracy are compatible with those of public 
libraries, public institutions that cannot be fully supported by economic efficiency 
practices.     
In the digital age, enabled by digital technologies and the Internet, ordinary 
people are increasingly powerful in terms of their ability to challenge cultural authorities 
(Sunder, 2012). New media technologies have lowered barriers to entry into the process 
of cultural production and distribution, although access to technology itself does not 
guarantee people’s active and critical participation in cultural meaning-making processes. 
Before the widespread availability of the Internet, individuals and disempowered 
communities struggled against remaining passive recipients of the mass culture (Sunder, 
2012). What matters here is that even though technological developments have opened 
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opportunities to challenge cultural authorities, the current copyright system is not ready 
to fully embrace the potential of participatory culture. As noted above, mash-ups, 
remixes, and a great deal of user generated content are vulnerable to copyright 
infringement claims because current copyright law does not clarify their legality or 
because legal access must be fought on a case-by-case basis. This chapter has addressed 
the question of how the concept of cultural democracy can provide a solid theoretical 
ground for adopting a digital first sale doctrine to realize its policy implications in the 
digital environment. In the next chapter, I provide policy recommendations regarding the 




Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
CULTURAL DEMOCRACY IN ACTION   
 
 
When it comes to copyright law and policy, a dominant justification for copyright 
protection has been economic efficiency. In fact, over the past several decades, the claim 
of economic efficiency has led to copyright protection being dramatically bolstered. 
However, our conventional understanding of copyright legislation and its purpose have 
been newly challenged by new cultural phenomena that ordinary users of digital content 
have popularized—phenomena such as contemporary participatory culture and remix 
culture, the Open Source and Creative Commons movements. For example, the European 
Commission’s recent initiative which requires the results of publicly funded scientific 
research to be published in open access journals is not compatible with economic 
efficiency paradigm.80 Economic efficiency cannot fully address contemporary societal 
issues pertaining to copyright because of the narrow understanding of “welfare” 
                                           
80 In 2003, the European Union issued a directive that governs people’s reuse of data that belong to the 
public sector. Arguably, the European Union has been a pioneer in terms of facilitating the ideal of open 
access, although the first government-owned open access data portal (www.data.gov) was established in the 
United States in 2009. The European Commission’s recent initiative is “to [optimize] the impact of 
publicly-funded scientific research, both at European level…and at the member state level.” (See 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/open-access-scientific-information#Newsroom) Here, the term 
“scientific” applies to all kinds of academic disciplines. It is worth noting that the requirement does not 
mean that the funding recipients should publish their research results in open access journals. They can 
decide not to publish their research results, but once a decision is reached to publish results then the 




permitted by economic efficiency. According to economic efficiency, welfare is 
measured by monetary value—individuals’ willingness and ability to pay. The societal 
values that copyright can deliver are not limited to economic interests, and copyright 
should be expected to contribute to cultural values related to class equity, access, free 
speech, democracy, among other such outcomes, whether or not they can be translated 
into economic value (Vaidhyanathan, 2001). Furthermore, the economic efficiency 
paradigm very rarely addresses distributive concerns.  
Acknowledging the limitations of the economic efficiency paradigm, a growing 
number of scholars have addressed the necessity of restoring balance by resorting to 
alternative understandings of copyright protection (Boyle, 1997, 2008; Bracha, 2007; 
Bracha & Syed, 2014; Coombe, 1998; Davies, 2002; Elkin-Koren, 1996; Gautam, 2014; 
Gillespie, 2007; Herman, 2013; Lessig, 2001, 2006, 2008; Litman, 1996, 2006, 2010; 
Netanel, 2008; Patry, 2011; Postigo, 2012; Sunder, 2012; Tang, 2011; Vaidhyanathan, 
2001).  
Although those studies have addressed and challenged a wide range of 
problematic conditions with regard to the current copyright regime, not all have provided 
a cohesive theoretical justification rooted in normative theories of copyright. Some 
studies simply assume that it is good to give users of creative works more access to 
creative works and to enable them to interact with those works more freely. This 
dissertation, building on the notion of cultural democracy, has sought to address the gap 
by identifying the ways that a normative theory can provide the philosophical foundation 
for endorsing a digital first sale doctrine.  
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To a large extent U.S. legal scholarship has been dominated by liberal political 
theory (Cohen, 2012). Terms like “freedom,” “autonomy,” and “rational choice” have 
pervaded law and policy debates. As shown in the previous chapter, cultural democracy 
extends the concept of self-determination to cultural domains. Advocating the necessity 
of adopting a normative framework for promoting “human flourishing,” Cohen (2012) 
also paid attention to the relationship between the material configuration and the 
everyday practice of what she calls “situated users.” She points out that people are 
situated in a material landscape, arguing “Our beliefs, goals, and capabilities are shaped 
by the cultural products that we encounter, the tools that we use, and the framing 
expectations of social institutions” (p. 2). She notes that those “situated users” play with 
cultural artifacts in their daily lives and “the play of everyday practice is the means by 
which human beings flourish” (p. 57). In this process, they sometimes adapt or remix 
existing creative works and make derivative works. Thus, giving people meaningful 
opportunities to participate in these cultural meaning-making processes is critical for 
promoting cultural progress (Bracha & Syed, 2014). In addition, ensuring participation is 
also important in terms of helping political processes to function well and create an 
attractive society (Fisher, 1998). Habermas (1996) addresses the importance of 
facilitating an expressive public sphere as an essential venue for making collective 
decisions. In a similar vein, Fisher (1998) also notes that “In an attractive society, all 
persons would be able to participate in the process of meaning-making….Active 
engagement of this sort would help both to sustain several of the features of the good 
life—e.g., meaningful work and self-determination—and to foster cultural diversity” (pp. 
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1217-1218). The notion of cultural democracy provides a theoretical ground for 
addressing the question of what copyright law ought to be in the digital age.  
In a world where copyright protection has dramatically increased, ordinary people 
are increasingly deprived of their autonomy and freedom to interact with existing creative 
works. Under the widespread usage of (perhaps virtually default usage of ) licensing 
agreements that restrict digital content consumers’ ability to alienate purchased digital 
content and the ever-strengthening copyright protection environment, ordinary users of 
digital content in a networked society are increasingly constricted in their capability to 
participate in cultural meaning-making processes.  
Below I provide a summary and conclusion of this study. I then suggest policy 
recommendations with regard to adopting a digital first sale doctrine. Finally, I briefly 
discuss future directions for study and reiterate the notion that cultural democracy 
provides a normative framework that guides us to better accomplish copyright law’s 
ultimate goal—to benefit the public and promote cultural progress.      
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
 
This study sought to better understand the first sale doctrine and to examine the 
applicability of the doctrine to digital goods. The ultimate conclusion of this study is 
there is a need for adopting a digital first sale doctrine and for reestablishing consumers’ 
rights to digital content in the digital age.  
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This dissertation has critically examined the historical development and 
implications of the first sale doctrine and has explored its applicability to digital 
copyrighted works, especially within the context of the use of ebooks. In agreement with 
Serra (2013), its motivation has been that the first sale doctrine can be an important 
component of insuring distribution rights for digital information products.  
Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that the current licensing scheme and 
the ever-strengthening copyright protection run against the original intent of copyright 
legislation. The concern is that we are increasingly moving toward a society where 
“owning” cultural works is not allowed and users of digital creative works are simply 
becoming licensees locked in with restrictive agreements imposed by copyright holders. 
In addition, the current copyright law does not keep up with new ways in which digital 
content consumers interact with cultural works in their daily lives. There is little doubt 
that we need to update and revise copyright laws in order to reflect technological 
advances and the participatory culture. It is crucial for us to rethink the ultimate goal of 
copyright legislation and to modify the narrow economic paradigm guiding copyright 
interpretations. Ultimately, copyright legislation exists not to benefit the copyright holder 
but to benefit the entire public, creators as well as users.   
Justifying a digital first sale doctrine, this study builds on democratic principles in 
connection with copyright theories. By doing so, this study aims to provide a theoretical 
foundation for adopting a digital first sale doctrine. In the digital age, secondary markets 
enabled by a digital first sale doctrine could bring about positive policy outcomes that 
include promoting market innovation, protecting consumer welfare and privacy, and 
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ensuring access to cultural works. The cultural democracy approach outlined in this 
dissertation justifies the application of the first sale doctrine to digital goods and provides 
a theoretical justification for restoring the balance between copyright holders and users of 
copyrighted material.  
It seems clear that content creation industries are moving quickly to control the 
disposition of their products in the digital marketplaces (Gautam, 2014). As Gautam 
(2014) argues, the Kirtsaeng case may further incentivize content industries, particularly 
in this case publishers, to rely on digital formats in an attempt to take advantage of a 
digital distribution model that gives them more control over their creative expressions. 
Both Amazon and Apple are trying build an online marketplace where customers can 
exchange preowned digital goods, although they have yet to announce specific details to 
the public (Streitfeld, 2013). Both tech-giants acquired patents for the exchange system 
that allows users to trade used digital goods, making sure that only one copy of a digital 
good can exist at any one moment. As of now, one thing is clear: Amazon and Apple are 
working to enter the digital secondary market, but to control it.  
Recently, ReDigi attempted to build a digital secondary market, introducing new 
technological and legal approaches. However, as discussed in previous chapters, the 
ReDigi court rejected ReDigi’s business model, saying that ReDigi’s service constituted a 
copyright infringement by making a new copy when transferring digital music files. 
Digital copies cannot be accessed or transferred without making temporary copies 
(Perzanowski & Schultz, 2014). For the past several decades, Congress has wrestled with 
the conflict over temporary copies made onto one’s computer. As shown in Chapter 1, 
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Congress introduced the “essential step defense” for owners of computer programs (Siy, 
2013), and Section 117 of Copyright Act deals with the defense,81 but this provision does 
not address RAM copies of non-computer programs, which is problematic given that in 
our daily lives we necessarily create numerous temporary RAM copies on a near constant 
basis. The legal status of these reproductions is still unclear. Technological and 
legislative approaches discussed in this chapter suggest that it is time for Congress to 
comprehensively consider those policy options to make appropriate changes to copyright 
laws.  
Previous chapters demonstrated that a digital first sale doctrine could provide a 
way to restore balance in the age of copyright maximalization. Simply creating a digital 
first sale doctrine cannot resolve the two issues of the legality of temporary copies and 
restrictive licensing regimes. The “essential step defense” should be widely applied to 
digital transactions so that purchasers or sellers of digital goods need not worry about 
infringing a copyright holder’s reproduction right. In addition, legislative efforts to limit 
restrictive licensing agreements are needed to prevent copyright holders from eroding and 
restricting digital content consumers’ rights in the digital age. Resolving these two 
problems in connection with a digital first sale doctrine would be the first step toward 
                                           
81 Section 117 of Copyright Act says: “it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer 
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program 
provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the 
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such 
new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event 
that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.” Section 512 of Copyright 
Act applies the essential step defense to service providers.  
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restoring the skewed balance of interest between copyright holders and users of digital 
content.   
One premise of this dissertation is that the ultimate beneficiary of copyright 
legislation should be the public or the larger society: “Copyright exists not to enrich 
authors and artists but to benefit the public” (McIntyre, 2014, p. 9). The current 
imbalance between copyright holders and users of copyrighted material should be 
corrected. In restoring a balance to the public’s interest and that of copyright holders, 
cultural democracy can provide a theoretical ground by giving more importance to 
ordinary citizens’ self-determination and individual liberty with regard to creative works. 
Jensen (1995) noted, “No growth comes without change, and change rarely comes 
without uncertainty, and uncertainty almost always sparks fear” (p. 286). For some 
people, legalizing the resale of digital goods may come as a threat. Resorting to the click-
wrap licensing scheme, copyright holders and online distributors have disregarded digital 
content consumers’ rights (Gautam, 2014).  
Over the past few decades, our society has witnessed an exponential increase in 
cultural participation by users of digital goods, enabled by the development of digital 
technologies and the Internet. This so-called participatory culture can engender 
tremendous opportunities for our society in terms of building an innovative and creative 
culture. And as discussed in the previous chapter, cultural democracy emphasizes the 
importance of ordinary users’ participation in cultural meaning-making processes as a 
means of promoting progress at both individual and societal levels. In this approach, 
ordinary citizens cannot achieve self-determination if they do not have meaningful 
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opportunities to consider and reconsider various life choices and actions in the cultural 
domain. Digital technologies and the Internet have helped ordinary citizens participate in 
cultural meaning-making processes more than ever before, a shift enabled by 
technological developments that support people’s participation in the cultural sphere as 
being equally as important as their participation in the political sphere is important in any 
democratic society.  
I have argued that the history and challenges presented in the ebook environment 
can be illustrative of the problems facing the types of content that can enrich a 
democratic culture. The ecosystem surrounding the ebook market is still, considering the 
long history of books, in an early stage. Notwithstanding that relatively short history, a 
number of issues have been raised by various stakeholders over the past few years. 
Ebooks have the potential to facilitate innovation in the development of publishing and 
bookselling industries, and to expand access to our rich repositories of print material. 
However, in the licensing age, purchasing an ebook does not allow you to transfer the 
purchased ebook, preventing you from exerting your presumed rights that have been 
attached to a physical copy of copyrighted works. Given the importance of books in 
accomplishing social goals such as increased literacy and expanded access to information 
and knowledge, the evolution of the ebook ecosystem deserves policy considerations, 
particularly in consideration of the interests of consumers, and disadvantaged groups 
(OECD, 2012).  
One question lawmakers, judges, and scholars have to ask themselves, when 
addressing copyright issues, is what the term “progress” –a word ensconced in the section 
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of the Constitution creating copyright—truly means (Tang, 2011). The first step to 
finding an answer to that question should be to start reframing the conventional 
understanding of copyright protection’s presumed consequences. An incentive 
paradigm’s narrow focus on economic efficiency needs to be supplemented by the notion 
of cultural democracy. From a cultural democracy perspective, cost-benefit precision is 
not the sole normative foundation undergirding copyright laws. Unlike an incentive 
paradigm, cultural democracy gives due weight to the realization of individuals’ self-
determination and liberty in the cultural sphere (Bracha & Syed, 2014). And this 
dissertation has demonstrated that the notion of cultural democracy can provide an 
alternative theoretical framework to accomplish copyright’s goal of progress by 
encouraging ordinary individuals’ active participation in cultural meaning-making 
processes.  
Before I discuss policy recommendations with regard to a digital first sale 
doctrine, I briefly discuss other issues that need to be addressed to fully benefit from a 
digital first sale doctrine.  
TWO HURDLES TO A VIABLE DIGITAL FIRST SALE DOCTRINE  
Temporary Reproduction Issue  
 
Recently, in the case of Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the first sale doctrine could 
not be applied to pre-owned digital music files because ReDigi’s service infringed on 
Capitol Record’s exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution. ReDigi’s software 
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program allowed its users to upload and resell only lawfully purchased digital music files. 
If they extracted files from CDs or downloaded music files through peer-to-peer file 
sharing sites, they were ineligible to use the service. By using ReDigi’s server, users were 
able to store their files for later listening or to resell them to other users. The court 
rejected ReDigi’s technology that validated its users’ music files to be eligible for sale, 
based on the conclusion that transferring digital works from users to ReDigi’s server 
makes a new copy on the server’s hard drive.  
U.S. courts have treated temporary reproductions of digital works on one’s computer 
as copies. Thus, virtually all activities through one’s computer such as reading ebooks or 
listening to digital music end up making a copy of an original copy (Perzanowski & 
Schultz, 2011). The ReDigi court ruled: 
[A] ReDigi user owns the phonorecord that was created when she purchased and 
downloaded a song from iTunes to her hard disk. But to sell that song on 
ReDigi, she must produce a new phonorecord on the ReDigi server. Because it 
is therefore impossible for the user to sell her ‘particular’ phonorecord on 
ReDigi, the first sale statute cannot provide a defense…Here, ReDigi is not 
distributing such material items; rather it is distributing reproductions of the 
copyrighted code embedded in new material objects, namely, the ReDigi server 
in Arizona and its users’ hard drives. The first sale defense does not cover this 
any more than it covered the sale of cassette recordings of vinyl records in a 
bygone era. (Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc, 2013, p. 655) 
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There is no compelling reason to make a difference between digital content 
consumers and computer users. As Perzanowski and Schultz (2011) noted, “the 
alienability of digitally distributed works is just as deeply intertwined with reproduction 
as the resale of computer programs. These similarities suggest that the exhaustion 
principle should be applied consistently to both computer programs and other digitally 
distributed works” (p. 936).  
However, as of now, the essential defensive maneuver that prevents computer 
program users from being subject to copyright liability is applied to no one other than 
computer program users. Thus, the benefit of adopting a digital first sale doctrine would 
be limited unless the temporary copying issue is solved. A digital first sale doctrine 
regime would work properly only when purchasing and reselling digital content do not 
infringe a copyright owner’s reproduction right. 
Restrictive Licensing Practices   
 
The second major issue concerns restrictive licensing. The software industry has 
figured that using a shrink-wrap license can better protect their rights. And other content 
industries have followed this strategy. A shrink-wrap is one type of license that “gets its 
name from the fact that retail software packages are covered in plastic or cellophane 
‘shrinkwrap,’ and some vendors…have written licenses that become effective as soon as 
the customer tears the wrapping from the package” (ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 1996, p. 
1449). Other forms of licenses include browse-wrap license and click-wrap license. A 
browse-wrap license is a licensing agreement that binds its users to its agreements when 
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they simply browse a website, while a click-wrap license agreement requires users who 
want to download and use digital content to click or check a box that includes an “I 
agree” or “Yes” icon. The Kindle Store Terms of Use could arguably be considered a 
browse-wrap agreement (Reis, 2015), given that once users browse Amazon Kindle 
Store’s website they are bound to its licensing agreements.   
By resorting to restrictive licensing agreements in conjunction with DRM, 
eretailers and copyright holders have bypassed the application of the first sale doctrine 
(Gautam, 2014).82 By relying on restrictive licensing agreements, copyright holders have 
controlled downstream sales in the same way that the Bobs-Merrill court sought to 
foreclose in its ruling (McKenzie, 2013). In other words, copyright holders have dictated 
post-sale restrictions through licensing agreements, saying that their content is not sold 
but merely licensed. Given that licensing agreements are largely governed by contract 
laws, a digital first sale doctrine would have little to say when it came to the licensing 
regime. Therefore, even though we have a digital first sale doctrine, copyright holders 
can bypass its application by resorting to licensing agreements. Because the current first 
                                           
82 To maximize control over their creative works, copyright holders have used DRM technologies in 
conjunction with other measures such as licenses. As Gautam (2014) notes, “DRM and distribution via 
license are particularly problematic because the restrictions they impose on distributed copies are not 
constructed with potential unforeseen beneficial uses in mind. Accordingly, these strategies may act to 
hamper follow-on innovation, as well as preservation of access to existing innovations” (p. 757). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the arrest of Dmitry Sklyarov boosted a controversy in regard to DRM and DMCA 
and helped the growth of digital rights movements (Postigo, 2012). The U.S. government had to confront a 
backlash from both digital content consumers and copyright activists as well as media reports that were 
unfavorable toward the U.S. government’s approach to enforcing the DRM scheme. Another backlash that 
ultimately prompted the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) to stop its campaign targeting 
individual peer-to-peer file-sharers is also worth noting. As this dissertation discusses in Chapter 6, those 
consumer backlashes toward DRM technologies along with an ever-strengthening copyright trend warrant 
further investigation, given that those movements can guide copyright reform debates and subsequent 
legislative efforts.    
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sale doctrine is only applied to a copy “owner,” licensees have no right to resell or rent 
out their copy (Mattioli, 2010). By giving only usage rights through licensing, rather than 
transferring ownership of copyrighted works, copyright holders can bypass the first sale 
doctrine (Gautam, 2014; Mattioli, 2010). Legal scholars have criticized this legal 
loophole (Gautam, 2014; McKenzie, 2013; Reis, 2015). They argue it should be tackled 
given that such a loophole severely restricts consumers’ expectations with regard to their 
purchased copyrighted works and runs afoul of the economic rationale of the first sale 
doctrine (Gautam, 2014; Mattioli, 2010). 
In effect, the content creation industries have performed a superior bait-and-
switch feat. The entertainment and content industries generating a false rhetoric regarding 
licenses, one that is inconsistent with the Copyright Act. Carver (2010), for example, 
points out that licensing refers to “transferring perpetual possession of a copy but 
retaining title to the copy” and that the invented notion is “both incoherent and not found 
in the Copyright Act” (p. 1954). Given that licensing involves a transferring of 
possession of a particular copy permanently, he further suggests that when courts 
determine a title to a copy has been transferred they have to consider whether the 
transferee has perpetual possession. Radin (2013) also criticized the current licensing 
regime, specifically for how multi-page End User Licensing Agreements (EULAs) 
prevent people from having any real choice about their legal rights rather than simply 
agreeing to a standard boilerplate and signing away their rights in order to use software or 
digital content. Radin (2013) viewed the no-choice boilerplate problematic because it 
undermines the very idea of contracts. She pointed out that 1) consumers are uninformed 
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because they are usually unlikely to read and understand licensing agreements, 2) they 
are sometimes not aware of the existence of the boilerplate, which is problematic in terms 
of giving consent, 3) their inability to modify the specific terms weakens consent (Radin, 
2013, p. 29). Fully addressing the issue of restrictive licensing agreements requires a 
discussion of theories of contract law, particularly from the perspective of contractual 
theories of autonomy and consumer welfare (Radin, 2013). Based on the examination  
of user policies and agreements adopted by three major social media platforms, Stein 
(2013) concludes that “the terms and conditions of the platforms on which contribute 
content, conduct exchanges, socialize, communicate, and otherwise interact” should be 
questioned in connection with their ability to further user participation (p. 368).  
Tackling theories of contract law goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. One 
thing is clear though: a digital first sale doctrine cannot properly function unless 
reasonable and acceptable terms are applied when dealing with the scope and boundaries 
on how users can interact with their digital goods as well as the need to fully inform users 
and provide them the ability to exercise more leverage when given a chance to negotiate 
terms. It is equally important that more attention be directed toward how the streaming 
model relates to users’ freedom to interact with cultural works.   
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION: A TECHNOLOGY-BASED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH    
 
It is often said that digital goods are different from physical goods in two ways. 
First, it is difficult and often costly to copy physically-contained copyrighted works, 
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whereas duplicating digital works can be done with only a few clicks of a mouse. In 
general, copying physical goods requires time, some material investment, and effort. 
Another difference between physical goods and digital goods is degradation. Physical 
works degrade over time and use. Digital goods, however, are not known to degrade over 
time given proper storage. Those against a digital first sale doctrine have relied on these 
two differences between physical and digital content.    
The next section of this chapter addresses a legislative approach and espouses a 
position that is cognizant of the technological change that is (now) endemic to intellectual 
property. More specifically, this chapter argues that in the process of updating and 
revising the first sale doctrine provision, the following policy recommendations need to 
be fully considered: the so-called “forward-and-delete” technology, an aging digital file 
system, the digital resale royalty scheme, and provisions for library exemptions.   
“Forward-and-Delete” Technology  
 
In 2001, largely due to concerns about the ease of copying and distributing digital 
copyrighted works, in the DMCA Section 104 Report, the U.S. Copyright Office 
recommended Congress not adopt a digital first sale doctrine and to take a “wait-and-see” 
approach (Hess, 2013). At that time, a “forward-and-delete” technology was discussed as 
a potential solution to the concern of multiple copying by users. Such technology would 
allow the original purchaser of a copy to transfer that copy to another user without 
leaving a copy on his or her computer. Arguably, this technology “is the legal equivalent 
of giving, lending, or selling a material copy in a fixed form” (Sikich, 2011, p. 22). The 
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Copyright Office was not sure whether or not an effective “forward-and-delete” 
technology existed at the time of the report. Since then, however, digital technologies 
have developed and clearly such technology exists. In fact, ReDigi recently implemented 
a “forward-and-delete” technology.   
The presence of “forward-and-delete” technology itself has little bearing on 
expanding the first sale doctrine to digital property. Thus, adoption of the technology 
(i.e., “forward-and-delete” system) as a default system is recommended for the proper 
functioning of a digital first sale doctrine. This should be done as an amendment to the 
Copyright Act. Legislation can provide a positive means to address implementation of 
that technology, thereby allowing copyright holders to be less concerned with the 
existence of multiple copies after transactions of digital content enter secondary markets. 
Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations 
(BALANCE ) Act of 2003 included a provision that legalizes the resale of digital goods 
under the implementation of a “forward-and-delete” scheme and limited the effectiveness 
of the click-wrap licensing scheme by adding the following provision: “When a digital 
work is distributed to the public subject to nonnegotiable license terms, such terms shall 
not be enforceable under the common laws or statutes of any State to the extent that they 
restrict or limit any of the limitations on exclusive rights under this title” (H.R. 1066, 
2003). Arguably, House Bill 1066 and similar proposals did not elicit enough support 
from copyright holders by giving favor to consumers without paying enough attention to 
placate content industries’ concerns about potential revenue losses that may be caused by 
unique challenges associated with people’s use of digital goods.     
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Aging File System 
 
Even assuming that some type of “forward-and-delete” technology became a 
default condition for the resale of digital goods, copyright holders are still likely to reject 
a digital first sale doctrine. This is largely because digital works do not degrade over 
time. A “forward-and-delete” technology can be a potential solution to thwarting the 
existence of multiple copies of one original copy. However, if one copy does not degrade 
over time, digital content consumers can use that copy for as long as they want, which 
obviates the need to purchase a new copy, whereas physical copies deteriorate over time 
and use. Some people still consider this non-degradable feature of digital content 
significant, thereby artificially making digital works degradable has been discussed 
(Perzanowski & Schultz, 2015). In 2011, IBM filed a patent for an “Aging File 
System.”83 According to the patent application submitted by IBM, “there is a need for a 
new kind of filing system that automatically and selectively ages files contained therein 
such that the files themselves are caused to age with time and are not maintained in their 
originally stored state” (“Aging File System,” 2011, p. 1, emphasis added).84 Although 
discussing specific details of that particular technology is beyond the scope of this study, 
one thing is clear: technological developments can make digital files automatically 
degradable through a wide range of parameters, including the number of times a copy is 
made. Arguably, as Hess (2013) argues, “[u]sing the ease of digital copying as an 
                                           
83 Aging File System, U.S. Patent No. 20110282838. 
84 See https://www.google.com/patents/US20110282838 
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element in this aging system may prove to be the most effective balance of public access 
and control for creative incentive in digital property currently available” (p. 2009).  
Implementing a technology that makes digital files degradable can be considered 
a political compromise in that it can potentially serve both the interests of copyright 
owners and users of copyrighted works. In the physical world, the degradability of 
physical works has played a role in supporting the free alienability of physical goods. By 
bringing degradability into digital goods, this technological approach opens up room to 
play out arguments for expanding the first sale doctrine to digital goods. Opponents of a 
digital first sale doctrine have argued that the first sale doctrine should not be applied to 
digital goods because they are not degradable, but implementing an aging file system to 
digital works clearly positions proponents of a digital first sale doctrine for refuting such 
arguments.  
Making digital copies degradable can be implemented in connection with the 
“forward-and-delete” system. Arguably, this approach could satisfy the copyright owner 
because the degradability of digital goods can cover some potential economic losses 
copyright owners might otherwise be unable to avoid. No matter what types of DRMs are 
adopted by copyright owners, it will always be possible for some users to circumvent 
DRMs and relevant technological barriers. Particularly, under the “forward-and-delete” 
system, some tech-savvy users may break the “forward-and-delete” system and make 
other copies. In this case, the degradability of digital goods can compensate for some 
potential economic losses.  
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Adopting a technological approach like the so-called “forward-and-delete” 
technology for a digital first sale doctrine has garnered some attention from both 
academia and Congress (Graham, 2002). The benefits and consequences of making 
digital copies degradable have not received adequate attention and deserves further 
investigation.  
One notable downside of these technological approaches is the considerable 
administrative costs. Both technological approaches discussed in this chapter require 
intermediaries that control the implementation and operation of the proposed 
technological systems. Pertinent stakeholders, policymakers, and the public will have to 
hold numerous Congressional hearings to figure out best practices in any case. In 
particular, when it comes to making digital files degradable, determining the appropriate 
number of copies before degradation is not an easy task and will require rigorous market 
research (Hess, 2013). In addition, whether temporary copies made on one’s RAM and 
other parts of a computer should be considered when counting the “number” of copies 
remains unanswered (Hess, 2013).   
Significance of Legislative Approach 
 
These technological approaches need to be accompanied by legislative 
approaches. When amending the Copyright Act, lawmakers need to fully consider 
technological affordances. Changing the Copyright Act to include digital copies in its 
first sale doctrine provision would be the simplest way to adopt a digital first sale 
doctrine. However, this option is not feasible because many people, particularly copyright 
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holders, believe that the differences between physical and digital copies are significant 
when it comes to expanding the first sale doctrine to digital works. Those who have an 
extreme viewpoint about the need for a digital first sale doctrine may argue that these 
differences are negligible and there is no compelling reason not to expand the first sale 
doctrine. Technological approaches, such as the “forward-and-delete” technology and an 
aging file system, stand between the two extremes: One ignores differences between 
physical and digital copies and including digital copies in the first sale doctrine; the other 
is simply not adopting a digital first sale doctrine. A statutory amendment that 
implements technological compromises would be desirable when balancing competing 
interests between the public and copyright owners, given that this approach lies between 
the two extremes. These approaches entail a combination of technological and legislative 
approaches. In other words, implementing a “forward-and-delete” system or an aging file 
system would require relevant legislations. Given that these technological compromises 
are subject to innovation and obsolescence, keeping up with new technological 
affordances might be needed in terms of updating specific rules that specify the 
application of legislation. Without pertinent legislative changes, the mere existence of 
these technological affordances would mean next to nothing in terms of implementing a 
digital first sale doctrine.  
A Digital Resale Royalty 
 
There is another pragmatic approach that does not necessarily involve the above 
noted technological approaches to a digital first sale. For example, a resale royalty could 
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re-balance copyright holders’ interests and users’ interests in a harmonious way by 
serving both parties’ interest. A digital resale royalty “[remits] a portion of the proceeds 
from any digital resale to copyright holders and expressly [permits] intermediary copying 
necessary to effectuate resales” (Serra, 2013, p. 1801). Serra (2013) argues that the 
royalty collection scheme, which is currently applied to digital performances of sound 
recordings under the Digital Performance Right in the Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 
could be applied to digital resales. In addition, Chapter 10 of the Copyright Act (“Digital 
Audio Recording Devices and Media”) addresses individuals’ use of digital musical 
recordings and includes sections that address the procedure of royalty payments with 
regard to digital audio recording devices. These existing royalty payment schemes could 
provide a framework for creating a digital first sale doctrine that allows secondary 
markets for digital works.85   
Adopting a digital resale royalty may be a political compromise that aims to serve 
both the interests of copyright holders and the users of copyrighted works. Setting aside 
practical issues to be solved, this type of compromise looks legislatively feasible, 
considering the fact that Congress resolved the tension between then-new cable systems 
and broadcast stations by adopting the compulsory licensing scheme in 1970s. To better 
                                           
85 In 1976, California passed the California Resale Royalty Act (Civil Code section 986) to collect and 
remit resale royalties for visual artists. In 2012, that law was struck down in the case of Estate of Graham v. 
Sotheby’s, Inc. Puerto Rico enacted a similar legislation and the law is still in effect (Serra, 2013). 
Currently, there is no federal resale royalty law, but Congress has paid attention to the feasibility of 
implementing resale royalty. In the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), “Congress granted certain 
moral rights to artists and directed the U.S. Copyright Office to compose a report exploring the feasibility 




protect the interest of consumers, more attention needs to be paid to various types of 
approaches.  
No technological solutions can avoid any potential leakage points where people 
can bypass a technological component such as a “forward-and-delete” technology, in 
whole or in part. In this case, a digital resale royalty can compensate for some economic 
loss of copyright holders while allowing the resale of digital goods in the market. A 
digital resale royalty brings a new stream of income to copyright holders such as 
publishers and record labels while allowing consumers to sell or transfer their digital 
works by paying digital resale royalties. This legislative approach also entails 
considerable administrative costs, and a system should be designed that simplifies the 
process of royalty payments. As Serra (2013) notes, “Given the technology necessary to 
resell an electronic work and the small returns on a per work basis, there are not likely to 
be small resellers or individuals in the market hawking used e-books or individual MP3s” 
(p. 1795). Therefore, it is reasonable to have online resellers like ReDigi or eBay collect 
and remit digital resale royalties because those entities can benefit from economies of 
scale and copyright holders can easily police the resale of their copyrighted works. 
Alternatively, creating a nonprofit organization for collecting and distributing digital 
resale royalties could be considered (Serra, 2013). When it comes to the performance of 
digital recordings, SoundExhange, a nonprofit performance rights organization 
designated by the Copyright Royalty Board, collects and distributes royalties, 
administering the statutory license for the digital performance right. This model was 
introduced to the market in 2003 (Serra, 2013). Since its launch in 2003, SoundExchange 
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has distributed more than two billion dollars and, in 2014 alone, distributed 
approximately $773 million to recording artists and record labels.86 
Exemptions for Libraries  
 
As an ever-increasing proportion of Americans read ebooks and some 
publications are only available in digital format, more and more libraries are lending 
ebooks to their patrons. Concerning library ebook lending, there should be a special 
exception for digital works that parallels the provisions of Section 108 of Copyright Act. 
With physical books, a library may, because of the first sale doctrine, sell or otherwise 
dispose of its books, but this doctrine is not currently applied to ebooks. In this chapter, I 
have sketched technological and legislative approaches toward a digital first sale 
doctrine. For example, a “forward-and-delete” technology and an aging file technology 
can be applied to the library lending in the context of the entire publishing ecosystem. 
Fully considering these technological approaches is important because licensing 
agreements between libraries and publishers can be influenced by the types of 
technologies applied to ebook lending.  
Libraries are struggling to deal with a publisher’s ebook selling policies. In 
September 2012, then the American Library Association President Maureen Sullivan 
published an open letter:  
                                           
86 See http://www.soundexchange.com/pr/soundexchange-wraps-record-setting-year-with-773-million-in-





It’s a rare thing in a free market when a customer is refused the ability to buy a 
company’s product and is told its money is “no good here.” 
Surprisingly…libraries find themselves in just that position with purchasing 
ebooks from three of the largest publishers in the world. Simon & Schuster, 
Macmillan, and Penguin have been denying access to their ebooks for our 
nation’s 112,000 libraries and roughly 169 million public library users… 
Let’s be clear on what this means: If our libraries’ digital bookshelves mirrored 
the New York Times fiction best-seller list, we would be missing half of our 
collection any given week due to these publishers’ policies. The popular “Bared 
to You” and “The Glass Castle” are not available in libraries because libraries 
cannot purchase them at any price. Today’s teens also will not find the digital 
copy of Judy Blume’s seminal “Forever,” nor today’s blockbuster “Hunger 
Games” series. (American Library Association, 2012, para. 1-2) 
The existence of digital secondary markets would resolve some of these problems. 
Thus, discussing and making some changes to the current restrictive licensing regime is 
important. In so doing, the technological approaches discussed in this chapter should be 
fully considered by publishers, libraries, intermediaries, policymakers, and even the 
public. And when it comes to a digital resale royalty, a special exception could be made 
to allow libraries to pay lower royalty rates to the copyright holder.   
The Copyright Act includes a special exception for libraries and archives, given 
that libraries and archives play a critical role in preserving our cultural resources and 
promoting cultural progress. As discussed in Chapter 5, Congress recognized the need for 
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allowing special provisions for libraries, and as a result Section 108 permits libraries and 
archives to reproduce and distribute copyrighted material under certain conditions. 
However, that provision fails to reflect recent technological developments with regard to 
the use of digital media that have changed the ways in which people interact with cultural 
works. Of particular concern, when license terms apply, libraries and archives are not 
allowed to enjoy exemptions like Section 108 when license terms apply, and libraries are 
disadvantaged by restrictive licensing agreements imposed by publishers. Future 
discussions of copyright reform must fully consider the role that public libraries play in 
furthering democratic values in our society. Therefore, it is recommended that Congress 
adopt a provision that prevents publishers and copyright holders from imposing 
nonnegotiable licensing terms on libraries. The BALANCE Act mentioned earlier 
included the following provision: “When a digital work is distributed to the public 
subject to nonnegotiable license terms, such terms shall not be enforceable under the 
common laws or statutes of any State to the extent that they restrict or limit any of the 
limitations on exclusive rights under this title” (H.R. 1066, 2003). This approach needs to 
be given renewed attention when special exemptions that help libraries fulfill their 
mission in the digital age are considered.    
All in all, when discussing amending copyright laws in connection with a digital 
first sale doctrine, Congress should fully consider the technological environment 
surrounding an implementation of digital resale and weigh the interests of copyright 
owners against digital content consumers. As discussed in Chapter 4, actual user 
preferences and practices that relate to the issue of “materiality” need to be fully 
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considered in updating and revising copyright law in the digital age. The above 
mentioned compromise would be legislatively feasible in that it would seek to serve both 
the interests of copyright holders and copy owners. Although the law is not going to do 
anything on its own, once enacted, the law can govern people’s behaviors and influence 
social norms, markets, and the architecture. Thus, the legislative approach in 
conjunctions with other approaches, such as technological solutions presented in this 
dissertation, can be a powerful tool in accomplishing an intended consequence. It is 
important to note that the existence of a well-functioning non-profit organization like 
SoundExchange suggests that managing a digital resale royalty is a feasible policy 
option.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
Two hurdles blocking the path to a digital first sale doctrine discussed earlier in 
this chapter deserve wider public attention and deeper academic investigation. Those 
problems relate not only to the discussion of expanding the first sale doctrine to digital 
works but also to copyright issues in general. The scope of the rights that digital content 
consumers enjoy is very likely to be determined by the ways in which those problems are 
discussed and resolved by pertinent stakeholders, scholars, policymakers and the public. 
As long as media and communication scholars are concerned about how legitimate 
competing interests between copyright holders and users of copyrighted works should be 
balanced in the digital age, then more research is needed to address those problems. Legal 
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scholarship has paid some attention to those two problems, mainly focusing on the need 
to revise the Copyright Act. Other issues also need vigorous attention.  
In challenging the thesis that the tangible nature of a copy is a key element to the 
first sale doctrine, media and communication scholarship may contribute by tackling the 
concept of “materiality” and by examining how the concept relates to copyright laws. 
Criticizing copyright law’s artificial distinction between a creative work and a physical 
copy of that copyrighted work, Burk (2013) argues that “[n]ew materialism might offer 
copyright a path out of such unsustainable distinctions…[by] recognizing the primacy of 
matter in the development of creative expression” (p. 2).  
Different disciplinary interests have addressed the concept of the materiality 
(Dourish & Mazmanian, 2011; Gillespie, Boczkowski, & Foot, 2014). Understanding the 
centrality of matter has become increasingly important for scholars in the humanities and 
science and technology studies (Burk, 2013), and this is particularly true in the case of 
“‘digital humanities,’ where the digitization of traditional expressive forms, or the 
development of new digital expressive forms, fundamentally implicates the connectivity 
of the virtual and the material” (Burk, 2013, p. 1). However, both communication and 
legal scholarship have paid scant attention to the concept of “materiality” in the context 
of copyright law. Given that copyright law’s distinction “between the immaterial ‘work’ 
and its fixation in a physical ‘copy’” has been increasingly challenged (Burk, 2013, p. 1), 
the concept of materiality needs to be better understood in the digital context, perhaps 
leading to more vigorous protection of parallel rights with digital content that are taken 
for granted with “physical” content. Conducting an extensive study of how different 
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disciplines define “materiality” in their own fashion would be an important starting point 
for better understanding the term and its implications.  
Digital technology has presented a host of challenges to copyright laws. One 
notable example of these challenges is the distinction between material and immaterial 
goods. The ReDigi court said that “the first sale defense is limited to material items, like 
records, that the copyright owner put into the stream of commerce” (p. 655). The ReDigi 
court held that because digital music files are not material items, the first sale defense 
cannot be expanded to digital works. However, this approach has its flaws. The first sale 
doctrine is applied to CDs and DVDs, and digital music files are nothing more than 
downloaded songs stored on a consumer’s hard drive. Songs embedded in tangible CDs 
are no different from songs stored on a hard drive in that both consist of a series of ones 
and zeros. Hard drives are also tangible and can wear down over time. In other words, 
hard drives are also tangible media and subject to degradation. Moreover, people use 
these formats in ways that emulate the ways they have interacted with other highly 
material forms over the years. Long (2008) offers a good example: 
Therefore, “to argue that there can be no such thing as a used digital media market 
merely because electronic transfers would deliver a potentially pristine copy of 
that work is to ignore the obvious: if a compact disc in good working condition is 
transferred in a used tangible goods market, the pristine underlying digital file 
which resides on that disc is delivered to the new user. Thus, it does not appear to 
be, on the surface, a valid argument that digital media is somehow less deserving 
of first sale protection merely because the ones and zeros residing on the hard 
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drive do not deteriorate, since the ones and zeros of the exact same song on a 
compact disc, which does receive first sale protection, do not deteriorate either. 
(Long, 2008, p. 1193) 
Another interesting area that deserves more academic exploration is the power of 
advocates in support of consumer rights. Awareness comes before any meaningful 
changes. In that regard, copyright reform movements are expected to take more active 
and strategic approaches for enhanced public awareness to revise copyright laws. 
Copyright activists have not always succeeded at reforming copyright law. However, at 
times their efforts have provided significant impetus for reshaping the debate surrounding 
intellectual property, including the rights of copyright holders. Online advocacy groups 
that support copyright reform have continually made their voices heard with the help of 
the Internet and communication networks (Herman, 2013; Postigo, 2012). The 
establishment of public interest groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Public Knowledge, and Creative Commons, demonstrates the general public’s growing 
awareness with regard to intellectual property issues. As noted earlier, after being 
confronted with unprecedented online protests, U.S. legislators withdrew their support, at 
least temporarily, for the following two proposed bills: “To promote prosperity, 
creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation by combating the theft of U.S. property, and 
for other purposes” (H. R. 3261) and “Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic 
Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011” (S. 968).87 It is very unlikely 
                                           
87 The two bills were commonly known as SOPA and PIPA. In 2011, SOPA was introduced in the House, 
and PIPA was introduced in the Senate.  
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that the current version of those two bills could be enacted without their undergoing 
significant changes. This outcry demonstrates ways copyright activism can play a role in 
shaping the terrain of copyright law.  
As legislative history has shown, adopting a digital first sale doctrine is unlikely 
to be successful unless the public’s support is presented. In that regard, the significance 
of digital rights movements becomes ever more imperative.88 Social movements 
surrounding intellectual property are worthy of deeper exploration in the digital context. 
Given judicial and legislative failures to act on copyright issues, these movements 
become increasingly imperative today to better protect copyright’s democratic values.  
Thus far, little attention has been paid to the question of who is shaping the debate 
over a digital first sale doctrine in Congress or elsewhere. What is needed is a thorough 
examination of power relations at play surrounding legislative efforts to expand the first 
sale doctrine to digital goods. Such an examination is needed to accomplish the goal of 
adopting a digital first sale doctrine. In doing so, researchers would do well to give 
                                           
88 As noted earlier, in the case of Used Soft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. (2012), the Court of 
Justice of the European Union held that consumers are allowed to resell their used software licenses. 
Although digital consumer rights movements over a digital first sale doctrine are in their early stages, by 
pointing to the UsedSoft precedent, the Federation of German Consumer Organizations (VZVB) has taken 
up this issue and sued Valve, an American entertainment software company, for not allowing its customers 
to resell their digital games (Plafke, 2013). A regional court in Berlin, Germany, dismissed VZVB’s lawsuit 
against Valve (Tach, 2014). As Brustein (2015) aptly notes, “unlike the established economics of 
secondhand CDs, DVDs, and game discs, the mechanics of selling used digital media are murky at best and 
not clearly legal” (para. 3). That being said, efforts to establish consumers’ rights to resell and transfer their 
digital content have been continued. For example, a startup called Tom Kabinet tried to open a secondary 
market for ebooks in the Netherlands (Meyer, 2014). In June 2015, Tom Kabinet launched a membership-
supported used ebook store in the Netherlands, enabling its members to “donate” their ebooks through the 
site. As a compensation for their donations, members are allowed to read other ebooks. New business 
models surrounding the usage of digital content may benefit when coupled with digital consumer rights 




serious attention to recent European and Canadian court decisions that favor consumers’ 
rights, including the resale of digital works, as well as consumer rights groups’ 
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